Skip to main content
. 2020 Dec 10;10:21761. doi: 10.1038/s41598-020-78546-1

Figure 3.

Figure 3

Social preferences and prior expectations across age cohorts. Social preferences and prior expectations are features that may account for choices in the games. (a) Indifference points in the Ultimatum Game as a measure of disadvantageous inequality aversion and (b) Indifference points in the Dictator Game as a measure of advantageous inequality aversion were used as social preference measures. (c) Prior expectations for the Trust Game, with higher values indicating greater expectations that others are Trustworthy. (d) Prior expectations for the Coordination Game, with higher values indicating greater expectations that the others are Friendly (i.e., not tending to prioritise their own payoffs over those of others). In panels a-d, error bars show s.e.m. (e) Mediation model for the effect of age on trust behaviour towards players from the Trustworthy environment (controlled for trust choices towards players of the Untrustworthy environment), via disadvantageous inequality aversion. (f) Mediation model for the effect of age on coordination behaviour (i.e., accepting a disadvantage) when confronted with players from the Unfriendly environment (controlled for accepting disadvantages when playing with the Friendly environment), via disadvantageous inequality aversion. Note in mediation models: c = total effect, c’ = direct effect; values are standardized regression coefficients of direct effects, and asterisks indicate significance levels (*P < 0.05, **P < 0.01, ***P < 0.001).