Table 2:
Redistributive effect of health financing in South Africa, 2010/2011
| Finance mechanism | Share in total financing (%) | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Direct taxes | 21.5 | 0.7183** (0.0285) | 0.7282** (0.0286) | 0.0046** (0.0009) | 0.0053** (0.0003) | 101.4 | 0.6 | 0.7 |
| Indirect taxes | 16.7 | − 0.2517** (0.0098) | −0.2491** (0.0097) | 0.0012** (0.0003) | 0.0014** (0.0001) | 99.0 | − 0.5 | − 0.6 |
| Total taxes | 38.2 | 0.4780** (0.0274) | 0.4892** (0.0274) | 0.0053** (0.0009) | 0.0058** (0.0003) | 102.3 | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| Private health insurance | 49.9 | 1.0293** (0.0700) | 1.1889** (0.0754) | 0.0641** (0.0041) | 0.0955** (0.0092) | 115.5 | 6.2 | 9.3 |
| Out-of-pocket payments | 12.0 | − 0.0853** (0.0252) | − 0.0647* (0.0262) | 0.0097** (0.0012) | 0.0109** (0.0015) | 75.8 | − 11.3 | − 12.8 |
| Overall health care payments | 1.5188** (0.0869) | 1.7345** (0.0929) | 0.0880** (0.0050) | 0.1277** (0.0109) | 114.2 | 5.8 | 8.4 |
The share in total health financing adds up to 100.1% due to approximations
Bootstrapped standard errors using 500 replications are presented in parenthesis
The values of DJA parameters: and
The values of , , and have been multiplied by 100 to enhance readability
DJA Duclos–Jalbert–Araar, horizontal effect, reranking, redistributive effect, vertical effect
*Statistically significant at the 5% level
** Statistically significant at the 1% level