Table 2.
Mean share, by treatment.
| Full information | Information avoidance | Overall | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strict | Weak | Strict | Weak | Strict | Weak | |
| High externality | 0.55 (0.42) | 0.65 (0.38) | 0.59 (0.38) | 0.69 (0.31) | 0.57 (0.39) | 0.67 (0.34) |
| Low externality | 0.43 (0.38) | 0.55 (0.34) | 0.50 (0.41) | 0.56 (0.34) | 0.46 (0.40) | 0.56 (0.34) |
| Overall | 0.49 (0.40) | 0.60 (0.36) | 0.54 (0.40) | 0.63 (0.33) | 0.51 (0.40) | 0.61 (0.34) |
| N | 55 | 59 | 57 | 59 | 112 | 118 |
Variable reports mean values of the variable share, as defined in the text. Standard deviations in parentheses. The number of observations (N) per condition is determined by the number of cases in which officials faced a tradeoff between bribe and citizen welfare maximization at least once.