Table 2.
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Residential | Residential | Residential | Residential | Residential | |
Stay at home dates (state-level) | 1.295*** | 1.103*** | 0.773*** | ||
(0.199) | (0.208) | (0.181) | |||
Stay at home dates individualism | -0.741*** | -0.228 | -0.746*** | ||
(0.231) | (0.138) | (0.154) | |||
Stay at home dates obedience | 0.477** | ||||
(0.227) | |||||
Observations | 139,009 | 139,009 | 139,009 | 138,847 | 138,847 |
R-squared | 0.916 | 0.918 | 0.922 | 0.956 | 0.956 |
County FE | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
Date FE | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
State-date FE | no | no | no | yes | yes |
Policy x log wages | no | no | yes | yes | yes |
The table presents OLS estimates from regressing time spent at home at the county-level on (the one day-lag of) a dummy taking value 1 if on a given day, the government required people to stay at home. Columns 3, 4 and 5 include interactions between the dummy and the logarithm of wage income per capita. Columns 4 and 5 include state-date fixed effects. The individualism measure is obtained by summing up country-level measures weighted by the share of ancestors’ country of origin. The obedience measure is derived analogously. Errors are clustered at the state-level. The coefficients with are significant at the 1% level, with are significant at the 5% level, and with are significant at the 10% level.