Table 2. Summary and analysis of existing efforts towards GPS spoofing.
| Reference | Target | Spoofing system | Device placement | Sophistication | Stealthiness | Limitations |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Location spoofing - drones | ||||||
| Shepard et al. (2012) | Hornet [Mini Drone] |
SDR [With custom made DSP core] (Humphreys et al., 2008) |
Off-board | Sophisticated | Covert | (1) Victim’s position required. (2) Fixed distance between attack device and victim. |
| Dey et al. (2018) | DJI [Phantom 4 Pro] |
GPS Simulator [LabSat3] |
Off-board | Simplistic | Covert | GPS denied environment. |
| He et al. (2019) | Parrot [AR Drone 2.0] |
SDR [HackRF One] |
Off-board | Intermediate | Overt | (1) Attack requires precise location information of the target. (2) Target was in Loiter mode/ hovering at 10 m. |
| Horton & Ranganathan (2018) | DJI [Matrice 100] |
SDR [BladeRFx40] |
Off-board | Simplistic | Overt | GPS denied environment. |
| Arteaga et al. (2019) | 3DR [Solo] |
SDR [BladeRFx40] |
Off-board | Simplistic | Overt | Limited attack range. |
| He et al. (2019) | Drone | SDR [HackRF One] |
Off-board | Simplistic | Overt | Attack could have been detected by analyzing drone camera feed. |
| Ma et al. (2020) | DJI [Phantom 3 SE] |
Custom Designed | Off-board | Intermediate | No Information | (1) Required real-time location information of the target. (2) Autonomous Mode only, attack. |
| Location spoofing - non-aerial platforms | ||||||
| Warner & Johnston (2002) | Truck [Navigation System] |
GPS Simulator [WelNavigate GS720] |
Off-board | Simplistic | Overt | Limited attack range. |
| Bhatti & Humphreys (2017) | Yacht | Custom Designed Kerns et al. (2014) |
On-board | Intermediate | Partially Covert | Required physical access to the target. |
| Huang & Yang (2015) | Smartphone [Nexus 5] |
SDR [BladeRFx40] |
Off-board | Simplistic | Overt | Limited attack range. |
| Wang, Chen & Pan (2015) | Smartphone [iPhone 6] |
SDR [BladeRFx40] |
Off-board | Simplistic | Overt | Limited attack range. |
| Silva (2017) | Smartphone [Android] |
SDR [HackRF One] |
Off-board | Simplistic | Overt | Limited attack range. |
| Zeng et al. (2018) | Car [Navigation System] |
SDR [HackRF One] |
On-board [Limpet] |
Simplistic | Overt | (1) Perceived victim’s route information. (2) Required physical access to the target. |
| Horton & Ranganathan (2018) | Smartphone [HTC Desire 626] |
SDR [BladeRFx40] |
Off-board | Simplistic | Overt | Device was disconnected from the Internet. |
| Goavec-Merou, Friedt & Meyer (2019) | (1) Smartphone [Android] (2) Ublox-NeoM8T |
SDR [Pluto] |
Off-board | Simplistic | Overt | System’s configuration was valid for only a few hours. |
| Gaspar et al. (2020) | (1)Android Phone (2) U-blox GPS receivers |
SDR-Custom Designed [BladeRF Based] |
Off-board | Simplistic | Overt | Limited attack range. |
| Rustamov et al. (2020) | (1) Smartphone [Android] (2) U-blox receiver |
SDR [HackRF One] based GPS spoofer |
Off-board | Simplistic | Overt | Limited attack range. |
| GPS based time spoofing | ||||||
| Shepard et al. (2012) | Smart-grid [Time-reference GPS receiver] |
SDR-Custom Designed [With DSP core] |
Off-board | Sophisticated | Covert | Perceived victim’s position information. |
| Wang, Chen & Pan (2015) | Smartwatch [Apple] |
SDR [BladeRFx40] |
Off-board | Simplistic | Overt | Limited attack range. |
| Karit (2017) | NTP server | SDR [BladeRF] |
Off-board | Simplistic | Overt | Moving time >5 min results in NTP demon shut down. |