

COMMENTARY



Vaccine safety – is the SARS-CoV-2 vaccine any different?

Noam Tau ^{a,b}, Dafna Yahav ^{b,c}, and Daniel Shepshelovich ^{b,d}

^aDepartment of Diagnostic Imaging, Sheba Medical Center, Ramat Gan, Israel; ^bSackler School of Medicine, Tel-Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel; ^cInfectious Diseases Unit, Rabin Medical Center, Beilinson Hospital, Petach Tikva, Israel; ^dDepartment is Internal Medicine I, Tel Aviv Sourasky Medical Center, Tel Aviv, Israel

ABSTRACT

Vaccines have changed modern medicine, and are a mainstay in reducing morbidity and mortality from infections. Our research group recently published a study in which we found that vaccines approved by the US Food and Drugs Administration were safe with few clinically important post-approval adverse effects. The current COVID-19 pandemic presents regulators with the unprecedented challenge of balancing a public demand for the rapid development and approval of a safe and effective SARS-CoV-2 vaccine without compromising the strict pre-marketing requirements used for previous vaccines. Here, we review the approval process and safety profiles of FDA approved vaccines and discuss some of the challenges currently facing the FDA regarding the SARS-CoV-2 vaccine approval.

ARTICLE HISTORY

Received 7 September 2020
Accepted 22 September 2020

Keywords

Vaccine; VAERS; FDA; safety; COVID-19; SARS-CoV-2

Introduction

Vaccines are among the most important advances in modern medicine. Few other medical developments have reduced child morbidity and mortality from infectious diseases such as mumps, measles, rubella, and poliomyelitis.^{1–3} Recent years have shown several outbreaks of vaccine-preventable diseases, mostly in unvaccinated individuals due to guardian hesitancy.^{4,5} Moreover, vaccination rates have dropped even further during the current ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, which might in turn result in even larger outbreaks of those vaccine-preventable diseases.⁶ Public trust in vaccine safety has become a cornerstone of public health measures, and as such, the US National Institutes of Health and Centers for Disease Control (CDC) have put major efforts in communicating vaccine safety to the public, both by sharing information regarding the rigorous vaccine approval studies and by constantly assessing emerging post-approval safety data.⁷

Following the 1986 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act,⁸ the US Food and Drugs Administration (FDA) and CDC have initiated the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS) program, designed to facilitate post-marketing safety monitoring of FDA-approved vaccines.^{9,10} The FDA receives more than 30,000 annual VAERS reports, and these are scrutinized for any unexpected adverse events patterns. VAERS reports, alongside with clinical trials and collaboration with databases such as the Clinical Immunization Safety Assessment Project,¹¹ enable the FDA to rapidly detect rare or long-term vaccine safety issues undetected in the initial approval studies. Importantly, these measures can also serve as a tool to increase public trust in vaccines.¹²

Are vaccines really safe?

A recent study published by our research group reported on the post-approval safety modifications of FDA-approved vaccines over a 20-year period (1996–2015).¹³ We have also described data sources triggering these label modifications.

During the study period, 57 vaccines were approved by the FDA, including vaccines for seasonal influenza ($n = 21$, 37%), and several vaccine combinations for tetanus, diphtheria, poliomyelitis, pertussis, *Haemophilus influenzae* type b, hepatitis A and B ($n = 16$, 28%). Most vaccine approvals ($n = 52$, 93%) were supported by randomized controlled trials (RCTs) which included a median of 4,161 persons (IQR, 2,204 to 8,634). Median safety follow-up was 1.5 months.

A total of 58 post-approval safety-related label changes were identified, comprising 49 warnings and precautions, 8 contraindications, and 1 safety-related withdrawal. Most of these were not clinically important. The most common issue which triggered safety profile modifications was expansion of population restrictions ($n = 21$, 36%), including immunocompromised patients, patients with specific preexisting medical conditions, pregnant women, and premature infants. There were also 13 (22%) safety modifications related to allergies, mostly due to changes in latex-containing packaging. Twelve (21%) post-marketing safety-related label changes involved risk of post-vaccination syncope episodes. The single safety-related vaccine withdrawal (RotaShield; Wyeth Laboratories) occurred within a year of initial marketing approval and was triggered by safety signals of an increased risk of less than 0.05% for bowel intussusception identified through VAERS shortly following marketing approval.^{14,15}

The excellent safety profile of FDA-approved vaccines underlines both the high-quality vaccine approval process

which relies on high-quality, large-scale RCTs to identify any potential safety issues prior to vaccine approval, and the robustness of VAERS and similar post-marketing vaccine safety surveillance programs. The rare safety issue leading to the single identified vaccine withdrawal was swiftly identified by the existing post-market surveillance program. The safety profile of FDA approved vaccines compares favorably to that of FDA approved drugs.¹⁶

SARS-CoV-2 and COVID-19

COVID-19 was declared a pandemic by the World Health Organization (WHO) in March 11, 2020, less than 3 months after receiving initial signals of a new type of viral pneumonia in Wuhan, China. More than 30 million people have been diagnosed with an infection caused by the novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2, resulting in more than one million deaths.¹⁷ Recently, it was reported that COVID-19 has become the number 3 cause of death in the US.¹⁸ The current pandemic has proven to be more than just a global medical crisis, and the past few months have seen a global economic recession and a staggering social burden caused by prolonged closures and social distancing.^{19–21} These ongoing events have had an even larger effect on vulnerable sectors, such as the elderly and some racial minorities.^{22,23}

SARS-CoV-2 vaccine development – business as usual?

The development of the SARS-CoV-2 vaccine is underway in an unprecedented rate. The virus' genetic sequence became publicly available within 2 weeks of initial recognition of the novel clinical entity.²⁴ A protocol for detection of SARS-CoV-2 using reverse transcription–polymerase chain reaction was published a few days later.²⁵ As of September 3, 2020, at least 176 vaccine candidates were being studied, and 34 of these were already in various stages of clinical assessment, some already enrolling patients to large RCTs.^{26,27} Some of these candidates use tried-and-tested technologies (e.g. protein subunit or an inactivated virus), while others utilize new techniques which have yet to be used in large-scale human vaccine production (e.g. viral vectors, mRNA, or DNA based).²⁸ The pace of vaccine development, driven by the urgent, unmet clinical need and large financial incentives is even more impressive when compared to the average pace of vaccine development, which lasts 10 to 15 years from pre-clinical studies to full marketing approval.^{29,30}

This unprecedented development and testing schedule might raise concerns regarding the thoroughness and quality of testing the efficacy and safety of the SARS-CoV-2 vaccine candidates.

Should the same high safety threshold be used for the COVID-19 vaccine?

The FDA has published a guidance document to industry regarding the development of vaccines for COVID-19.³¹ In the document, the FDA states that “The general safety evaluation of COVID-19 vaccines, including the size of the safety database to

support vaccine licensure, should be no different than for other preventive vaccines for infectious diseases.” In response to the guidance, two phase III studies have recently began patient recruitment, with an accrual goal of 30,000 patients each, a number reflecting the fact that there are no previously approved COVID-19 vaccines for efficacy and safety comparison.^{32,33} Meanwhile, as these trials are ongoing, news of successful development of a viral-vector vaccine (Sputnik V) emerged from the Gamaleya Research Institute of Epidemiology and Microbiology in Russia.³⁴ No results were published for the vaccine's phase I and II trials, and Russian authorities stated that phase III trials will be ongoing during vaccine production and dissemination.³⁵

These two different approaches to vaccine development in the face of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic reflect different priorities regarding the preferred balance between rapid vaccine approval with incomplete safety data versus slower approval following the assessment of mature data from large RCTs. The choice between these approaches raises issues extending far beyond the scope of pure medical research.

Large-scale phase III RCTs will provide the best safety and efficacy data for vaccine candidates and will likely result in a vaccine with few, if any, unexpected post-marketing safety issues, as shown by the FDA's impressive track record. These studies are also likely to serve as an important tool in improving public trust in the upcoming vaccines, a trust level which is currently wanting.^{36–38} Vaccine-skepticism might be further amplified if the Sputnik V vaccine proves to have a less-than-optimal safety record, and may in turn result in a significant number of people choosing not to get vaccinated by any COVID-19 vaccine, thereby perpetuating the current pandemic. This potential increase in vaccine hesitancy might also affect rates of non-COVID vaccination. From this perspective, The FDA should approve a new vaccine only following the successful completion of large phase III RCTs, with ample safety follow-up periods. The main limitation of this approach is the relatively long timeframes required for the recruitment, follow-up, and data analysis of these trials, and the potential price in human lives, social distancing, and economic havoc increasing with every day without an approved vaccine. The FDA is faced with a hard choice, weighing safety and public trust against rapid approval and dissemination of a potentially lifesaving vaccine. Previous experience with similar regulatory dilemmas is limited to few examples, including the case of the rapid H1N1 vaccine development in 2009, resulting in unexpected side effects.^{39,40}

During the current pandemic, the FDA approved various treatments for COVID-19 through the Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) framework, in order to rapidly authorize several novel treatments with insufficient evidence for regular approval.⁴¹ On a recent interview, FDA commissioner Dr. Stephen Hahn revealed that the FDA is considering giving an EUA status to upcoming vaccine candidates.⁴² Granting a SARS-CoV-2 vaccine EUA status will represent a huge gamble for the FDA. Should the vaccine prove to be safe and effective, the benefits to vulnerable populations and to society will be considerable and the FDA will be lauded as a flexible, nimble, focused and effective organization, able to rapidly adjust to new conditions and make informed choices in the face of uncertainty. However, if the new vaccine will

prove to be less effective than anticipated, or if it will be associated with a less favorable safety profile than reflected by the limited pre-approval data, the damage to the FDA's reputation and to the perceived safety profile of vaccines might be unprecedented.

The COVID-19 crisis extends far beyond the realm of a purely medical event, and carries vast social, financial, regulatory, and political implications. Policies and priorities involved in the development and approval of the COVID-19 vaccine should not be discussed only among medical professionals and administrators, and should not remain in the territory of medical regulators. Although political involvement in the medical sphere is usually undesired, the current situation demands a new way of thinking. Just as the tools used to curb the pandemic are not restricted to the medical domain (e.g. social distancing, bans on international travel, large-scale quarantines, mandatory face masking), the decisions regarding the best method of achieving control over the pandemic should not be left only in the hands of physicians and medical authorities. Shared decision-making regarding the acceptable safety margins and efficacy thresholds for upcoming vaccines may be the best way forward. Transparent discussions between vaccine experts, regulators, financial and political leaders, and public representatives can increase the trust in the decision process and its results.

Conclusions

Vaccines are remarkably safe, with few clinically significant post-approval adverse events and a robust post marketing surveillance program. Using the same strict approval standards for the SARS-CoV-2 vaccine will lead to a delayed approval of a safer vaccine compared to an approval based on incomplete, preliminary data. Weighing these alternatives and choosing a path forward is matter of an already overdue public discussion.

Disclosure of potential conflicts of interest

No potential conflicts of interest were disclosed.

ORCID

Noam Tau  <http://orcid.org/0000-0003-0849-1708>

Dafna Yahav  <http://orcid.org/0000-0003-3181-9791>

Daniel Shepshelovich  <http://orcid.org/0000-0002-9145-618X>

References

1. Armstrong GL. Trends in infectious disease mortality in the United States during the 20th century. *JAMA*. 1999;281(1):61–66. doi:10.1001/jama.281.1.61.
2. Roush SW; Group and the V-PDTW. Historical comparisons of morbidity and mortality for vaccine-preventable diseases in the United States. *JAMA*. 2007;298(18):2155–63. doi:10.1001/jama.298.18.2155.
3. McGovern ME, Canning D. Vaccination and all-cause child mortality from 1985 to 2011: global evidence from the demographic and health surveys. *Am J Epidemiol*. 2015;182:791–98. doi:10.1093/aje/kwv125.
4. Phadke VK, Bednarczyk RA, Omer SB. Vaccine Refusal and Measles Outbreaks in the US. *JAMA*. 2020 Aug 14. [accessed 2020 Aug 31]. doi:10.1001/jama.2020.14828.
5. Gardner L, Dong E, Khan K, Sarkar S. Persistence of US measles risk due to vaccine hesitancy and outbreaks abroad. *Lancet Infect Dis*. 2020 Jul 30. [accessed 2020 Aug 31]. doi:10.1016/S1473-3099(20)30522-3.
6. Santoli JM, Lindley MC, DeSilva MB, Kharbanda EO, Daley MF, Galloway L, Gee J, Glover M, Herring B, Kang Y, et al. Effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on routine pediatric vaccine ordering and administration - United States, 2020. *MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep*. 2020;69:591–93. doi:10.15585/mmwr.mm6919e2.
7. National Institutes of Health (NIH). Building trust in vaccines; 2019 Nov 25 [accessed 2020 Aug 31]. <https://www.nih.gov/about-nih/what-we-do/science-health-public-trust/perspectives/science-health-public-trust/building-trust-vaccines>
8. [USC02] 42 USC CHAPTER 6A, SUBCHAPTER XIX: VACCINES. [accessed 2020 Aug 31]. <https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?path=/prelim@title42/chapter6A/subchapter19&edition=prelim>
9. Shimabukuro TT, Nguyen M, Martin D, DeStefano F. Safety monitoring in the vaccine adverse event reporting system (VAERS). *Vaccine*. 2015;33:4398–405. doi:10.1016/j.vaccine.2015.07.035.
10. Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS); 2020 Jul 23 [accessed 2020 Aug 31]. <https://www.cdc.gov/vaccinesafety/ensuring-safety/monitoring/vaers/index.html>
11. CDC. Clinical immunization safety assessment (CISA) project; 2020 Jul 7 [accessed 2020 Aug 31]. <https://www.cdc.gov/vaccinesafety/ensuring-safety/monitoring/cisa/index.html>
12. Scherer LD, Shaffer VA, Patel N, Zikmund-Fisher BJ. Can the vaccine adverse event reporting system be used to increase vaccine acceptance and trust? *Vaccine*. 2016;34(21):2424–29. doi:10.1016/j.vaccine.2016.03.087.
13. Tau N, Yahav D, Shepshelovich D. Postmarketing safety of vaccines approved by the U.S. food and drug administration: a cohort study. *Ann Intern Med*. 2020 Jul 28 [[accessed 2020 Aug 31]];173(6):445–49. doi:10.7326/M20-2726.
14. CDC. VPD-VAC/Rotavirus/Rotashield and Intussusception Historical info; 2019 Apr 15 [accessed 2020 Aug 31]. <https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/vpd-vac/rotavirus/vac-rotashield-historical.htm>
15. CDC. Withdrawal of rotavirus vaccine recommendation. [accessed 2020 Aug 31]. <https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm4843a5.htm>
16. Tau N, Shochat T, Gafer-Gvili A, Tibau A, Amir E, Shepshelovich D. Association between data sources and us food and drug administration drug safety communications. *JAMA Intern Med*. 2019 Sep 3 [[accessed 2020 Aug 31]];179(11):1590. doi:10.1001/jamainternmed.2019.3066.
17. Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center. COVID-19 map. [accessed 2020 Sep 6]. <https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html>
18. The Hill. Coleman J. COVID-19 now No. 3 cause of death in US; 2020 Aug 17 [accessed 2020 Aug 31]. <https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/512427-covid-19-now-no-3-cause-of-death-in-us>
19. World Bank. COVID-19 to plunge global economy into worst recession since world war II; 2020 Jun 8 [accessed 2020 Sep 3]. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2020/06/08/covid-19-to-plunge-global-economy-into-worst-recession-since-world-war-ii>
20. Time. Bremmer I. The next global depression is coming and optimism won't slow it down; 2020 Aug 6. [accessed 2020 Aug 31]. <https://time.com/5876606/economic-depression-coronavirus/>
21. Oxford Law Faculty. Launch of report into child to parent violence during the pandemic; 2020 Aug 8. [accessed 2020 Aug 31]. <https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/news/2020-08-18-launch-report-child-parent-violence-during-pandemic>
22. Calderón-Larrañaga A, Dekhtyar S, Vetrano DL, Bellander T, Fratiglioni L. COVID-19: risk accumulation among biologically and socially vulnerable older populations. *Ageing Res Rev*. 2020 Aug 17. [accessed 2020 Aug 31]. doi:10.1016/j.arr.2020.101149.
23. Alcendor DJ. Racial disparities-associated COVID-19 mortality among minority populations in the US. *J Clin Med*. 2020 Jul 30. [accessed 2020 Aug 31]. doi:10.3390/jcm9082442.
24. NCBI. Wuhan seafood market pneumonia virus isolate Wuhan-Hu-1, complete genome; 2020 Jan 12. [accessed 2020 Aug 31]. <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/nucleotide/MN908947.1>

25. WHO. Corman V, Bleicker T, Brünink S, Drosten C, Landt O, Koopmans M, Mc E, Zambon M. Diagnostic detection of Wuhan coronavirus 2019 by real-time RT-PCR; 2020 Jan 13. [accessed 2020 Aug 31]. https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronavirus/wuhan-virus-assay-v1991527e5122341d99287a1b17c111902.pdf?sfvrsn=d381fc88_2
26. WHO. Draft landscape of COVID-19 candidate vaccines; 2020 Sep 3. [accessed 2020 Sep 3]. <https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/draft-landscape-of-covid-19-candidate-vaccines>
27. Kaur SP, Gupta V. COVID-19 Vaccine: a comprehensive status report. *Virus Res.* 2020 Aug 13. [accessed 2020 Aug 31]. doi:10.1016/j.virusres.2020.198114.
28. Shin MD, Shukla S, Chung YH, Beiss V, Chan SK, Ortega-Rivera OA, Wirth DM, Chen A, Sack M, Pokorski JK, et al. COVID-19 vaccine development and a potential nanomaterial path forward. *Nat Nanotechnol.* 2020;15:646–55. doi:10.1038/s41565-020-0737-y.
29. Bregu M, Draper SJ, Hill AVS, Greenwood BM. Accelerating vaccine development and deployment: report of a royal society satellite meeting. *Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci.* 2011;366:2841–49. doi:10.1098/rstb.2011.0100.
30. IFPMA. The complex journey of a vaccine; 2014 Jan 17. [accessed 2020 Aug 31]. <https://www.ifpma.org/resource-centre/the-complex-journey-of-a-vaccine-2/>
31. FDA Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research. Development and licensure of vaccines to prevent COVID-19; 2020 Jun 30. [accessed 2020 Aug 31]. <https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/search-fda-guidance-documents/development-and-licensure-vaccines-prevent-covid-19>
32. ClinicalTrials.gov. Phase III double-blind, placebo-controlled study of AZD1222 for the prevention of COVID-19 in adults; 2020 Aug 18. [accessed 2020 Aug 31]. <https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/NCT04516746>
33. ClinicalTrials.gov. A study to evaluate efficacy, safety, and immunogenicity of mRNA-1273 vaccine in adults aged 18 years and older to prevent COVID-19; 2020 Jul 14. [accessed 2020 Aug 31]. <https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/NCT04470427>
34. Official website vaccine against COVID-19 Sputnik V. [accessed 2020 Aug 31]. <https://sputnikvaccine.com/about-vaccine/>
35. TASS. Third stage of Russia's coronavirus vaccine research may begin in 7-10 days; 2020 Aug 16. [accessed 2020 Aug 31]. <https://tass.com/coronavirus-outbreak-in-china/1190127>
36. European Commission. Statement by Vice – president Jyrki Katainen on European Immunisation Week. Vaccination: time to speak out against disinformation; 2019 Apr 26 [accessed 2020 Aug 31]. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_19_2254
37. AP NEWS. AP-NORC poll: half of Americans would get a COVID-19 vaccine; 2020 May 28. [accessed 2020 Aug 31]. <https://apnews.com/dacdc8bc428dd4df6511bfa259cfec44>
38. Neumann-Böhme S, Varghese NE, Sabat I, Barros PP, Brouwer W, van Exel J, Schreyögg J, Stargardt T. Once we have it, will we use it? A European survey on willingness to be vaccinated against COVID-19. *Eur J Health Econ.* 2020;21:977–82. doi:10.1007/s10198-020-01208-6.
39. Verstraeten T, Cohet C, Dos Santos G, Ferreira GL, Bollaerts K, Bauchau V, Shinde V. Pandemrix™ and narcolepsy: a critical appraisal of the observational studies. *Hum Vaccin Immunother.* 2016;12:187–93. doi:10.1080/21645515.2015.1068486.
40. Edwards K, Lambert P-H, Black S. Narcolepsy and pandemic influenza vaccination: what we need to know to be ready for the next pandemic. *Pediatr Infect Dis J.* 2019;38:873–76. doi:10.1097/INF.0000000000002398.
41. FDA. Office of the commissioner. Emergency use authorization; 2020 Aug 31 [accessed 2020 Aug 23]. <https://www.fda.gov/emergency-preparedness-and-response/mcm-legal-regulatory-and-policy-framework/emergency-use-authorization>
42. JAMA. COVID-19 and the FDA; 2020 Jul 30 [accessed 2020 Aug 31]. <https://edhub.ama-assn.org/jn-learning/video-player/18529255>