Figure 3.

False uniqueness and false consensus (heterodirectional biases) lead to deadlocks resulting in individual and collective suboptimal configurations

We show the position of the equilibrium points associated with different biases. Dashed lines represent unstable equilibria, and full lines represent stable equilibria. Positive (negative) values of the gradient of selection, in white (gray), indicate a tendency for the number of cooperators to increase (decrease). False uniqueness (χ < 0, left) is characterized by the existence of a stable configuration in which cooperators and defectors coexist, and the population is unable to solve the coordination dilemma. From the social-optimum point of view, this is the worst-case scenario because individuals contribute but not enough to surpass the threshold. A second—higher—coordination needs to be achieved for the population to reach a fully cooperative state. False consensus introduces a region where individuals believe there are no incentives to changing strategy even though the population is in a suboptimal configuration from the individual and collective point of view. In such a region, individuals do not change strategies, and the gradient of selection is 0 (neutral region, pink). Again, a second, higher, coordination needs to be achieved for the population to reach a fully cooperative state. Same parameters as Figure 1, with M = 8 and δ = −χ.