Table 5.

Summary for security and privacy study analysis on medical network.

Ref.	Target Security Concern	Target Security Requirement	Security Solution	Strength	Weakness
[59]	- Collusion attack - MITM attack	- Scalability - Confidentiality - Availability - Integrity - Authenticity	- AES - CP-ABE - Access Control	Efficient approach of using ABE by encrypting a symmetric key, RSK, instead of the whole data	Security for e-health data depends on a secure socket layer (SSL) that could not be fully adopted in a resource-constrained WSN environment
[55]	- Eavesdropping - Tracking - Spoofing attack	- Confidentiality - Availability (reliability)	- AES - ABE - Authentication - Access Control	Flexible privacy protection strategies according to three trust levels of a user or node	Security could easily be threatened if a node that has a high trust level is compromised
[57]	- Eavesdropping - Impersonation attack - Replay attack - DoS attack	- Confidentiality - Integrity - Authenticity - Non-repudiation - Lightweight - Forward security	- ECC - Mutual Authentication	Efficient authentication protocol using a non-pairing operation and ECC-based scheme	The required computation cost is still high for resource constrained WBAN nodes because of the certificateless scheme
[60]	- Replay attack - Impersonation attack - MITM attack	- Anonymity - Unlinkability - Forward Secrecy	- ECC - Mutual Authentication	Conditionally anonymous authentication to trace a malicious user and batch authentication for efficiency	Conditional traceability could be abused by an insider; however, there is no mention of this drawback
[68]	- Replay attack - Impersonation attack - Spoofing attack - DoS attack - Location tracking - MITM attack	- Confidentiality - Anonymity - Availability - Forward secrecy - Scalability	- ECC - Mutual Authentication	Low computation cost and communication overhead	The communication between tag and reader was insecure
[69]	- Eavesdropping - Replay attack	- Confidentiality - Authenticity - Lightweight	- ECC - CLSC - Authentication	Efficient scheme based on ECC and signcryption	Anonymity should be considered to ensure patient privacy
[71]	- Eavesdropping - Replay attack	- Confidentiality - Lightweight	- ABE	Efficient ABE based on online/offline encryption techniques and ABF for access control policy to protect the privacy of users’ attributes	ABF could hinder the encryption performance
[63]	- Eavesdropping - Replay attack - Impersonation attack - Tracking attack	- Confidentiality - Anonymity - Authenticity	- ABE - Access Control	Low computation cost for EHR encryption/decryption	Pairing operation that cause high computation cost is required
[73]	- Eavesdropping - Replay attack	- Confidentiality - Integrity - Authenticity	- Pairing-based HE - Aggregate Signature	Data confidentiality is preserved while data aggregation and batch verification are performed for efficiency	Requires exponentiation and pairing operations that cause a high computation cost
[74]	- Eavesdropping - Replay attack - Impersonation attack	- Confidentiality - Forward secrecy - Backward secrecy	- HE - Key Distribution	Direct communication between a patient’s mobile device and medical devices is possible	Diagnosis reliability should be provided
[64]	- Eavesdropping - Replay attack - Collusion attack	- Availability (Fault Tolerance) - Collusion resistance	- BGN cryptosystem	Differential attack and privacy are considered	The BGN cryptosystem has a small plaintext space for e-health data
[80]	- Eavesdropping - Replay attack	- Anonymity - Confidentiality - Integrity - Non-repudiation	- CLSC - Authentication - Access Control	Key escrow resilience and elimination of certificate management based on certificateless access control	Requires exponentiation and pairing operations that cause high computation cost
[82]	- Eavesdropping - Impersonation attack	- Confidentiality - Integrity - Anonymity - Lightweight - Unlinkability - Forward secrecy	- CLGSC	Key escrow resilience and low computation cost by eliminating pairing operations	Requires a relay selection strategy to improve transmission efficiency and reliability
[75]	- Eavesdropping	- Confidentiality - Integrity	- HE	Eavesdropping in wireless environments could be mitigated by dividing data	A sensor node in WSNs could not use HE because of the resource constraint
[62]	- Eavesdropping - Replay attack - Impersonation attack - MITM attack	- Integrity - Non-repudiation - Forward secrecy	- Mutual Authentication - Key agreement based on Chebyshev chaotic map	The major advantage is that it provides continuous remote patient supervision that can improve patient health	SPoF can be posed because of the centric medical cloud that manages all patients’ health data
[83]	- Eavesdropping - Replay attack - Impersonation attack - MITM attack	- Anonymity - Authenticity - Forward secrecy	- Mutual Authentication	Medical data cannot be tampered with and is untraceable by means of a blockchain	Using the cloud as a central database of medical data can cause SPoF. This drawback could weaken the advantages of blockchain
[84]	- Replay attack - Eavesdropping - Impersonation attack - MITM attack	- Confidentiality - Integrity - Availability - Anonymity - Lightweight - Unlikability - Forward secrecy - Backward secrecy	- Mutual Authentication	Very low computation cost and energy consumption	Mutual authentication is only considered between the WBAN and controller nodes
[85]	- Eavesdropping - DoS attack - Impersonation attack - Tracking attack	- Confidentiality - Anonymity - Authenticity - Unlinkability	- Authentication - Access Control	A lightweight authentication protocol for resource-constrained RFID tags	When an RFID reader gets an authentication response from a tag, all group keys should be used to decrypt the response until it succeeds
[68]	- Replay attack - DoS attack - Impersonation attack - MITM attack - Spoofing attack - Tracking attack	- Confidentiality - Availability - Anonymity - Forward secrecy - Scalability	- Mutual Authentication	Low computation cost and communication overhead and solves some security flaws of previous authentication schemes	The session key should be generated for security between a tag and reader because the secure channel between the tag and reader was not established
[65]	- Eavesdropping - Replay attack - DoS attack - Tracking attack	- Confidentiality - Anonymity - Forward security	- Mutual Authentication	Low computation cost	Communication cost is a little high compared to other studies
[66]	- Eavesdropping - Replay attack - Impersonation attack - Tracking attack	- Confidentiality - Integrity - Forward secrecy - Backward secrecy	- Mutual Authentication	Low computation power requirement for RFID tag based on the proposed lightweight MRot(x,y) function	It could be vulnerable to secret disclosure attack
[87]	- Replay attack - DoS attack - Spoofing attack	- Confidentiality - Integrity - Availability - Authenticity - Non-repudiation	- Flexible Access Control	The proposed access control model supports a flexible access control policy based on the BTG concept	ID and password are required when the BTG policy is applied, and the proposed access control model did not provide anti-tampering measures
[58]	- Eavesdropping	- Confidentiality	- Compressive sensing	Chaotic CS more energy-efficient and secure than traditional CS	Encrypted data might be easily decrypted if an adversary takes a measurement matrix because the encryption is performed with the same matrix
[56]	- DoS attack	- Availability	- Traceback technique	Lightweight to be applied in a WBAN environment	The proposed technique is only based on WBAN and MAC header and the number of bytes in the DPPM label depends on the network topologies