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. 2020 Oct 7;94:201–220. doi: 10.1016/j.econmod.2020.09.023

Table D.2b.

Number of advisors: differential effect of congestion at the declarative stage.

(1) (2)
Congestion declarative 0.0346
(0.0299)
−0.0277
(0.0353)
Congestion declarative x # Advisors: >0 and −0.0581∗
(0.0313)
0.0107
(0.0349)
Congestion declarative x # Advisors: >5 −0.0603∗
(0.0311)
0.0173
(0.0375)
# Advisors: >0 and ​≤ ​5 0.1371∗∗∗
(0.0525)
# Advisors: >5 0.1370∗∗∗
(0.0521)
Cash flow 0.0473∗∗∗
(0.0158)
0.0408∗∗
(0.0140)
EBIT/Assets 0.3441∗∗∗
(0.0193)
0.1205∗∗∗
(0.0314)
Debt Burden −0.0044∗
(0.0024)
−0.0042
(0.0032)
Debt/Assets 0.0784∗∗∗
(0.0055)
−0.0487∗∗∗
(0.0136)
Sales growth
0.0321∗∗∗
(0.0047)
0.0168∗∗∗
(0.0039)
Year FE Yes Yes
Province FE Yes No
Firm FE Wo Yes
Observations 46,486 46,247
R-squared 0.0401 0.4047

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

∗∗∗p ​< ​0.01, ∗∗p ​< ​0.05, ∗p ​< ​0.1.

Note: Table D.2b reports the estimated effect of the congestion rate in the civil jurisdiction at the declarative stage on the investment rate of firms, considering potential heterogenous effects across firms depending on the number of advisors that a company reports to have. The dependent variable is the investment rate. We account for year fixed effects. Standard errors are two-way clustered at both the firm and year level. In all regressions the firm-level controls are cash flows, EBIT/assets, debt burden, Debt/assets, and sales growth. Furthermore, we include province level controls: the number of lawyers, the number of courts over the total population, population growth, credit over GDP and the unemployment rate. Columns 1 incorporates province fixed effects. Columns 2 incorporates firm fixed effects. All variables are lagged by one year. The considered sample covers the period 2002–2016.