Table 4.

Effects of the efficacy of the administrative jurisdiction on investment.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Congestion administrative	−0.0001 (0.0009)	−0.0001 (0.0009)	−0.0018∗∗ (0.0006)
Number of Lawyers		−10.3201 (7.9010)	0.9767 (11.3395)
Regional: #Courts/(population ​+ ​firms)		2.0226∗∗∗ (0.2454)	1.4689∗∗∗ (0.3085)
Regional: Population growth		−0.2217∗∗ (0.0872)	−0.2698∗∗∗ (0.0723)
Regional: Credit/GDP			0.0143∗∗∗ (0.0030)
Regional: Unemployment			−0.0010∗∗∗ (0.0002)
Year and firm FE	YES	YES	YES
Observations	3,511,238	3,511,238	3,511,238
R-squared	0.3155	0.3155	0.3156

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

∗∗∗p ​< ​0.01, ∗∗p ​< ​0.05, ∗p ​< ​0.1.

Note: Table 4 reports the estimated effect of the congestion rate in the administrative jurisdiction on the investment rate of firms, as specified in the equation presented in section 3. The dependent variable is the investment rate. We account for firm fixed effects by means of the within transformation. We also account for year fixed effects. Standard errors are two-way clustered at both the firm and year level. In all regressions, the firm-level controls are cash flows, EBIT/assets, debt burden, Debt/assets, and sales growth. Columns 1 includes our main regressor of interest, the congestion rate in the administrative jurisdiction. Columns 2 and 3 introduce further controls at the province level. All variables are lagged by one year. The considered sample covers the period 2002–2016.