Figure 2.
The marginal cost/benefit of honest gossip (a–d; darker green: higher marginal benefit of honest gossip, darker red: higher marginal cost of honest gossip; cost and benefit are represented with negative and positive numbers on the right bar) and the predicted behaviour of the gossiper (e–h; green area: honest gossip, red area: dishonest gossip) across the four main interaction types as a function of the fitness interdependence between the gossiper and the target (Vgt) and between the gossiper and the receiver (Vgr). (a,e) Mutualism (receiver/target: +/+; stag-hunt game with a cooperating target; T = 0, S = 0.1); (b,f) antagonism (receiver/target: +/−, snowdrift game with a cooperating target; T = 1.5, S = 0.5); (c,g) antagonism (receiver/target: −/+, helping game with a cooperating target; b = 1, c = 1); (d,h) competition (receiver/target: −/−, punishment game with a defecting target; c = 1, γ = 1).