Table 1.
The main characteristics of the studies reviewed in this SR.
| Study ID | The main objective | Study Design | Meteorology Parameters |
The main key finding | Recommendations | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PM | RH | Tem | |||||
| (Santarpia et al., 2020a), USA | Detection of the virus in air and surface | Experimental | N* | N | N | Viral contamination confirmed in all samples | During curing for COVID-19 patients, airborne isolation precautions were recommended. |
| (Masoumbeigi et al., 2020), Iran | Detection of the virus in hospital indoor air | Experimental | N | R | R | The occurrence of the virus in hospital air samples was not confirmed. | Due to the close contact with patients, the protection of medical staff and healthcare workers must be considered according to international and national strict guidelines. |
| (Santarpia et al., 2020b), USA | Transmission potential of SARS-CoV-2 in Viral Shedding | Experimental | N | N | N | Air samples and toilet facilities had evidence of viral contamination | Indirect contact through airborne transmission played a role in the spread of disease, therefore the use of airborne isolation precautions was supported |
| (Kim et al., 2020), Korea | Detection of SARS-CoV-2 in hospital indoor air | Experimental | N | N | N | There is no positive results for the SARS-CoV-2 RNA in the indoor air samples | They suggest that remote air transmission (more than 2 m) of SARS-CoV-2 from hospitalized COVID-19 patient is uncommon. |
| (Liu et al., 2020), China | Detection of SARS-CoV-2 in two Hospitals |
Experimental | N | N | N | SARS-CoV-2 RNA was detected in isolation wards, ventilated patient rooms, toilet areas, and medical staff areas. | Room ventilation, open space, sanitization of protective apparel, and proper use and disinfection of toilet areas can effectively limit the concentration of SARS-CoV-2 RNA in aerosols |
| (Faridi et al., 2020), Iran | Detection of SARS-CoV-2 in indoor air environment of hospital | Experimental | R* | R | R | All indoor air samples were negative. | Implement in vivo experiments using actual patient cough, breath, and sneeze aerosols to evaluate the possibility of production of the airborne size carrier aerosols and the viability fraction of the embedded virus in these carrier aerosols. |
| (Kenarkoohi et al., 2020), Iran | The monitoring of hospital indoor air environment for the detection of SARS-CoV-2 virus | Experimental | R | R | R | They indicated two viral RNA positive air samples in the indoor air environment of the hospital were found. | More studies and quantitative analysis are required to determine the role of actual cough mechanisms in the emission of airborne size carrier aerosols. |
| (Razzini et al., 2020), Italy | Detection of SARS-CoV-2 RNA in hospital indoor air | Experimental | N | N | N | The results showed that all the indoor air samples collected from the ICU and the corridor as a contaminated area, were positive. | The authors recommended that strict disinfection precautions, protective measures and hand hygiene be taken for medical personnel and isolation from airborne transmission. |
| (Chia et al., 2020), Singapore | Detection of SARS-CoV-2 in indoor air environment of hospital rooms of infected patients | Experimental | R | R | R | Detection of SARS- CoV-2 PCR-positive particles of sizes more than 4 μm and 1–4 μm in two rooms. Although particles in this size range have the potential to remain in the air longer. | Detailed epidemiological studies of the outbreak are required to determine the relative contribution of various routes of transmission and their correlation with factors at the patient-level. Implement experiments to collect more data on virus viability and infectivity to confirm potential airborne spread of the virus. |
| (Stadnytskyi et al., 2020), Philadelphia | Potential importance of small speech droplets in SARS-CoV-2 airborne transmission | Experimental | N | N | N | The normal speaking could be a substantial probability that causes airborne virus transmission in confined environments | – |
| (Orenes-Piñero et al., 2020), Spain | Evidences of SARS-CoV-2 virus air transmission indoors | Experimental | N | N | N | Surfaces could not be touched by patients or health workers, so viral spreading was unequivocally produced by air transmission. | These data support the recommendation to carry out frequent disinfection of the surfaces of hospitalized patients. |
| (Wang and Yoneda, 2020), Japan | Determination of the optimal penetration factor for evaluating the invasion process of aerosols | Simulation | R | N | N | The penetration mechanism was explored by the proposed optimal penetration factor and the error analysis of each method. They also provided a rapid and accurate assessment method for preventing and controlling the spread of the epidemic. | – |
| (Buonanno et al., 2020), Italy | Estimation of airborne SARS-CoV-2 emission | Simulation | N | N | N | Proper ventilation was a key role in the containment of the virus in indoor environments | – |
| (Vuorinen et al., 2020), Finland | Simulation aerosol transport for SARS-CoV-2 transmission in inhalation indoors | Simulation | N | N | N | The exposure time to inhale O(100) aerosols could range from O(1 s) to O(1 min) or even to O(1 h) depending on the situation | – |
N*= Not reported R*=Reported.