Table 1.
Effects related to how experimental factors influence deceptive behavior.
| Χ2 | p | |
|---|---|---|
| Intercept | 9.4164 | 0.002*** |
| Political Orientation of the Priming | 3.2016 | 0.073 |
| Opponents’ Status | 13.7616 | 0.000*** |
| Priming Type | 0.1971 | 0.657 |
| Outcome of the game | 0.6039 | 0.437 |
| Political Orientation of the Priming*Opponents’ Status | 0.1276 | 0.720 |
| Political Orientation of the Priming*Priming Type | 0.9057 | 0.341 |
| Opponents’ Status*Priming Type | 0.6705 | 0.412 |
| Political Orientation of the Priming*Outcome of the game | 5.0632 | 0.024* |
| Opponents’ Status*Outcome of the game | 23.1529 | 0.000*** |
| Priming Type*Outcome of the game | 0.1858 | 0.666 |
| Political Orientation of the Priming*Opponents’ Status*Priming Type | 0.0123 | 0.911 |
| Political Orientation of the Priming*Opponents’ Status*Outcome of the game | 0.0151 | 0.902 |
| Political Orientation of the Priming*Priming Type*Outcome of the game | 5.1844 | 0.022* |
| Opponents’ Status*Priming Type*Outcome of the game | 2.9264 | 0.087 |
| Political Orientation of the Priming* Opponents’ Status* Outcome of the game* Priming Type | 0.6542 | 0.418 |