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. 2020 May 20:dkaa194. doi: 10.1093/jac/dkaa194

Table 1.

Potential impacts of healthcare system adaption during the COVID-19 pandemic on antimicrobial resistance

Affected area Potential impact Potential interventions
Increased focus on hand hygiene in hospitals Reduction in the spread of AMR within healthcare settings Ensure adequate resources and equipment available to support increase in demand (e.g. hand sanitizer)
Ensure that routine surveillance systems remain in place to monitor rates of AMR within healthcare settings
Social distancing in the community Reduction in antimicrobial- seeking behaviours by members of the public, leading to reductions in antimicrobial prescribing Reinforcement through public engagement
Less opportunity for isolation of infectious/MDRO patients Potential spread of MDRO Hand hygiene and barrier nursing
Potential for suboptimal management of other public health challenges (e.g. TB) Sustaining MDRO surveillance
Staff and patient education and training
Clustered cohorting of patients by risk factor (e.g. COVID-19 and CPE; COVID-19 and MRSA)
Pre-emptive discharge of patients and cancellation of routine procedures to enhance bed capacity Reduction in patients carrying MDRO, such as CPE, within the hospital environment Stringent surveillance systems to detect and track the spread of AMR on reintroduction of these patients to healthcare services
Diversion of all PPE for SARS-CoV-2 patients Potential spread of MDRO Hand hygiene and barrier nursing
Sustaining MDRO surveillance
Staff and patient education and training
Appropriate stratification of PPE for different indications in line with evidence-based guidelines
Increased rates of empirical antimicrobial therapy for patients presenting with respiratory symptoms Potentiation of AMR Clear guidelines for empirical therapy in suspected SARS-CoV-2 patients, specifically delineating the requirement for anti-pseudomonal and/or atypical coverage
Education and emphasis on local stewardship within all healthcare workers
Re-establishment of AMS oversight as soon as possible
Upskilling of staff within the organization (e.g. nurses and pharmacy technicians) to take on broader roles and responsibilities
Development of rapid diagnostics to support prescribing decisions, including a clear role for the use of procalcitonin to detect bacterial infection
Ensuring that pandemic preparedness is part of future IPC and AMS strategy
Increased rate of telemedicine within primary and secondary care and outpatient services Possible increase in community rates of antimicrobial prescribing as part of safety-netting Need for education and specialist support to develop AMS strategies for telemedicine
Possible reduction in community antimicrobial prescriptions due to social distancing and reduced access to pharmacies Engagement with community-based pharmacies, who may not be confident in screening secondary care medicines
Need for development in technology to support risk stratification
Redeployment of antimicrobial stewardship teams to deal with healthcare strain due to pandemic Loss of developed stewardship frameworks within local healthcare environments Focus on education and responsibility of individual teams for promotion of appropriate antimicrobial usage
Addressing current social hierarchies within healthcare and upskilling of staff within the organization (e.g. nurses and pharmacy technicians) to provide routine AMS services
Integration of AMS/IPC teams
Maintenance of institutional memory and team dynamics within organizations experiencing rapid reorganization and recruitment of staff Loss of best practice and leadership within local team environments Education and training
Focus on fostering positive behaviours towards antimicrobials and infection control
Ensuring that structures are agile enough to absorb new individuals with minimal impact of process and patient care
Overcrowding associated with overloading of healthcare systems Major driver for the transmission of AMR Stringent surveillance systems to detect and track the spread of AMR
Ensuring that routine MDRO screening still takes place in the face of increased viral screening
Cohorting of high-risk patients
Contingency plans for rapidly responding to detected outbreaks
Depletion of structural resources Loss of side-room capacity leading to propagation of SARS-CoV-2 infection due to cohorting of positive and negative patients Stringent pathways for segregation of cases
Rapid diagnostics to facilitate rapid identification

AMS, antimicrobial stewardship; IPC, infection prevention and control.