Table 2.

Main effects of exposure to norm violations

	Trust in elections	Accept election	Elections rigged	Election violence	Political violence	Support democracy
Election norm violations	$-0.001$	$-0.030$	0.059	0.030	$-0.040$	$-0.025$
	(0.026)	(0.032)	(0.048)	(0.043)	(0.034)	(0.031)
General norm violations	$-0.017$	$-0.024$	0.067	0.134	0.021	0.036
	(0.025)	(0.032)	(0.048)	(0.043)	(0.036)	(0.033)
Difference in effects
Election $-$ general	0.016	$-0.006$	$-0.008$	$-0.105$	$-0.061$	$-0.061$
	(0.026)	(0.032)	(0.048)	(0.044)	(0.034)	(0.032)
Control variables	$✓$	$✓$	$✓$	$✓$	$✓$	$✓$
N	2,137	2,137	2,137	2,137	2,001	2,001

The p values are as follows: *P <0:05, **P <0:01, ***P <0:005 (two-sided; adjusted to control the FDR per ref. 26 with α=0:05). Cell entries are OLS coefficients, with robust standard errors in parentheses. All models control for pretreatment variables selected as most prognostic via lasso regression (see preregistration for details and list of candidate variables). Outcome variables for first four models calculated as mean of nonmissing values for each respondent across waves 2 to 4 (see SI Appendix for results by wave). Support for political violence and democracy were measured in wave 4. The marginal effects of the treatments on support for political violence and democracy (fifth and sixth columns, “Difference in effects” rows) were not preregistered and are thus exploratory; we include these estimates for presentational consistency.