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. 2022 Jan 6;51(6):969–989. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.2796

TABLE 5.

How much do conspiracy theory beliefs predict COVID‐19 screening tests, COVID‐19 vaccination intentions and COVID misinformation sharing tendencies (n = 378)

Model 1 Model 2
Outcome: Intention to get tested
COVID conspiracy belief −.39*** (.08) [−.55, −.24] −.34*** (.08) [−.50, −.18]
Analytical thinking −.01 (.03) [−.07, .04] −.02 (.03) [−.08, .04]
Trust in government .23** (.08) [.08, .38] .26** (.08) [.10, .42]
Ethnic minority −.16 (.14) [−.44, .13]
BBC news .13 (.15) [−.17, .42]
Conservative .22 (.14) [−.50, .06]
Model summary
F change (df) (3, 367) = 15.15, p < .001 (3, 364) = 1.28, = .280
R2, R2 change .13, .13 .15, .01
Outcome: Intention to get vaccinated
COVID‐19 conspiracy belief −.49*** (.10) [−.68, −.30] −.41*** (.10) [−.62, −.22]
Analytical thinking .00 (.04) [−.07, .08] −.00 (.04) [−.07, .07]
Trust in government .37*** (.10) [.18, .56] .33** (.10) [.13, .53]
Ethnic minority −.53** (.18) [−.88, −.18]
BBC news .13 (.18) [−.23, .49]
Conservative .05 (.18) [−.40, .29]
Model summary
F change (df) (3, 367) = 18.35, p < .001 (3, 364) = 1.28, = .024
R2, R2 change .12, .03 .14, .02
Outcome: Spreading COVID misinformation
COVID‐19 conspiracy belief .52*** (.06) [.41, .62] .48*** (.06) [.36, .59]
Analytical thinking −.04 (.02) [−.08, .01] −.03 (.02) [−.07, .01]
Trust in government .02 (.05) [−.09, .13] .03 (.06) [−.09, .14]
Ethnic minority .11 (.10) [−.09, .31]
BBC news −.29 (.10)** [−.49, −.08]
Conservative .04 (.10) [−.16, .23]
Model summary
F change (df) (3, 367) = 2.11, p < .001 (4, 364) = 3.92, p = .027
R2, R2 change .25, .25 .27, .02

* p < .05, ** < .01, *** p < .001. Sociodemographic variables that had statistically significant correlations with conspiracy theory beliefs (p < .05) were included in the model.