Rational choice-based lens |
Transaction cost economics |
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High transaction costs are associated with negotiating, monitoring and enforcing a contract.
Opportunism of actors is reinforced by uncertainty and environmental complexity because of the bounded rationality of the options and scarcity of alternative actors.
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Transaction attributes (assets specificity, frequency of transactions, measurement needs and uncertainty) determine mechanisms.
Hierarchy-type mechanisms (HTMs) for frequent and costly transactions with specific assets.
Market-type mechanisms (MTMs) when transaction costs are low, and transactions are less frequent, not asset-specific and with predictable outcomes.
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Principal–agent theory |
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Bounded rationality and opportunism of actors and complexity in the environment lead to uncertainty over outcomes.
Conflicting goals and interests between the principal and the agent.
Different attitudes toward risk between the principal and the agent.
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Choice of the contract is influenced by outcome uncertainty, risk aversion, goal conflict, information systems, task programmability, outcome measurability and length of the relationship.
Behaviour-based contracts consistent with HTM.
Results (output/outcome)-based contracts are consistent with MTM.
Strengthen information systems to reduce information asymmetry.
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Power-based lens |
Resource dependence theory |
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Stability of resource flow
Asymmetrical control under uncertainty
Interdependence/reciprocity when benefits are mutual
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Power-based considerations lead to contingent mechanisms.
Interdependence leads to mainly NTMs.
Asymmetrical control is associated with HTMs.
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Political economy perspectives |
Coordination dynamics and mechanisms evolve because of a political (contested and negotiated) process.
Internal politics of coordination unfolds within the dynamic interactions between actors and context.
Actors exercise agency to manoeuvre through a complex power, institutional and ideational context.
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Necessity in response to regulatory instruments
Legitimacy in response to normative elements
Any other contingency through framing based on cultural cognitive elements
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Conflicting institutional logics and interests promote organisational silos.
Multiplicity of power centres arising from institutions, ideas and agents.
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Contingent and dynamic mechanisms as institutional arrangements.
Strategic framing, socialisation (such as a transfer of staff within public/civil service) and organisational culture.
Formal and informal institutional arrangements such as coordination structures and processes.
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