Table 2.
Table of characteristics—PES programmes
| Programme | Country | Programme description | Ecosystem targeted | Programme objectives | Scale | Targeting approach | Start and end date | Impact evaluations |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Projeto Assentamentos Sustentáveis na Amazônia | Brazil | Local‐level programme that targets conversation of forest land as well as the adoption of more sustainable land use techniques. Payments are conditional on the conservation of at least 50% of land as legal reserve, another 30% of the payment is conditional on the conservation of 15‐m wide forest riparian zones and the remaining 40% is conditional on the adoption of an environmentally sustainable production system. In addition, the programme is offering free administrative and technical support | Forests | Conservation; environmentally beneficial/preferable to BAU land‐use; socioeconomic (livelihoods, poverty reduction, etc.); other (support farmers to comply with law) | Local | Intervention target groups not clear | 2012–2017 | Simonet et al. (2017) |
| Bird Nest protection programme | Cambodia | A local‐level PES programme that rewards community members for the monitoring and protection of nests of specific endangered bird species. Payments are conditional on nest protection and chick survival | Forests | Conservation; restoration | Local | Not clear | 2003 and ongoing | Beauchamp (2018) (associated papers: Clements (2012)—thesis and Clements et al. (2015) |
| Conservation Agreement | Cambodia | Local‐level programme that serves as an additional conservation incentives to an established protected area. Payments are conditional on a range of land‐use changes and conversation practices such as preventing slash‐and‐burn practices in pristine forest, as well as monitoring poaching and prohibiting logging for commercial purpose, but also participating in community patrolling. CI also required setting up committees at commune level, which are in charge of organising the distribution of incentives and patrolling | Forests | Conservation; other (community building and collective action) | Local | Priority target communes are selected following three sets of criteria relevant to local characteristics: the importance in terms of biological diversity, causes/intensity of deforestation threats and credibility of resources users as an conservation partner | 2005–2012 | Chervier (2017a) and (2017b)—paper on same intervention but with different data set on a different outcome |
| Sloping Land Conversion Program/Grain for Green Program | China | The regional‐level PES programme is one of the largest PES experiments in the world in terms of scale, payment and duration. Initiated in 1999, the programme aimed to increase vegetative cover over 32 million hectares by 2010, of which 14.7 million hectares would be converted from cropland on steep slopes back to forest and grassland. The programme is primary targeted at the reforestation of previously converted, mainly sloping land via compensation for changes in land‐use practices. Poverty alleviation objectives were referenced as secondary objectives at a later stage | Forests; grassland | Restoration; environmentally beneficial/preferable to BAU land‐use; socioeconomic (livelihoods, poverty reduction, etc.) | Regional | Slope is one of the main criteria by which land is selected. In practice, the central and the local governments bargain over the land conversion quota | 1999 and ongoing | Duan (2015); Groom (2010); Liang (2012); Lin (2014); Lui (2013); Liu (2014); Liu (2018); Liu (2015); Uchida (2009); Xu (2010); Yao (2010) |
| Paddy Land‐to‐Dry Land program | China | A regional‐level land use conversion programme that aims to protect water quality and quantity. Payment is conditional on a conversion from rice to dryland cultivation essentially compensating upstream communities for providing ecosystem services valuable to downstream areas. Poverty alleviation objectives were referenced as secondary objectives at a later stage | Farmland | Conservation only; socioeconomic (livelihoods, poverty reduction, etc.) | Regional | Eligible areas decided by government. Eligibility criteria include areas with land‐use practices targeted for conservation | 2006 and ongoing | Zheng et al. (2013) |
| Desertification Combating Program around Beijing and Tianjin | China | A local‐level PES programme that targets cropland conversion to reduce desertification and associated sandstorms. Payment is conditional on farmers planting trees on barren forestland of at least the area of their converted cropland. Other elements of the programme include irrigation projects; resettlement of rural households away from fragile ecological areas; and changing herding and animal husbandry practices to control overgrazing and rehabilitate degraded grassland | Forests; farmlands | Restoration; environmentally beneficial/preferable to BAU land‐use | Local | Eligible areas decided by government with household then being able to opt into the programme. Eligibility criteria include areas with land‐use practices targeted to change in order to avoid desertification | 2001 and ongoing | Liu, Mullan, et al. (2014) (Associated papers Liu et al. (2013); Liu et al. (2018); Zhang and Liu (2005) |
| Regional Integrated Silvopastoral Ecosystem Management (RISEMP) | Colombia | Local‐level programme that targets the adoption of silvopastoral practices in degraded pastures, so as to generate increased biodiversity conservation and carbon sequestration. Payment is conditional on the adoption of a suite of more sustainable silvopastoral practices. Additional technical assistance to support the uptake of practices is provided | Farmland | Environmentally beneficial/preferable to BAU land‐use | Local | Both intervention target groups and targeting methods are unclear | 2003–2007 | Pagiola et al. (2016) (associated paper Pagiola et al., 2013) |
| Regional Integrated Silvopastoral Approaches to Ecosystem Management Project (RISEMP) | Costa Rica | A regional PES programme that was implemented in a total of three countries (Columbia, Nicaragua and Costa Rica) aiming to change silvopastoral practices in degraded systems. Payments were conditional on the adoption of a suite of more sustainable silvopastoral practices. Additional technical assistance to support the uptake of practices is provided | Farmland | Environmentally beneficial/preferable to BAU land‐use | Regional | Both intervention target groups and targeting methods are unclear | 2002–2008 | Garbach et al. (2012) |
| Programa de Pagos por Servicios Ambientales (PSA) | Costa Rica | The PSA offers different contracts to landholders for forest conservation, reforestation and/or sustainable forest management. Government makes direct payments to those landholders that comply with the contracts. Farmers are paid for the area (per hectare) of forest on land enroled in the programme (rather than directly for ecosystems services). Those with a contract for forest conservation need to fence off their land and post signs, prevent forest fires and hunting and not engage in agricultural activities or cutting down of trees for timber. Pre 2000, enrolment in the programme required landowners to have an official cadastral map of their land from the national registry, proof of ownership and an agreed forest management plan. In some areas, local NGOs faciliated the application process for signing up to PSA. Landholders may also receive technical assistance from local NGOs in implementation of forest management | Forests | Conservation; socioeconomic (livelihoods, poverty reduction, etc.) | National | Voluntary programme, first come, first served. Contracts could be established on properties of up to 300 hectares. In some areas, the local NGO implementers gave priority to areas based on areas that they percevied to be a higher risk of deforestation | Contracts signed between 1998 and 2004‐ongoing | Arriagada (2012); Arriagada et al. (2011, 2015); Robalino (2013, 2014, 2015); Sierra and Russman (2006) |
| Programa Socio Bosque | Ecuador | National‐level programme that targets the prevention of destruction and degradation of native ecosystems, as well as the increase of income and human capital in the poorest communities of Ecuador. The programme specifically targets ecosystems that are threatened, provide valuable environmental services such as regulation of hydrological systems, carbon storage and biodiversity; and are located in the poorest regions. Payment is conditional on a range of conversation related‐practices | Forests; other ecosystems | Conservation only socioeconomic (livelihoods, poverty reduction, etc.) | National | Eligible areas decided by government with communities being able to opt in. Eligibility criteria include (a) deforestation threat, (b) type of environmental services including: carbon storage, water cycle regulation, habitat for biodiversity and (c) poverty levels | 2008 (general programme); 2009 specific area, ongoing | Jones et al. (2017); Hayes et al. (2017); Mohebalian (2016, 2018) |
| ICRAF PES experiment | Malawi | Local‐level pilot programme that targets afforestation of degraded areas. Payment is conditional on the number of surviving trees and additional technical assistance on forest management is provided | Forests | Restoration; environmentally beneficial/preferable to BAU land‐use; Socioeconomic (livelihoods, poverty reduction etc.) | Local | Landholders were identified in census with >1 ha of land and with clear land rights. Households reporting >1 acre of private land in the baseline survey were ineligible for contracting and were excluded from the randomisation | 2008–2011 | Jack and Santos (2017) |
| Mexico's PSAH | Mexico | National‐level PES programme that targets the conversation of forest cover. Poverty alleviation objectives were added at a later stage of the programme. Payments are conditional on the maintenance of forest functions as measured by forest cover. The programme grants 5‐year renewable contracts to both individual and communal landowners. Landowners may enrol a portion of their property and must maintain existing forest cover within the enroled parcel, but can make changes to land cover in other parts of their property. Verification of forest cover is made by satellite image analysis or ground visits. Landowners are removed from the programme if CONAFOR finds deforestation due to conversion to agriculture or pasture within the enroled area. Payments are reduced if forest is lost due to natural causes such as fire or pests | Forests | Conservation only; socioeconomic (livelihoods, poverty reduction, etc.) | National | Eligible areas decided by government with communities having to apply for inclusion. Eligibility criteria include areas targeted for conversation and with sufficient forest cover. Socioeconomic criteria (e.g., degree of marginalisation, female applicant, existing forest management plan) were adopted at a later stage | 2003 and ongoing | Alix‐Garcia et al. (2015a; 2015); Arriagada et al. (2018); Le Velly et al. (2017); Scullion et al. (2011); Sims et al. (2017) |
| The Monarch Butterfly Conservation Fund | Mexico | A regional PES programme that combined designation of protected areas with PES to conserve over wintering habitat for the monarch butterfly. Payments are an incentive to abstain from felling timber and conditional on observed forest cover status | Forests | Conservation only | Regional | Groups needed to fall in area where butterfly takes habitat in winter, but no further information provided | 2000 and ongoing | Honey‐Roses et al. (2011) |
| PESL (and PSAH) | Mexico | This local‐level programme includes a PES mechanism specifically designed to address local drivers of deforestation and forest degradation, among other incentives for sustainable use and rainforest conservation. Payment is conditional on the conversation of standing rainforest to ensure the provision of hydrological and biodiversity services | Forests | Conservation only (biodiversity conservation forest and hydrologic services) | Local | Eligible areas decided by government with communities required to apply for inclusion in the programme. Eligibility criteria include sufficient among of forest and clear property rights, among other | 2005; 2008‐ongoing | Costedoat et al. (2015) |
| Nhambita PES‐project | Mozambique | A local‐level PES programme that targets reforestation and poverty alleviation. Payments are conditional on the planting and management of tress. Additional community development and capacity‐building initiatives are provided to strengthen the developmental objectives of the PES | Farmland | Restoration; socioeconomic (livelihoods, poverty reduction, etc.) | Local | Not clear why specific area for programme was chosen | 2002 and ongoing | Hedge et al. (2011); Jindal et al. (2012) |
| Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) Pilot | Nepal | A local‐level pilot PES programme that targets sustainable forest managment and poverty alleviation. The programme attempted to test the feasibility of the design of a PES programme that builds on existing community‐based forest management practices in Nepal including a strong equity focus and livelihood development objective. Instead of being conditional purely on forest carbon increments, pilot payments were based on weights assigned to the baseline carbon stock, annual carbon growth and social safeguard components. Additional capacity‐building and livelihood support activities were conducted | Forests | Environmentally beneficial/preferable to BAU land‐use; socioeconomic (livelihoods, poverty reduction, etc.) | Local | Not clear why specific area for programme was chosen | 2011–2013 | Sharma et al. (2015) |
| EPWS | Tanzania | A local‐level PES programme that incentives farmers to change current land use practices by planting trees and conservation farming so as to reduce forest products harvesting and reducing soil erosion so as to protect the flow and depth of water in the Mfizigo sub catchments. The programme explicityly combines conversation and poverty alleviation objectives to nuture sustainable natural resource management and improved livelihood security for the communities adjacent to the forest. It also includes a specific focus on equity in programme desing and ojectives | Forests; farmland | Conservation only; socioeconomic (livelihoods, poverty reduction, etc.) | Local | The programme was voluntary. A prerequisite for site selection was the livelihood status of farming communities, as they had to be at, or below, the poverty line | 2006; 2008–2012 | Kwayu (2017); Lokina (2016) (associated paper: John (2012) |
| PES experiment | Uganda | Regional‐level PES programme that targets the conversation of forestland. Payment is conditional on no not clearing tress with an additional option to participate in reforestation activities. Their first step when entering a community was to hold a parish‐level meeting for eligible PFOs to advertise and explain the programme. They then worked with interested PFOs to verify their forest land, measure its area and determine their eligibility. For those who signed up, an organisation monitored their land via spot checks and made annual payments to those who complied with the contract. The monitoring occurred through in‐person spot checks once every one or two months, during which the organisation employees checked for fresh tree stumps or other signs of cleared forest. PES enrollees also had the option to reforest up to two hectares of land. They were provided seedlings, and the PFO received 70,000 UGX per hectare per year if the seedlings survived | Forests | Conservation; restoration | Regional | Not clear why specific area for programme was chosen | 2011–2013 | Jayachandran et al. (2017) (associated paper: Jayachandran et al. (2011) |
Abbreviations: BAU, business as usual; PES, payment for environmental service; PESL, Programa Especial de la Selva Lacandona; PFO, private forest owner; PSAH, Payments for Hydrological Services Program.