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. Author manuscript; available in PMC: 2020 Oct 1.
Published in final edited form as: Soc Choice Welfare. 2019 Jan 24;52(4):709–739. doi: 10.1007/s00355-018-1168-7

Table 6.

Proportions of trials in which recipients rewarded or punished the allocator, respectively, conditional on the choice of the allocator

Dependent variable: dummy for whether the recipient rewarded the allocator
Dependent variable: dummy for whether the recipient punished the allocator
(1) Give to me (2) Give to other (3) Randomize (4) Give to me (5) Give to other (6) Randomize
Equal 0.44*** 0.05** 0.22*** 0.04** 0.33*** 0 11***
(0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03)
Poor 0.43*** 0.04** 0.10*** 0.04** 0.38*** 0.21***
(0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04)
Rich 0.43*** 011*** 0.16*** 0.05** 0.23*** 0.13***
(0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
Mean of dep. variable 0.43 0.07 0.16 0.04 0.31 0.15
F stat: equal = poor 0.01 0.52 12.43 0.00 4.47 7.36
p value: equal = poor 0.91 0.47 0.00*** 1.00 0.04** 0.01***
F stat: equal = rich 0.05 4.27 3.27 0.33 5.92 0.40
p value: equal = rich 0.83 0.04** 0.07* 0.57 0.02** 0.53
F stat: poor = rich 0.01 5.37 4.83 0.40 11.21 8.34
p value: poor = rich 0.93 0.02** 0.03** 0.53 0.00*** 0.01***
Observations 840 840 840 840 840 840

Proportions of trials in which recipients rewarded or punished the allocator, respectively, conditional on the choice of the allocator. Regressions are run without a constant term such that all coefficients directly capture proportions of trials. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered at the participant level. F statistics and corresponding p values from Wald tests of coefficient equality between β1 and β2, β1 and β3, as well as β2 and β3 are reported below the table.

*

Significant at the 10% confidence level,

**

significant at the 5% confidence level,

***

significant at the 1% confidence level