Table 2.
Why false hope is not a problem, as derived from Blumenthal‐Barby40
| Arguments against false hope | Why this argument is not valida |
|---|---|
| Violates: informed consent | False hope does not always mean a lack of knowledge: Patients can choose to believe information and choose not to be informed |
| False hope through self‐deception does not undermine accuracy of decisions | |
| Violates: truth‐preparedness | False hope creates happy feelings that may outweigh harms, while consequential claims of being less prepared for the truth do not have empirical evidence to support it |
| Violates: opportunities | False hope does not create as many opportunity costs as critics contend, and the argument around sacrificing opportunities is an empirical claim that cannot be substantiated |
| False hope can lead to increasing opportunities by pleasant experiences motivating actions (e.g., by not believing your husband has an affair, you stay married to your husband) | |
| Violates: instrumental value of truth | False hope can be practically rational and does not always amount to epistemic irrationality–False hope can make you happy and there’s nothing wrong with being happy |
a
According to Blumenthal‐Barby.