Identification of mutations that make SARS-CoV-2 more transmissible, virulent, and immune evasive |
Informing genomic surveillance and countermeasure design such as vaccines or monoclonal antibodies |
May enable engineering of more concerning variants of SARS-CoV-2 or other viruses |
Starr et al. (2021) (16) |
Publication of detailed SARS-CoV-2 engineering protocols |
Increased access to recombinant SARS-CoV-2 for response research |
May inform malicious or careless actors on how to create SARS-CoV-2 variants |
Xie et al. (2021) (20) |
Engineering immune evasion for viral vectors |
Improve effectiveness and reusability of viral vector vaccines |
Can create transferable insights on engineering immune evasion for pathogens |
Sandbrink and Koblentz (2021) (23), Roberts et al. (2006) (25) |
Creation of transmissible vaccines |
Use for vaccination of animal reservoirs for eradication of zoonotic viruses at risk of spillover |
Safety risks; ethical and ecological concerns; may create insights on engineering transmissibility, genetic stability, and immune evasion |
Nuismer et al. (2018) (31), Nuismer and Bull (2020) (30), Sandbrink et al. (2021) (32) |
Increased gain-of-function work on future potential pandemic pathogens, not limited to coronaviruses |
Prediction of zoonotic epidemics, possibility to inform biosurveillance targeting, and design of countermeasures |
Risk of accidental exposure and lab release of engineered pathogens; risk of informing the creation of pathogens with enhanced lethality and transmissibility |
Herfst et al. (2012) (34), Imai et al. (2012) (35), Casadevall and Imperiale (2014) (74) |
Large-scale viral collection and characterization |
Prediction of zoonotic epidemics, possibility to inform biosurveillance targeting, and design of countermeasures |
Risk of accidental exposure and release; risk of informing viral engineering by creating large-scale data sets connecting sequence and function |
Carroll et al. (2018) (40), Monrad and Katz (2020) (41), Carlson et al. (2021) (42) |