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Comment

Optimising SARS-CoV-2 pooled testing for low-resource settings

Several policy proposals to suppress severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) have been supporting mass individual testing in the USA and other countries.1–3 With restricted testing capacity, such testing is not only infeasible for low-income countries, but also an inefficient use of scarce testing kits that adversely affects the global supply of testing kits.

Group testing offers a viable alternative.^{4,5} The idea of this approach is to test samples drawn from multiple people at the same time. If the test is negative, everyone in the group is considered negative; if it returns positive, then at least one individual is infected with SARS-CoV-2. Here we discuss three different approaches to group testing that are benchmarked against individual testing. Approach 1 discusses prevalence estimation, and approaches 2 and 3 discuss strategies to relax lockdowns with maximum laboratory capacities of pooling 64 (approach 2) and ten samples (approach 3).

Approach 1 estimates the prevalence of SARS-CoV-2. Let us compare two methods: individual testing, in which a sample of *N* people (eg, 220 million) are tested for the virus, and group testing, in which *G* groups of *n* individuals are tested. A simple approach is to do onetime pooled sampling to identify negative and positive clusters. Given a prevalence of *p* we can calculate *n*. 6 However, we assume the maximum value of *n* to be 64 or fewer on the basis of a recent laboratory-based study in Israel.⁷ Notably, for prevalence estimation, the SARS-CoV-2 status of individuals does not need to be verified, which saves on tests.

For a prevalence of 1% or lower, where *n* is 64 and G is 3·44 million, 3·44 million tests will be needed. Thus, group testing is 64:1 more efficient than individual testing. Even when prevalence increases (eg, *p=*10%), we can still see that group testing requires fewer tests than individual testing. Under this scenario, the group size *n* (a plot of *n* against *p* is shown in the appendix [p 1]) can be thought of a measure of relative efficiency of group testing over individual testing in terms of tests needed; even pooling ten swabs will be ten times more efficient than individual testing.

Nearly three billion people worldwide have been in lockdown since the beginning of the SARS-CoV-2 epidemic, but since the beginning of May, 2020, there has been a push towards relaxing lockdowns.⁸ Consider instead the household as a basic unit of analysis. If one person is affected by SARS-CoV-2, the risk of infection among household members is likely to be very high.^{9,10} In approach 2, the size of the group to be tested is determined to maximise the number of households whose testing shows they are not infected. This approach will allow low-income countries to send healthy people back to work as soon as possible, jointly addressing concerns regarding increased hunger and disease. Such an approach yields *n* to be the inverse of *p.*⁶ Similar to approach 1, we assume maximum *n* to be 64 or fewer. If *p* is 1%, 34·12 million households will be divided among 0·53 million groups of 64 individuals, and 0·53 million tests will be required compared with 220 million needed under an individual-testing approach. Approach 2 is even more efficient than approach 1 for a wide range of prevalences (appendix p 1).

In practice, approach 2 could be implemented in various ways. For instance, we could use contact tracing to divide a country into susceptible groups (*S*), and non-susceptible groups (NS). In that case, we can redo the optimisation so that for *S*, with a higher *p*, *n* will be smaller and *G* will be larger, and for NS, with a lower *p*, *n* will be larger and *G* will be smaller. Hence, an area with a prevalence of 0·5% or less can be thought of as part of an NS group, and an area with a prevalence of 10% can be thought as being part of an *S* group (appendix p 1). We can see that our approach yields a more efficient solution to test not only the NS groups, but even the *S* groups*.*

In approach 3, we consider that low-income counties have restricted laboratories capacities so that no more than ten tests can be pooled. Under this approach, the estimates for the relative benefit curve with restricted See **Online** for appendix tests are still an order of magnitude larger (64·5:1) than that for the individual-testing approach, irrespective of testing in higher (p=10%) or lower (p=0·5%) prevalence areas (appendix p 1). Notably, pooled testing presents an efficient solution even for identifying individuals eg, for any positive pool, one can re-test subgroups

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within any positive pools until any positive individual or individuals are identified.⁶

Group testing is not only more feasible but is a more efficient method than individual testing by several orders of magnitude, and at a time when tests are in short supply globally, is a more socially responsible strategy.

We declare no competing interests.

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