Table 3.
Effects of the efficacy of civil executions on investment.
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Congestion execution | −0.0020∗∗∗ (0.0005) |
−0.0018∗∗∗ (0.0006) |
−0.0013∗∗ (0.0005) |
−0.0012∗∗ (0.0004) |
−0.0010∗∗ (0.0005) |
|
| Cashflow | 0.0669∗∗∗ (0.0033) |
0.0669∗∗∗ (0.0033) |
0.0669∗∗∗ (0.0033) |
0.0669∗∗∗ (0.0033) |
0.0669∗∗∗ (0.0033) |
0.0669∗∗∗ (0.0033) |
| EBIT/Assets | 0.0234∗∗∗ (0.0047) |
0.0235∗∗∗ (0.0047) |
0.0235∗∗∗ (0.0047) |
0.0235∗∗∗ (0.0047) |
0.0234∗∗∗ (0.0047) |
0.0235∗∗∗ (0.0047) |
| Debt Burden | −0.0086∗∗∗ (0.0003) |
−0.0086∗∗∗ (0.0003) |
−0.0086∗∗∗ (0.0003) |
−0.0086∗∗∗ (0.0003) |
−0.0086∗∗∗ (0.0003) |
−0.0086∗∗∗ (0.0003) |
| Debt/Assets | −0.0317∗∗∗ (0.0028) |
−0.0317∗∗∗ (0.0028) |
−0.0317∗∗∗ (0.0028) |
−0.0317∗∗∗ (0.0028) |
−0.0317∗∗∗ (0.0028) |
−0.0317∗∗∗ (0.0028) |
| Sales growth | 0.0094∗∗∗ (0.0008) |
0.0094∗∗∗ (0.0008) |
0.0094∗∗∗ (0.0008) |
0.0094∗∗∗ (0.0008) |
0.0094∗∗∗ (0.0008) |
0.0094∗∗∗ (0.0008) |
| Number of Lawyers | −10.5356 (7.5013) |
−9.2084 (7.8005) |
−8.2718 (8.5081) |
1.6404 (10.9864) |
||
| Regional: #Courts/(population + firms) | 1.9123∗∗∗ (0.2610) |
1.9380∗∗∗ (0.2655) |
1.8780∗∗∗ (0.2559) |
1.4597∗∗∗ (0.3214) |
||
| Regional: Population growth | −0.2210∗∗ (0.0821) |
−0.1903∗∗ (0.0812) |
−0.1989∗∗ (0.0819) |
−0.2561∗∗∗ (0.0712) |
||
| Regional: Credit/CDP | 0.0132∗∗∗ (0.0032) | 0.0127∗∗∗ (0.0032) | 0.0126∗∗∗ (0.0031) | |||
| Regional: GDP growth | 0.0665∗∗ (0.0244) | |||||
| Regional: Unemployment |
−0.0009∗∗∗ (0.0002) |
|||||
| Year and firm FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Observations | 3,511,238 | 3,511,238 | 3,511,238 | 3,511,238 | 3,511,238 | 3,511,238 |
| R-squared | 0.3155 | 0.3155 | 0.3155 | 0.3156 | 0.3156 | 0.3156 |
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
Note: Table 3 reports the estimated effect of the congestion rate in the civil jurisdiction (execution stage) on the investment rate of firms, as specified in the equation presented in section 3. The dependent variable is the investment rate. We account for firm fixed effects by means of the within transformation. We also account for year fixed effects. Standard errors are two-way clustered at both the firm and year level. Column 1 presents a classical investment regression model where only firm-level variables are included. Column 2 augments the model by including our main regressor of interest, judicial congestion at the execution stage, measured at the province level. Columns 3 to 6 introduce further controls at the province level. All variables are lagged by one year. The considered sample covers the period 2002–2016.