Table 5.
Effects of the efficacy of the administrative jurisdiction on investment when civil justice efficacy is also considered.
| (1) | (2) | (3) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Congestion administrative | −0.0001 (0.0008) |
0.0000 (0.0008) |
−0.0017∗∗ (0.0006) |
| Congestion declarative | −0.0143∗∗∗ (0.0029) |
−0.0145∗∗∗ (0.0030) |
−0.0068∗∗ (0.0029) |
| Number of Lawyers | −6.4252 (8.9479) |
1.9210 (11.8845) |
|
| Regional: #Courts/(population + firms) | 2.0529∗∗∗ (0.2274) |
1.5266∗∗∗ (0.2892) |
|
| Regional: Population growth | −0.2154∗∗ (0.0769) |
−0.2625∗∗∗ (0.0710) |
|
| Regional: Credit/GDP | 0.0134∗∗∗ (0.0031) |
||
| Regional: Unemployment |
−0.0009∗∗∗ (0.0003) |
||
| Year and firm FE | YES | YES | YES |
| Observations | 3,511,238 | 3,511,238 | 3,511,238 |
| R-squared | 0.3155 | 0.3155 | 0.3156 |
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
Note: This table reports the estimated effect of the congestion rate in the administrative jurisdiction on the investment rate of firms, after further controlling for the congestion rate in the civil jurisdiction (declarative stage). The dependent variable is the investment rate. We account for firm fixed effects by means of the within transformation. We also account for year fixed effects. Standard errors are two-way clustered at both the firm and year level. In all regressions the firm-level controls are cash flows, EBIT/assets, debt burden, Debt/assets, and sales growth. Columns 1 includes our two measures of congestion. Columns 2 and 3 introduce additional controls at the province level. All variables are lagged by one year. The considered sample covers the period 2002–2016.