Figure 5.

False uniqueness originates a stable cooperator-defector coexistence, whereas false consensus introduces a neutral region on cooperation dynamics (time-series analysis)

(A–C) We simulate the time evolution of strategy adoption in large populations composed of (Z = 1,000) individuals incurring (A) false uniqueness, (B) no bias, or (C) false consensus. Each gray curve corresponds to a single run starting from a random initial condition (in terms of the initial number of cooperators). The red curve corresponds to the average over all runs. We confirm that false uniqueness originates a prevalent cooperator-defector coexistence, where populations with an intermediate number of initial cooperators get trapped in a deadlock configuration. False consensus, on the other hand, leads to a neutral region where individuals maintain their strategies (eventually approaching the limits of such area and evolving to either full cooperation or full defection). Same parameters as in Figure 2.