Sampling procedure	Laboratory guidelines based on Commission Decision 2002/106/EC if not stated otherwise		Conclusions	Recommendations
ToR 1: In the event of suspicion or confirmation
1st scenario 4.1.1.1 In the event of a suspicion of CSF in an establishment where animals of the listed species are kept			Sampling procedures regarding the sampling of dead pigs, and pigs with clinical signs for virological testing can be considered effective for detecting the disease in herds where CSF is suspected due to clinical signs and mortality. Serological testing of randomly selected pigs in herds where clinical signs have not been observed can be considered effective only in specific situations. Additional testing of pigs that have had positive or suspicious serological test results with an aim to isolate the virus from fetuses of seropositive sows or in contact pigs could be considered adequate.	Enhanced passive surveillance during defined monitoring period in herds that are suspected to be infected due to the epidemiological link to an affected holding, but where clinical signs in pigs have not been detected. Serological testing of randomly selected animals should be conducted only if this could be considered necessary due to epidemiological considerations. Two groups of animals at risk not mentioned in the diagnostic manual are pigs with stunted growth, and sows that had aborted, these two groups could be added in any future guidelines.
2nd scenario 4.1.1.2. For the purposes of the epidemiological enquiry as referred to Article 57 of Regulation (EU)2016/429 in an CSF officially confirmed establishment			For epidemiological investigation it is important to examine the distribution of infections and seroconversions across infected farms. Given the adoption of group housing in sows there is no reason to aim for a lower seroprevalence in sows than in younger pigs. To identify possible infections thorough clinical and laboratory examination is needed on farms pre‐emptively culled.	It is recommended that a clinical inspection and, if deemed indicated from clinical examination, sample collection for virus detection to establish the distribution of infection across infected farms, is carried out. The serological survey should aim for detection of a seroprevalence of 10% in all age groups of pigs.
3rd scenario 4.1.1.3. For granting a specific derogation from killing animals of the categories of article 13.2 of the Delegated Regulation in an CSF‐affected establishment			While testing to grant a derogation the possible presence of chronically infected pigs and immunotolerant carriers should be considered.	It is recommended that all pigs are tested twice a month for virus detection and derogation is not granted before all pigs have been negative for virus for at least three consecutive times.
5th scenario 4.1.1.4. For wild animals of the listed species within the CSF‐affected establishment and its surroundings.			If wild boars have entered the territory of the affected establishment (e.g. pastures), there is a risk of spread of the virus to the wild boar population in the surroundings of the affected establishment. Contrarily, infection may have originated in the wild boar population, being wild boars the source of infection for pigs in the establishment.	If incursion of wild boars to the territory of the establishment has occurred and those animals have been caught and culled, blood and tissue samples should be collected for laboratory examination and virus and antibody detection with relevant diagnostic tests performed. Enhanced passive surveillance (wild boar carcass search) in the area surrounding the establishment should be implemented. All wild boars found dead should be tested for virus and antibodies. If hunting is ongoing in the surroundings, all hunted animals should also be tested.
6th scenario 4.1.1.5. For animals of listed species in the non‐affected establishments located in a protection zone			Visit and examination as per 1st scenario is effective as first screening.	Weekly testing of 2 dead pigs > 2 months of age after visit.
8th scenario 4.1.1.6. For non‐affected establishments located in a surveillance zone				Weekly testing of 2 dead pigs > 2 months of age to replace visit before lifting restrictions.
ToR 1: To grant derogations for animal movements
9th scenario 4.1.2.1. From non‐affected establishments located in the protection zone to slaughterhouses located within the protection zone or in the surveillance zone or outside the restricted zone			Infection in a farm can be present even if the group to be shipped looks healthy. Collecting samples for laboratory testing at the slaughterhouse has limited added value if clinical inspection at the farm and group to be shipped has not shown any indication for CSF.	Clinical inspection of the entire farm before shipment is recommended. Sample collection for laboratory testing at the slaughterhouse may be omitted.
12th scenario 4.1.2.2 From non‐affected establishments located in the protection zone to a plant approved for processing or disposal of animal by‐products in which the animals are immediately killed			As per Section 4.1.2.1.	As per Section 4.1.2.1.
13th scenario 4.1.2.3. From an establishment in a surveillance zone to a slaughterhouse located within or outside the restricted zone and from an establishment outside the surveillance zone to a slaughterhouse situated in the surveillance zone			As per Section 4.1.2.1.	As per Section 4.1.2.1 No additional testing is needed for farms located outside the surveillance zone.
15th scenario 4.1.2.4 From an establishment in a surveillance zone to an establishment belonging to the same supply chain, located in or outside the surveillance zone			If enhanced surveillance is carried out in the establishments of the surveillance zone (ongoing weekly sampling of two dead pigs as described in Section 4.1.1.6), the assessed measures are considered sufficient, except in the event of infection with a strain off low virulence.	If infection with a CSFV strain of lower virulence is suspected, additionally to the clinical examination foreseen in present procedures, testing for virus of all animals being dispatched should be considered necessary to prevent transmission of the virus.
18th scenario 4.1.2.5 From an establishment located in the restricted zone to move within the restricted zone when restriction measures are maintained beyond the period set out in Annex XI of the Delegated Regulation			As per Section 4.1.2.4	As per Section 4.1.2.4
ToR 1: For repopulation purposes
19th scenario 4.1.3.1 For the animals that are kept for the repopulation prior to their introduction			As per Section 4.1.2.4	As per Section 4.1.2.4 No need for prior testing of animals introduced from outside the restricted zones.
20th scenario 4.1.3.2 In the event of unusual mortalities or clinical signs being notified during the repopulation			As per Section 4.1.1.1	As per Section 4.1.1.1
21st scenario 4.1.3.3 For animals that have been repopulated			Current procedures for repopulation are deemed effective.	It is recommended to use the same detection threshold for serology in all age groups of pigs.
ToR 2
Description		Conclusions		Recommendations
4.2 Assessment of the length of the monitoring period of CSF		Scenarios 1–3, 4 and 6 The monitoring period as defined in Annex II of the Delegated Regulation of 15 days cannot be considered effective. Scenario 5 Based on the results of the ELS, sampling the animals at least 22 (15 + 7) days after semen collection as foreseen in the Delegated Regulation is considered effective to detect antibodies with several laboratory methods, given that the infection may have occurred at the latest at the day of semen collection. Scenario 7 For the purpose of this scenario the existing length of the monitoring period as defined in Annex II of the Delegated Regulation (15 days) effective as it would allow for early detection of potentially infected pigs at the first visit following re‐stocking.		Scenarios 1–3, 4 and 6 Given the current level of awareness of ASF, a monitoring period of 25 days is recommended (the average period reported in the ELS for secondary outbreaks), except for the first affected establishments detected in an area (index cases), where a monitoring period of 40 days (the average period reported in ELS, including primary outbreaks) is recommended. A revision of these proposed recommendations should be carried out if the level of awareness due to ASF in the EU were to decrease. Based on available estimates of the time between likely entry of infection and notification of suspicion, the panel is 70–100% certain that infection in 95% or more of establishments suspected and eventually confirmed will have become initially infected within 25 days before the date of notification of suspicion except for index cases (within 40 days in that case). Scenario 5 The existing length of the monitoring period is considered effective. Scenario 7 The existing length of the monitoring period is considered effective.
ToR 3
Description		Conclusions		Recommendations
4.3.1 Assessment of the minimum radius		Based on available estimates on spatial spread of CSFV in previous outbreaks occurring in Europe, the panel is 90–100% certain the minimum radius of 3 km will prevent transmission outside the protection zone in 95% or more of the established zones. Regarding surveillance zones, the panel is 95–100% certain the minimum radius of 10 km will prevent transmission outside the surveillance zone in 95% or more of the established zones.		It is recommended that the current radii of the protection (3 km) and surveillance zones (10 km) are maintained.
4.3.2 Assessment of the minimum period		Considering the time between introduction and the reporting of a suspicion of CSF, as assessed in this opinion, the existing minimum times for maintenance of the measures in the protection (15 days) and surveillance zones (30 days) are not considered efficient.		It is recommended that the minimum time for maintenance of the measures in the protection zone should be increased to 25 days, and to 40 days in the surveillance zone. It is concluded with a 70–100% certainty that maintenance of the measures in the protection zone for 25 days and for 40 days in the surveillance zone will allow the detection of additional affected establishments where infection started before control measures were implemented in 95% or more of the implemented zones.