Table 2.

Manifestations of risk management strategies in different disciplines.

	Historically Grown Technologies
Disciplines → Design methods ↓	Construction engineering	GS hits	Chemical engineering	GS hits	Aerospace engineering	GS hits	Urban engineering	GS hits
A Probabilistic risk-based design	Target failure probabilities are specified, depending on the failure consequences of the structures.	2510	Process safety design: Identify failure scenarios and estimate consequences; redesign until risks are below a target level (of 10−6/year/individual).	361	Acceptable level of risk calculations based on components.	1820	Related to the probabilistic design of infrastructure within the urban environment.	219
B Safety factor-based design	Multiplication factors are used on characteristic/ representative values of load and resistance variables.	15,100	Anticipate higher loads and weaker resistance by incorporating safety factors in the design.	4820	Example: Determining maximum load for strength of wings and other structures.	12,700	As above.	2570
C Fail-safe design/ fail-secure design	Failure of one construction element does not lead to complete collapse.	2070	Replace materials with less-hazardous options (e.g., clean with water and detergent rather than a flammable solvent).	1960	Example: Statically stable design of aircraft, which means failure of automatic flight control system does not lead to an uncontrollable aircraft.	17,600	Related to resilience of the urbanized area.	1280
D Active safe design	Actively monitor the construction site to prevent accidents and fatalities.	374	Use of sensor and control technology to stabilize pressure and temperature levels.	357	Example: Traffic collision avoidance system warns of traffic and advises pilots.	2360	Focused on active safe design of road infrastructure in the urban environment.	672
E Passive safe design	Use passive safe columns to absorb the energy of a collision.	333	Gravity taking leaks to safe places; use bunds; avoid knock-on effects.	730	Example: Crash structures and seat design.	1750	Focused on passive safe design of hazardous industries inside urbanized areas.	222
F Security-proof/ vandalism-proof design	Use gates, fences, or surveillance cameras.	8	Use gates, fences, or surveillance cameras.	23	None: Aircraft operate in secure areas and people inside aircraft generally do not want to put themselves in danger.	177	Crime prevention by improving natural surveillance in the urban environment.	8800
G Idiot-proof/fool-proof design	Careful supervision of design and execution phases of the construction project.	432	Make incorrect assembly impossible; ease of control.	264	MINIMAL: Airbus aircraft have built in protection against aircraft upset due to incorrect pilot inputs. Highly skilled end-users (pilots) are expected.	4280	None.	0
H Fault-tolerant design	Space between construction elements to accommodate fluctuations in geometrical dimensions.	1520	Equipment and processes designed to withstand possible faults or deviations from design.	2870	All crucial systems are redundant, sometimes triply or quadruply. A single fault should never lead to a crash.	20,400	Related to infrastructural design of the built environment.	2220
I Circular design	Modular construction strategies (“Lego-type” structures).	125	Redefine performance to include entire product life cycle; “Nexus” solutions that synergistically solve several sustainability issues.	115	MINIMAL: Aircraft are mainly designed for their operational phase. After the operational phase, aircraft are stored or scrapped.	417	Green cities.	107
Disciplines → Design methods ↓	Software engineering	GS hits	Bio-engineering	GS hits	Nano-engineering	GS hits	Cyber space	GS hits
A Probabilistic risk-based design	Use probabilistic programming or probablistic verification to take uncertainties into account; (For this column we take the software developer’s perspective not the user of the software).	514	Escape frequencies as a measure.	232	For example, the spread of various areas and species in the environment.	97	Explicit modelling of threat actors and their behavior may provide guidance regarding risk level and associated controls.	98
B Safety factor-based design	Make software forewards compatible by anticipating on future functional and safety requirements.	3280	Found in rationales of SbD but implementation limited.	5840	Limiting release may be combined with limiting toxicity.	846	Security measures such as cryptographic key lengths should consider future developments (e.g., increased computing power).	390
C Fail-safe design/fail-secure design	Use software verification or static analysis tools to ensure that certain properties hold by construction.	12,500	Closest to the technical application of Safe-by-Design (e.g., kill switches).	6350	Naomaterials used to make fail-safe (construction) materials; rarely used to make nanomaterials themselves safe.	445	Intrusion prevention systems aimed at reducing damage from a detected cyberattack.	2690
D Active safe design	Programmer manually writes tests or uses program analysis tools to ensure software quality.	2040	Closest to the technical application of Safe-by-Design (e.g. biosensors).	547	Mostly, nanomaterials used in components for active safety; rarely used to make nanomaterials themselves safe.	77	Network monitoring may indicate attacker activity and enable operator responses.	767
E Passive safe design	Testing or program analysis tools are integrated in the software development pipeline through continuous integration.	1180	Closest to the technical application of SbD (e.g. auxotrophy).	548	Mostly, nanomaterials used in components for passive safety; rarely used to make nanomaterials themselves safe.	124	Decentralized architectures limit the amount of data accessible through a single system.	253
F Security-proof / vandalism-proof design	Explicitly validate inputs to provide robust response to all possible inputs, for example, to prevent injection attacks.	1430	None.	3	None.	0	Backups and quick restore procedures make cyber attacks and vandalism less attractive.	317,000
G Idiot-proof / fool-proof design	Testing or program analysis tools are integrated in the software development pipeline through continuous integration.	3870	Can be understood as biosecurity, not presently covered.	3130	Typically refers to synthesis and applications and not so much to safety.	219	Privacy-friendly or security-friendly defaults (e.g., multi-factor authentication) may protect users against attacker manipulation (e.g., phishing e-mails).	2610
H Fault-tolerant design	Explicitly validate inputs to provide robust response to all possible inputs, for example, overflows and illegal memory access.	17,500	None. Not in the rationales of SbD.	4190	No relation to toxicity.	0	Network segmentation limits possibilities for attackers to compromise the whole system.	12,000
I Circular design	Reuse of software through libraries, thereby inheriting safety guarantees of the libraries.	303	None. Is found in bioengineering but not discussed in the context of safety.	371	Possible tension between Safe-by-Design and circular design (see text).	81	Adequate identification of and response to software vulnerabilities, via software updates, is crucial.	78

Note: GS = Google Scholar.