Table 1.
Potential impacts of healthcare system adaption during the COVID-19 pandemic on antimicrobial resistance
Affected area | Potential impact | Potential interventions |
---|---|---|
Increased focus on hand hygiene in hospitals | Reduction in the spread of AMR within healthcare settings | Ensure adequate resources and equipment available to support increase in demand (e.g. hand sanitizer) |
Ensure that routine surveillance systems remain in place to monitor rates of AMR within healthcare settings | ||
Social distancing in the community | Reduction in antimicrobial- seeking behaviours by members of the public, leading to reductions in antimicrobial prescribing | Reinforcement through public engagement |
Less opportunity for isolation of infectious/MDRO patients | Potential spread of MDRO | Hand hygiene and barrier nursing |
Potential for suboptimal management of other public health challenges (e.g. TB) | Sustaining MDRO surveillance | |
Staff and patient education and training | ||
Clustered cohorting of patients by risk factor (e.g. COVID-19 and CPE; COVID-19 and MRSA) | ||
Pre-emptive discharge of patients and cancellation of routine procedures to enhance bed capacity | Reduction in patients carrying MDRO, such as CPE, within the hospital environment | Stringent surveillance systems to detect and track the spread of AMR on reintroduction of these patients to healthcare services |
Diversion of all PPE for SARS-CoV-2 patients | Potential spread of MDRO | Hand hygiene and barrier nursing |
Sustaining MDRO surveillance | ||
Staff and patient education and training | ||
Appropriate stratification of PPE for different indications in line with evidence-based guidelines | ||
Increased rates of empirical antimicrobial therapy for patients presenting with respiratory symptoms | Potentiation of AMR | Clear guidelines for empirical therapy in suspected SARS-CoV-2 patients, specifically delineating the requirement for anti-pseudomonal and/or atypical coverage |
Education and emphasis on local stewardship within all healthcare workers | ||
Re-establishment of AMS oversight as soon as possible | ||
Upskilling of staff within the organization (e.g. nurses and pharmacy technicians) to take on broader roles and responsibilities | ||
Development of rapid diagnostics to support prescribing decisions, including a clear role for the use of procalcitonin to detect bacterial infection | ||
Ensuring that pandemic preparedness is part of future IPC and AMS strategy | ||
Increased rate of telemedicine within primary and secondary care and outpatient services | Possible increase in community rates of antimicrobial prescribing as part of safety-netting | Need for education and specialist support to develop AMS strategies for telemedicine |
Possible reduction in community antimicrobial prescriptions due to social distancing and reduced access to pharmacies | Engagement with community-based pharmacies, who may not be confident in screening secondary care medicines | |
Need for development in technology to support risk stratification | ||
Redeployment of antimicrobial stewardship teams to deal with healthcare strain due to pandemic | Loss of developed stewardship frameworks within local healthcare environments | Focus on education and responsibility of individual teams for promotion of appropriate antimicrobial usage |
Addressing current social hierarchies within healthcare and upskilling of staff within the organization (e.g. nurses and pharmacy technicians) to provide routine AMS services | ||
Integration of AMS/IPC teams | ||
Maintenance of institutional memory and team dynamics within organizations experiencing rapid reorganization and recruitment of staff | Loss of best practice and leadership within local team environments | Education and training |
Focus on fostering positive behaviours towards antimicrobials and infection control | ||
Ensuring that structures are agile enough to absorb new individuals with minimal impact of process and patient care | ||
Overcrowding associated with overloading of healthcare systems | Major driver for the transmission of AMR | Stringent surveillance systems to detect and track the spread of AMR |
Ensuring that routine MDRO screening still takes place in the face of increased viral screening | ||
Cohorting of high-risk patients | ||
Contingency plans for rapidly responding to detected outbreaks | ||
Depletion of structural resources | Loss of side-room capacity leading to propagation of SARS-CoV-2 infection due to cohorting of positive and negative patients | Stringent pathways for segregation of cases |
Rapid diagnostics to facilitate rapid identification |
AMS, antimicrobial stewardship; IPC, infection prevention and control.