Table A1.
Recent Empirical Investigations of Last-Term Shirking in the United States
| Evidence of Shirking? | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Paper | Sample | Dependent Variable(s) | Ideology | Attendance | Casework | Oversight |
| Term limits | ||||||
| Alt et al. (2011) | Governors | Fiscal variables | ✓ | |||
| Bails and Tieslau (2000) | State legislatures | Fiscal variables | X | |||
| Besley (2006) | Governors | Fiscal variables; congruence | X | |||
| Besley and Case (1995) | Governors | Fiscal variables | ✓ | |||
| Besley and Case (2003) | Governors | Fiscal variables | ✓ | |||
| Cain and Kousser (2004) | California | Vote deviation; oversight | X | ✓ | ||
| Carey et. al. (1998) | State legislatures | Legislation; casework | X | ✓ | ||
| Carey et al. (2006) | State legislatures | Legislation; casework | X | ✓ | ||
| Clark and Williams (2013) | State legislatures | Vote deviation; attendance | ✓† | ✓ | ||
| Crain and Oakley (1995) | Governors | Capital investments | ✓ | |||
| Crain and Tollison (1993) | Governors | Fiscal volatility | ✓ | |||
| Cummins (2012) | State legislatures | Budget balance | ✓ | |||
| Erler (2007) | State legislatures | Fiscal variables | X | |||
| Keele et al. (2013) | State legislatures | Fiscal variables | X | |||
| Lewis (2012) | State legislatures | Fiscal variables | ✓ | |||
| Wright (2007) | State legislatures | Congruence; attendance | X | ✓ | ||
| Retirement | ||||||
| Carson et al. (2004) | Congress | Vote deviation | X | |||
| Figlio (1995) | Congress | Vote deviation; attendance | ✓ | ✓ | ||
| Lott (1987) | Congress | Vote deviation; attendance | X | ✓ | ||
| Lott (1990) | Congress | Attendance | ✓† | |||
| Lott and Bronars (1993) | Congress | Vote deviation | X | |||
| Rowley, Schneider and Tollison (1993) | Congress | Vote deviation | ||||
| Rothenberg and Sanders (2000) | Congress | Vote deviation; attendance | ✓ | ✓ | ||
| Snyder and Ting (2003) | Congress | Vote deviation | ✓† | |||
| Tien (2001) | Congress | Congruence | ✓ | |||
| Vanbeek (1991) | Congress | Vote deviation | X | |||
Notes:
✓
= results in study can be interpreted as evidence of shirking;
X
= no evidence of shirking;
†
= conclusion applies only to a subset of states or legislators. The four types of shirking are with respect to vote content (ideology), legislative attendance rates, constituency services (casework), and agency oversight. Cells are left blank if a study did not consider a given type of shirking. “Fiscal variables” include per capita state government expenditure and taxation (and sometimes borrowing costs and economic growth).