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Oxford University Press - PMC COVID-19 Collection logoLink to Oxford University Press - PMC COVID-19 Collection
. 2021 Sep 23;136(4):641–665. doi: 10.1002/polq.13241

The Geopolitical Consequences of COVID-19: Assessing Hawkish Mass Opinion in China

Joshua Byun, DG Kim, Sichen Li
PMCID: PMC8661655  PMID: 34908593

PUBLIC COMMENTARY IN THE ERA OF COVID-19 suggests that America’s self-confidence as a global power is at an all-time low. In the months following the acceleration of the pandemic in March 2020, mainstream political discourse was flooded with observations that the United States was one of the worst-hit countries in the world in terms of confirmed cases and deaths,1 that its institutions were “too broken” to fight the pandemic,2 that its “reputation for knowing what it is doing” had been destroyed,3 that its exceptionalism “had blinded the country’s leaders (and many of its citizens) to potentially lifesaving lessons from other countries”,4 and that it had been revealed to be a “failed state.”5 Many also worried that strategic interlocutors abroad would not be oblivious to America’s turmoil. It was argued, for example, that America’s global reputation had “hit rock-bottom.”6 Unease was said to be growing among U.S. allies who viewed Washington’s poor handling of the health crisis as indicative of its declining reliability as a leading power.7

Perhaps most unsettling, however, was the possibility that America’s geopolitical rivals would be tempted to exploit what they perceived to be its moment of weakness—and, by extension, their suddenly enhanced relative power—to challenge its national interests and undermine its global leadership.8 When it came to America’s foremost major-power rival, anecdotal evidence indicated that there was no shortage of domestic voices in China pressuring Beijing to adopt a more assertive foreign policy in light of the disruption COVID-19 had wrought on the United States.9 Chinese leaders were said to be struggling to “[tone] down calls by nationalists to strike Taiwan while the United States… is hobbled by the pandemic and social strife.”10 Others asserted that the Chinese government and state-sponsored media were “reveling” as the United States botched its response to the pandemic,11 and that Beijing would “[move] quickly and adeptly to take advantage of the opening created by U.S. mistakes” with the goal of “fundamentally alter[ing] the United States’ position in global politics and the contest for leadership in the twenty-first century.”12

Many Americans thus take for granted that COVID-19 will transform China’s attitude toward great-power competition. But often implicit in this worry are more basic, untested assumptions about the ways in which the pandemic’s perceived consequences are affecting widespread foreign policy beliefs in China. This study uses original surveys fielded in China during the first six months of the global pandemic to systematically evaluate these assumptions, asking a series of questions about the kinds of foreign policy beliefs that prevail among ordinary Chinese citizens. What is the Chinese public’s outlook on their country’s relative power and influence vis-à-vis the United States in the era of COVID-19? What kinds of policies do they believe China should pursue toward America and its allies? Are the perceived effects of the pandemic really affecting these beliefs in a meaningful way?

Our central findings are twofold. First, the Chinese public in the COVID-19 era holds conspicuously optimistic beliefs about the growth of China’s relative power vis-à-vis the United States: over half the respondents surveyed expect China to catch up with or surpass the United States in terms of relative power sometime during the next decade, and about 17 percent believe that this has already happened. This optimism corresponds remarkably well with the widespread perception that the COVID-19 pandemic is accelerating China’s rise as a global power. Second, there are strong reasons to believe that “COVID-19 optimism” is fueling increased support for hawkish foreign policies among large segments of the Chinese public. The more strongly respondents believe that COVID-19 is hastening the growth of China’s relative power, the more they are likely to support the use of force against the United States and its allies, as well as supplanting U.S. dominance in the Asia-Pacific. Importantly, however, there is some evidence that this is a qualified hawkishness. Detailed analysis of the policy rationales offered by many of our respondents indicate that public support for the use of force against the United States tends to be premised on a situation in which China is being coerced or aggressed upon first.

We make several contributions to the understanding of pandemic politics and international relations. First, our study enriches the International Relations (IR) conversation on power shifts by providing evidence that a major health crisis can seriously jeopardize a great power’s strategic position in the eyes of a rival state’s population. This hints at the possibility of a research agenda that looks beyond traditional economic and military indices to examine how significant shifts in the balance of power—both actual and perceived—can be catalyzed by factors relatively neglected in mainstream IR scholarship. In an era of global interconnectedness, a highly infectious disease can be one such catalyst.

Second, we offer new insights on the determinants of mass foreign policy opinion in China. Specifically, we show that ordinary Chinese citizens assess their country’s options in international politics much like an “intuitive power transition theorist”; the inference that China’s relative power is rapidly catching up to that of its major adversary is reliably associated with the kinds of foreign policy behavior they are willing to support.

Third, this study is, to our knowledge, the first to gather and analyze large-scale data on Chinese public opinion to inform the debate on the geopolitical consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, which has thus far been dominated by journalistic speculation and anecdote. The findings validate some of the concerns voiced in mainstream pandemic commentary while dispelling others. On the one hand, optimistic perceptions about COVID-19’s geopolitical consequences are indeed linked to foreign policy hawkishness in China. On the other hand, we show that this hawkishness is neither as unmeasured nor as wanton as sometimes portrayed in more hard-line Western commentary.

Finally, our findings substantiate a broader conjecture: if the United States wants to reliably project authority and influence abroad in the twenty-first century, it must first put its house in order. Even before the pandemic, political scientists and other informed critics worried that America’s domestic ailments would have lasting repercussions for its foreign policy if left unaddressed.13 Today, debate continues on the extent to which the United States’ failures in the face of COVID-19 might compromise what the late Robert Gilpin once termed its “reputation for power.” Gilpin noted that this reputation is “enormously important,” since “if your strength is recognized, you can generally achieve your aims without having to use it.”14 In this vein, numerous analysts argue that the current health crisis has profoundly hurt America’s reputation for power. “This time it really is different,” Alexander Cooley and Daniel Nexon write. “U.S. global leadership is not simply in retreat; it is unraveling.”15 While this perspective merits close attention, it rests on empirical claims that cannot be adjudicated without a much more systematic analysis of how America’s internal turmoil affects its reputation for power abroad than has thus far been available. We offer one such analysis.

The remainder of this article proceeds as follows: First, we make the case that the perceived effects of a global health crisis on a leading great power should have substantive implications for how the members of a rival power’s domestic public weigh their country’s foreign policy options. Second, we offer an anatomy of the Chinese public’s foreign policy beliefs in the COVID-19 era as revealed by our original surveys. We conclude by discussing the implications of our study for the understanding of COVID-19’s consequences, Chinese public opinion, the balance of power, and U.S. foreign policy in the era of a global pandemic.

FOREIGN POLICY ATTITUDES IN THE SHADOW OF A GLOBAL PANDEMIC

Over the past few decades, scholars have paid increasing attention to the effects of public opinion on the foreign policies of authoritarian regimes. One strand of this research focuses on identifying linkages between mass beliefs and an authoritarian state’s broad external behavior. Important early works, for example, argued that nationalist myths propagated to mobilize domestic support for parochial elite interests or long-term grand strategic objectives may subsequently lock state leaders into an excessively uncompromising and aggressive foreign policy orientation.16 “Even if the elite avoids internalizing its own myths,” Jack Snyder wrote, “it may nonetheless become politically entrapped in its own rhetoric.”17 Adopting a broadly similar reasoning, policy analysts in the United States frequently assert that historically- grounded nationalist sentiments are pushing Chinese leaders toward hawkish foreign policies.18 Thus, according to James Reilly, the Chinese Communist Party today practices a form of “responsive authoritarianism” in its foreign policy, “accommodating popular pressures within its policy-making processes in ways that shore up regime stability.”19

More recent studies investigate the role of authoritarian public opinion in the context of military crises. Mainly inspired by domestic audience costs theory,20 these works examine the possibility that hawkish mass preferences may constrain the policy options available to China’s leaders in militarized disputes with smaller neighbors or the United States.21 In disputes that are perceived to implicate the state’s national honor and status, even authoritarian rulers must be sensitive to the potential costs of being perceived by the public as having backed down or accepted defeat.22 By extension, they may sometimes deliberately cultivate hawkish sentiments within their own population in order to credibly signal resolve during crises.23 The bottom line is that the United States and its allies in East Asia “have an interest in expanding the political space for Chinese leaders to make concessions… [They] should hope that China’s leaders pay domestic costs sufficiently low to allow them to back down in a crisis.”24

In sum, while debate persists on the precise mechanisms that connect the two variables, there is growing consensus among scholars that public opinion conditions authoritarian foreign policy in significant ways.25 Indeed, even the claim that authoritarian leaders shape and shove the public’s views on international affairs in order to secure narrow domestic interests or justify aggressive strategic behaviors presupposes the importance of mass beliefs. There would be no point in seeking to manipulate public opinion if public opinion did not “matter.” It is therefore not surprising that Chinese leaders devote considerable resources to monitoring the public’s attitudes. For example, the Chinese government reportedly keeps more than two million “microblog monitors” on its payroll to track public sentiments expressed online.26 Some have gone so far as to argue that Beijing “probably knows the public’s opinion better and reacts to it more directly than even the U.S. government.”27

But what determines the content of public opinion? What kinds of events might prompt shifts in the average person’s overall beliefs about international politics and the foreign policy options at their country’s disposal? Answering this question is critical for understanding public opinion’s influence on authoritarian foreign policy in general, and Chinese foreign policy in particular. As Jessica Chen Weiss notes, “If domestic audiences in China… want the government to take a tougher foreign policy stance, then claims about domestic pressure are harder to dismiss… But if public attitudes are more dovish than the status quo in Chinese foreign policy, then foreigners indeed have grounds for skepticism when Chinese officials claim that their hands are tied by domestic opinion.”28 This position is strengthened by evidence that the success of the Chinese government’s efforts to manage the domestic costs of conciliatory policies depends to a large extent on the ex ante distribution of foreign policy beliefs among its public.29 In short, once it is recognized that public opinion matters a great deal for China’s foreign policy, it becomes pertinent to ask what factors influence the Chinese public’s actual beliefs and preferences.

We argue that the perceived effects of a global pandemic can function as a powerful heuristic that shapes the public’s foreign policy attitudes. There is reason to believe that a pandemic’s widely publicized impact on the livelihoods of individual nations should influence the ordinary person’s outlook about their country’s growth in relative power. Accurately assessing trajectories in the balance of power is a demanding task that most citizens are neither equipped nor inclined to carry out.30 Instead, members of the public are likely to rely on “fast and frugal” decision criteria—that is, “heuristics”—to draw broad-stroke conclusions about their country’s future power and influence.31 As a high-impact event that inflicts salient economic, social, and even military tolls on numerous countries on a more or less simultaneous basis, a global disease outbreak represents exactly the kind of indicator that members of the public should be expected to pick up as a heuristic to update their “images” about the international power balance. “In politics,” Robert Jervis observed, “sudden events influence images more than do slow developments.”32 The perception that a global pandemic has debilitated a geopolitical rival while leaving one’s own country relatively strong is likely to become an especially important proxy used by individuals—particularly those normally uninformed or apathetic about international politics—to make optimistic inferences about broader trends in the two competitors’ relative power and influence. This leads to our first hypothesis: Members of the public who perceive that a global pandemic has disproportionately weakened a geopolitical rival will be more optimistic about their country’s growth in relative power than those who do not.

We further argue that updated beliefs about relative power trajectories should lead to changes in the public’s foreign policy preferences. A large literature on power shifts holds that “the redistribution of wealth and power toward a particular state in an international system tends to stimulate the state to demand a larger bundle of welfare and security objectives.”33 This classic argument yields a baseline expectation about how foreign policy attitudes will be altered in the shadow of a global pandemic. Borrowing A.F.K. Organski’s words, when the pandemic is perceived to have disproportionately weakened a dominant rival, actors should infer a “reason to believe that they can rival or surpass in power the dominant nation” and become less willing “to accept a subordinate position in international affairs when dominance would give them much greater benefits and privileges.”34 Members of the public that internalize this reasoning will be more likely to support assertive or even aggressive foreign policy options should their government deem them necessary. This leads to our second hypothesis: Members of the public who become more optimistic about their country’s growth in relative power because of the perceived effects of a global pandemic will be more willing to support hawkish foreign policies than those who do not.

The linkage between perceptions of rising power and hawkish preferences is intuitive, although more complicated than often supposed. Most works devoted to the subject today assume that rising powers should have little incentive to act upon their aggressive preferences as long as they continue to rise; instead, they have a vested interest in delaying the onset of hostilities in order to achieve further growth in relative power.35 This point, however, should not detract from the basic insight that individuals who perceive their country’s relative rise in power vis-à-vis its competitors typically aspire to change the status quo in its favor and tend to be more optimistic about the prospect of using force to do so successfully. This will be especially true for individuals who sense that rival powers are already engaged in aggressive behavior against their home state. In this setting, taking advantage of the state’s improved power position to revise the international status quo against hostile rivals becomes more appealing.

Taking stock, we wager that members of the public think like “intuitive power transition theorists,” relying on rough-and-ready cues from their information environment to infer trends in the balance of power and to update the menu of foreign policy options they are willing to support. If the perceived effects of a global pandemic become a heuristic that informs this process, they will shape not only judgments about near-term strategic fluctuations but also expectations about the relative power position a country will occupy 10 or 20 years down the road. This framework offers clues to how the Chinese public’s foreign policy attitudes should evolve in the era of COVID-19. In a context in which a global health crisis is perceived to have reduced a rival great power’s strategic vitality, the Chinese public will adopt a more optimistic outlook on the growth of their country’s relative power. This, in turn, will translate into increased support for hawkish foreign policies. The remainder of this article interrogates these claims with original survey evidence.

THE ANATOMY OF FOREIGN POLICY BELIEFS IN CHINA AMID THE GLOBAL PANDEMIC

We offer an anatomy of foreign policy beliefs in China at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. The goal is (1) to map the relationship between the perceived effects of the pandemic and beliefs about China’s global power position in Chinese public opinion, and (2) to explore the linkage between such beliefs and the willingness to support hawkish foreign policies. Toward this end, we fielded two public opinion surveys in mainland China in the spring and fall of 2020 (nspring = 1,010; nfall = 1,252). Respondents were recruited through Qualtrics’ Chinese partners and invited to participate anonymously in exchange for cash compensation. Each survey used quotas based on demographic features such as gender, age, education level, and income to match census representation. Individual characteristics such as political knowledge and nationalist sentiment were also measured. Details on sample characteristics and survey wordings—including the Chinese-language versions—are provided in the online appendix.

Our internet-recruited samples are similar in composition to online samples used in other recent studies of Chinese public opinion. Recent research by Xiaojun Li, Weiyi Shi, and Boliang Zhu has found that point estimates of public opinion generated by such samples largely mirror those produced by subsamples of internet users in nationally representative surveys, particularly when using demographic weights to ameliorate disparities with the benchmark surveys (as we do).36 Our online samples are thus useful to the extent that they reliably showcase the beliefs of internet-active citizens, “an important constituency for regime stability and leadership survival in China.”37

Optimism about China’s Rising Power, Spring 2020

We begin with a descriptive overview of the Chinese public’s outlook on their country’s position in the global balance of power. The central aim of our first survey was to obtain informative snapshots of these beliefs in the early months of the pandemic. We chose to focus mainly on perceived shifts in the balance of military power. Our wager here is that most people intuitively understand “a state’s effective power [as] ultimately a function of its military forces and how they compare with the military forces of rival states.”38 Thus, respondents were asked the following question: “How long do you think it will take for China’s military power to catch up with and surpass that of the United States?” Response choices included “less than 5 years,” “5–10 years,” “10–20 years,” “20–30 years,” “30–50 years,” and “more than 50 years.” Those who selected “less than 5 years” were directed to a follow-up question that asked them to further specify their answer, offering a range of response options from “3–5 years” to “China is already stronger than America.” These questions help us construct a granular picture of the ordinary Chinese citizen’s outlook about their country’s relative power position vis-à-vis its major rival.

Figure 1 visualizes public outlooks about China’s military growth as revealed by responses to our first survey, the bulk of which were collected in March and April 2020. A plurality of the respondents—57 percent—believe that China will catch up to the United States militarily within the next 10 years. Moreover, about 33 percent believe that China will catch up within the next five years, and 17 percent believe that China is already as strong as or stronger than the United States.

FIGURE 1.

FIGURE 1

Beliefs about China’s Rising Power vis-à-vis the United States

Additional analysis presented in the online appendix disaggregates these responses along various demographic traits. To summarize, high levels of political knowledge are associated with diminished optimism over China’s relative rise: 40 percent of individuals who scored below the median on a series of political knowledge questions believe that China will catch up to the United States within the next five years, while only 25 percent of those who scored above the median share this outlook. A similar pattern is displayed for education: 37 percent of individuals who have not received a college education believe that China will catch up to the United States within the next five years, compared with 26 percent of those who have received a college education. Age, gender, and nationalistic attitudes are also significantly associated with optimistic outlooks, while income is not.

The main takeaway is that the Chinese public in the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic held beliefs about the U.S.-China power trajectory that were considerably more optimistic than, say, assessments made by most authoritative scholars or informed commentators on the subject.39 It is difficult to compare these outlooks with those that prevailed before the global COVID-19 outbreak, since few previous surveys on the Chinese public’s international outlook match ours in level of detail. However, first-cut comparisons with data from earlier years do suggest a recent spike in public optimism. For example, surveys administered in 2007, 2012, and 2017 by the nonprofit “Committee of 100” found the percentage of respondents who believed that China would become the “world’s leading superpower in 20 years” to be 55 percent, 58 percent, and 60 percent for the respective years.40 The corresponding figure inferred from our survey responses would be 75.4 percent.

COVID-19 Optimism and Support for Hawkish Foreign Policies, Fall 2020

In our follow-up efforts, we aimed to assess how the widely publicized effects of the COVID-19 pandemic were shaping public optimism about China’s relative power trajectory. Toward this end, our second survey, administered from August 2020, asked the extent to which respondents believe the pandemic would accelerate China’s relative power growth. As shown in Figure 2, about 78 percent agree or strongly agree with this statement: “Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, China will catch up more rapidly with the U.S. in economic and military power.” Again, it is worth noting how these responses contrast with the judgments of more informed analysts. For instance, a snap poll conducted by the Teaching, Research, and International Policy Project in May 2020 found that the majority of IR scholars active in American academic institutions (54 percent) do not expect the pandemic to “fundamentally alter the distribution of power in world politics.”41 Note also the contrast with results from recent U.S. surveys conducted by the Pew Research Center, which found that about half of the American public expects China’s international influence to decrease as a result of the pandemic, and less than 30 percent expect U.S. power and influence to be hurt by the outbreak.42

FIGURE 2.

FIGURE 2

Beliefs about COVID-19 and the China-U.S. Power Balance, Fall 2020

The next component of the survey focuses on the linkage between “COVID-19 optimism” and foreign policy preferences. We are specifically interested in examining whether optimistic expectations about China’s relative power growth following COVID-19 are associated with increased support for aggressive foreign policies designed to change the international status quo. For this purpose, the survey asked respondents to indicate their level of support for a variety of hawkish foreign policy options. Following a common practice in research on Chinese foreign policy attitudes,43 our main questions asked respondents to indicate their willingness to support the use of military force to resolve ongoing disputes between China and a foreign country. The questions thus took the following form:

Would you support or oppose the following policies?

  • Use military force against the American naval forces in the South China Sea to resolve territorial disputes.

  • Use military force against the Japanese naval forces in the East China Sea to resolve territorial disputes.

  • Use military force against Taiwan for reunification.

A final question asked about the respondent’s support for “pushing out the United States’ influence from the Asia-Pacific to establish China’s hegemony over the region.” In each question, responses were collected along a 7-point Likert scale ranging from “strongly oppose” to “strongly support.”

For our main analysis, we rescaled our measure of the dependent variables to range from 0 to 100, so that changes in its value represent percentage-point changes in public support for the given hawkish foreign policy. This allows us to interpret our results in a manner that closely resembles how public opinion data are typically presented by mainstream media and political commentary. The analysis was conducted with a battery of demographic control variables, including gender, age, income, and levels of education and political knowledge. Estimates are obtained using ordinary least squares models with robust standard errors.

Skeptics might raise the possibility of reverse causality as a result of motivated reasoning. Specifically, individuals with ex ante hawkish foreign policy attitudes might be predisposed to interpret the geopolitical consequences of COVID-19 in a way that is favorable to hawkish policies. This suspicion is quite reasonable, particularly given recent findings that Chinese public attitudes lean “more hawkish than dovish,” especially among internet users, who are arguably “the most visible and vocal segment of the Chinese population.”44

To account for this concern, our analysis controls for baseline levels of hawkish foreign policy orientation. The main measure we use is “military assertiveness,” captured by the extent to which the respondent agrees or disagrees with statements such as “The best way to ensure world peace is through China’s military strength” or “Going to war is unfortunate, but sometimes the only solution to international problems” (see the online appendix for details). If the COVID-19 optimism variable still has predictive power after controlling for this potential confounder, we can be more confident that the perceived effects of the pandemic shape foreign policy hawkishness independent of the initial attitudes of the observer.

Table 1 displays our results. We confirm that individuals who are more optimistic about China’s relative power growth in the wake of COVID-19 are more likely to support hawkish foreign policies. In the case of policies toward the United States, the probability that a respondent will support the use of military force against the American navy to address territorial disputes in the South China Sea jumps by approximately 50 percentage points when moving from the lowest value of COVID-19 optimism (strongly disagree) to the highest value (strongly agree) with other variables held constant. Corresponding increases in predicted probabilities for supporting the use of force against Japan and Taiwan are about 40 percentage points and 30 percentage points, respectively (see Figure 2 in Appendix B).

Table 1.

COVID-19 Optimism and Support for Hawkish Foreign Policy

Use of Force against U.S. Use of Force against Japan Use of Force against Taiwan Regional Hegemony
COVID-19 optimism 0.05 *** 0.03 *** 0.03 ** 0.04 ***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Military assertiveness 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.13*** 0.13***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Education −0.03*** −0.04*** −0.01 −0.02***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.01) (0.004)
Male −0.02 0.004 0.07*** 0.04*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Age 0.0002 −0.0003 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Income 0.01** 0.01** 0.02*** 0.01**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Political knowledge −0.03 −0.02 0.06* −0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.02 0.15***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Adjusted R2 0.24 0.23 0.17 0.22
N 1,252 1,252 1,252 1,252

Source: Analyses are based on the Fall 2020 survey.

Note: Robust standard errors appear in parentheses.

*

p < .05;

**

p < .01;

***

p < .001.

Importantly, COVID-19 optimism predicts increased support for hawkish foreign policies even when controlling for military assertiveness, although the coefficients are slightly smaller than when the control is omitted (see online appendix for comparison). This suggests that our hypothesized mechanism—centered around perceptions of shifting relative power driven by the pandemic’s geopolitical impact—operates distinctly from motivated reasoning and ex ante policy preferences. In the online appendix, we present the results of a wide array of alternative specifications, including those that account for alternative confounders such as nationalism. The effect of COVID-19 optimism is robust across these different analyses. Taken together, these findings point to a powerful relationship between the perceived geopolitical impact of COVID-19 and mass foreign policy opinion in China.

Rationalizing Hawkishness

Finally, we were interested in how optimistic individuals rationalized foreign policy hawkishness, particularly vis-à-vis China’s main geopolitical rival. Thus, in an open-ended question at the end of the fall survey, we asked respondents to briefly explain in their own words why they support or oppose using force to resolve disputes with the United States in the South China Sea.

A structural topic modeling analysis detailed in the online appendix reveals systematic differences in the topics mentioned by individuals who believe that COVID-19 will hasten China’s relative rise vis-à-vis those who do not. As one might expect, individuals with high levels of COVID-19 optimism are significantly less likely to discuss the negative economic consequences of war (Topic 1) and less likely to stress that force should be used only as a last resort (Topic 10). At the same time, they are more likely to underscore that U.S. intervention in the South China Sea infringes upon China’s territorial sovereignty (Topic 2), and that China should use military force to deter provocations from its rivals (Topic 4). However, it is worth noting that although optimistic individuals are more open to the idea of using force, they continue to emphasize the disruptive effects of war (Topic 6) and that maintaining peace should be a priority (Topic 9).

We now take a closer look at the word choices or “tone” of optimistic respondents vis-à-vis non-optimistic respondents. Figure 3 visualizes the lexical choices or “fightin’ words” of individuals who “strongly agree” or “agree” that China will rise faster as a result of COVID-19, as well as those of the remaining sample.45 The size of each word is proportional to the frequency with which it appears in the open-ended responses. Responses by individuals who are either agnostic or pessimistic about China’s relative power trajectory in the wake of COVID-19 feature keywords such as “result in” (导致), “no” (没), and “economy” (经济). Responses by optimistic individuals tend to be more lexically diverse. At the same time, they more often feature terms such as “use” (动用), “interests” (利益), “trust” (相信), and “make trouble” (惹事).

FIGURE 3.

FIGURE 3

Fightin’ Words by Level of COVID-19 Optimism

The foregoing exercise is useful because, having identified the words associated with each group’s responses, we can proceed to examine the different contexts in which they appear. The results are telling. Overall, we find that those who are less optimistic about China’s future rise use more moderate language in their rationalizations and tend to worry about the economic consequences of war. One respondent reasons, “Using force against the United States will offer it legitimate excuses to fight with China, and attack China in all aspects including the economy. The gains do not make up for the losses.” Other examples include “The best solution to the South China Sea issue should be peaceful, although it will be difficult to find [such a solution]. But once war breaks out, the world will face an unmanageable situation”; “The outbreak of war will only result in economic recession”; and “Using force will make people’s lives fall into an abyss of misery for both countries. I do not want it to happen.”

Those who are optimistic about China’s power trajectory tend to give more diversified answers, including some that are quite pacifist. For example, one respondent states categorically that “using force cannot solve the problem.” Another writes, “Objection. As long as there is war, the people will become the victims.” Other respondents express an intent to follow the state’s lead: “Keep neutral and trust the decisions made by my country”; “Trust decisions made by the state leaders.” As a group, however, these individuals are much more likely to give more assertive rationalizations. These sometimes involve measured statements, such as “Extreme circumstances call for extreme measures. Using force is not the only solution to the problem, but sometimes using it properly can solve the issue”; “We can try using force if negotiations do not solve the problem. China’s territorial integrity must remain intact”; and “If [the South China Sea issue] cannot be solved peacefully, then [we] can only use force.” At other times, the responses veer more nationalistic and militant. Examples include, “There is no need to tolerate the intolerable”; “It is necessary to maintain territorial integrity by using force”; “The South China Sea belongs to China. Even though a thousand miles away, those who affront China will pay.”

We were not surprised to find that optimistic respondents tend to couch their foreign policy preferences in more assertive language. What was surprising, however, was the lengths to which many of these individuals went to qualify their hawkish sentiments in the brief space allotted. In most instances, expressions of support for the use of force are explicitly bound to a scenario wherein China is already being aggressed upon or bullied by the United States. One respondent writes that “although using force is not the best way to resolve disputes, it is the best solution when a foreign country tries to impose hegemony. China is sacred and inviolable.” Another states, “We will not attack unless we are attacked. If we are attacked, we will fight to the end.” Numerous others concur: “If the United States takes a hard line, we should do so as well”; “As long as our country’s basic interests are not infringed, I do not wish for war to happen. But if it does, I and my people will firmly support driving out the United States, even if it costs our lives”; “The United States harassed and provoked us over our territory using its military force. Why does it behave this way if it does not want a fight? It is better to fight to the end. We need to defend ourselves when getting bullied”; and “Based on the United States’ current attitude, it is highly likely that conflict will break out. It is not that we support using force, but we are forced to use it. Chinese people do not make trouble but have no fear of trouble!”46

The perceived effects of the COVID-19 pandemic have not altered the foreign policy beliefs of every citizen in China. But among the many who do expect the pandemic to accelerate the rise of Chinese power, challenging the United States and its allies militarily and establishing Chinese hegemony over the Asia-Pacific tend to be perceived as more attractive solutions to China’s problems abroad. In short, ordinary citizens intuitively connect optimistic outlooks about China’s relative power to support for foreign policy hawkishness. However, at least in the case of China’s rivalry with the United States, this is a qualified hawkishness. While most respondents who are optimistic about China’s rising power in the wake of COVID-19 are clearly more willing to contemplate aggressive measures against the United States, they do not advocate the use of force as a blanket policy measure. Instead, there is a strong reactive and conditional element to their support.

CONCLUSION

Once informed that a global pandemic has weakened an established great power, how will the mass public of its major rival update their beliefs about their country’s future position in the international system? And what will they propose their government do in regions and issue areas where the key interests of both countries are at stake? In this article, we have used original surveys fielded in China during the first six months of the COVID-19 pandemic to address these questions. We find that ordinary Chinese citizens are highly optimistic about China’s future position in the global balance of power, and these attitudes are likely shaped to a significant extent by perceptions of how COVID-19 pandemic has impacted the relative power trajectories of China and its major geopolitical rival. We further find that the more optimistic individuals are about China’s rise in the wake of COVID-19, the more likely they are to express support for various hawkish foreign policy options. That said, much of this support is extended on the premise of initial hostility by external actors.

Before discussing the broader contributions of our findings, it is worth acknowledging their limitations. Two, in our view, merit explicit consideration. First, critics may charge that our study can say little about how China’s approach to foreign policy will evolve as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, since our empirical investigations concern the attitudes of China’s public and not the elites who ultimately guide its behavior abroad. While this point is important to keep in mind whenever making statements about international politics using public opinion data, it does not diminish the instructiveness of our results. As described earlier, there are good reasons why policymakers in both Washington and Beijing pay close attention to Chinese public opinion, and why many scholars do so as well. Indeed, a large part of the anxiety displayed in U.S. public discourse regarding COVID-19’s potential influence on China’s external behavior has to do with claims that popular opinion in China is “clamoring” for Beijing to adopt more hawkish foreign policies as the United States reels from the pandemic.47

Moreover, even if we accept that the last word in foreign policy is the prerogative of leaders and elites, there is a strong case to be made for looking first to the attitudes of the Chinese public. Recent anecdotal and survey evidence suggest that China’s leadership, if anything, might be even more predisposed to assertive policies abroad than ordinary citizens. As one scholar writes, recent statements by Beijing’s political elite evince “support for more ambitions policies,” bolstered by the increasingly widespread belief that “Washington’s commitment to East Asia has declined and that China will sooner or later replace the United States as the world’s number one military power.”48 In the same vein, a 2012 Peking University survey comparing elite and mass attitudes found that government officials, scholars, business leaders, and media professionals tend to be considerably more hawkish in foreign policy outlook than ordinary citizens.49 To the extent that hawkish mass opinion reinforces and facilitates these attitudes, there is much to be learned from investigating how it is shaped by COVID-19’s perceived impact on international affairs.

A second limitation, arguably more important, is that our study offers few clues as to how resilient the patterns we have identified will prove to be over time. We have offered detailed snapshots of Chinese foreign policy attitudes during the first six months of the pandemic, but it is unclear whether a significant ideational shift will be evident five or 10 years from now. Future research on the pandemic’s effects should continue to explore this issue. Our findings represent a sturdy groundwork for this effort to proceed.

These caveats notwithstanding, this study advances our understanding of the COVID-19 pandemic and international relations in important ways. First, our study suggests that the effects of a global disease outbreak can catalyze significant shifts in how individuals perceive the global balance of power. We hope that this finding will encourage the IR subfield to broaden its conversation on power shifts to accommodate salient twenty-first century political developments. Aaron Friedberg wrote in 1988 that “[s]hifts in the distribution of power within an international system may be ‘real’ in some sense, but they may fail to have any impact unless and until they are perceived.”50 In this vein, the COVID-19 pandemic has become an agent of perceptual change in China; for many people, it will likely be remembered as a landmark event in the story of China’s rise to great-power status. Anecdotes prevalent in mainstream political discourse had already hinted at such an effect, not only in China but in other countries as well. “America has not done badly, it has done exceptionally badly,” one French commentator observed. “Sometime in 2021 we come out of this crisis and we will be in 2030… There will be more Asia in the world and less West.”51 It may well be the case that such beliefs are mistaken or exaggerated.52 But the fact remains that perceived changes in the balance of power can exert an outsized influence on international relations. In the twenty-first century, these changes may be triggered by factors that have yet to make serious inroads into mainstream IR scholarship. Global pandemics might be one of them; others might include climate events or the rise of incompetent populist leaders. Political scientists studying power shifts disservice their own relevance if they decline to explicitly address such developments.

Second, this study adds to our knowledge on the sources of hawkish foreign policy opinion in China—a crucial point of inquiry among scholars and policymakers alike. We have argued that ordinary Chinese citizens assess their country’s foreign policy options much like an “intuitive power transition theorist.” This resonates with Joshua Kertzer, Jonathan Renshon, and Keren Yarhi-Milo’s claim that individual judgments about resolve seem to be governed by a “relatively ubiquitous mental model”—that is, people tend to rely on the same indicators that deterrence theorists have traditionally highlighted in assessing an actor’s resolve in international politics.53 An analogous model is suggested by our findings: ordinary members of the Chinese public appear to make inferences about how a global pandemic affects their country’s foreign policy options in a manner that would be familiar to the classical power transition theorists. These results should caution scholars against presuming that there is something sui generis or culturally determined in Chinese public opinion.

Third, ours is the most detailed empirical analysis to date of the Chinese public’s foreign policy preferences in the context of the ongoing global pandemic. The findings can inform the broader discussion about COVID-19’s geopolitical consequences. On the one hand, our findings corroborate a speculation that has now become routine in American political commentary: the widespread belief that the COVID-19 pandemic has altered global power trajectories between China and the United States indeed appears to be driving foreign policy hawkishness among the Chinese public. It might be true, as Daniel Drezner has argued, that in the absence of a fundamental shift in the distribution of hard-power resources and global interests “COVID-19 is unlikely to have the transformative effects on international relations that so many are confidently predicting.”54 According to our results, however, this is clearly not how the Chinese public views the matter. On the other hand, we also find important nuances in these hawkish attitudes that are typically overlooked in mainstream discussion. Crucially, much of the foreign policy hawkishness espoused by the Chinese public is best described as a qualified hawkishness; there is some reason to believe that blanket support for aggressive behavior abroad will not be forthcoming from the Chinese public in the absence of some perceived affront by external actors.

Finally, our findings should be of interest to anyone who is concerned about U.S. global authority and leadership. In a 2013 book titled Foreign Policy Begins at Home, Richard Haas, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, warned that the United States’ failure to redress its domestic ailments “directly threaten America’s ability to project power and exert influence overseas, to compete in the global marketplace, to generate the resources needed to promote the full range of U.S. interests abroad, and to set a compelling example that will influence the thinking and behavior of others.”55 The results of our study corroborate this insight. The COVID-19 pandemic’s devastating impact on the United States—and perhaps the political dysfunction, deep-rooted racial injustices, yawning economic inequalities, and dilapidated health care infrastructure it has shed new light on—appears to have significantly eroded America’s reputation for power among large segments of the Chinese public. The result is that many are more willing to support aggressive and potentially destabilizing policies toward the United States and its allies than before. Accordingly, for those of us who care about America’s ability to reliably project power and influence abroad in the twenty-first century, and who believe that this is ultimately a good thing, our findings point to yet another reason why the United States must decisively defeat COVID-19. Foreign policy begins at home.

Supporting Information

Additional supporting information may be found online in the Supporting Information section at the end of the article.

Supplementary Material

polq13241-sup-0001-FINAL_Byun_Online_Appendix_Geopolitical_Consequences_of_COVID19_final

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Original survey data used in this article were gathered as a part of the “China From the Ground Up” project administered by the China Data Lab at the University of California, San Diego, supported by the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Henry Luce Foundation, and private donors to the 21st Century China Center. For valuable comments and advice, the authors thank Eliza Gheorghe, Robert Gulotty, Weiyi Shi, Yiqing Xu, and Arthur Zeyang Yu. They are also grateful for feedback from participants at the UC San Diego’s Workshop on International Politics, the UC San Diego 21st Century China Center’s China Research Workshop, the University of Chicago’s Workshop on International Politics, the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, the International Studies Association Annual Convention, and the Peace Science Society International Conference.

Biographies

JOSHUA BYUN is a Ph.D. candidate in the department of political science at the University of Chicago. His research focuses on questions related to grand strategy, alliance politics, and military effectiveness.

D.G. KIM is a Ph.D. candidate in the department of political science at the University of California, San Diego. His research focuses on foreign policy, public opinion, race, ethnicity, and politics.

SICHEN LI is a Ph.D. candidate in the department of political science at the University of California, San Diego. Her research focuses on the political economy of high-tech trade and great power relations.

Footnotes

1

Soo Kim, “The U.S. Now Has over 20 Percent of the World’s Total Coronavirus Cases,” Newsweek, 31 March 2020, accessed at https://www.newsweek.com/us-now-has-over-20-percent-worlds-total-coronavirus-cases-1495241, 27 June 2020.

2

Michelle Goldberg, “America Is Too Broken to Fight the Coronavirus,” New York Times, 22 June 2020, accessed at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/22/opinion/us-coronavirus-trump.html?smtyp%A0=%A0cur%26smid%A0=%A0fb-nytimes, 3 September 2020.

3

Stephen Walt, “The Death of America’s Competence,” Foreign Policy, 23 March 2020, accessed at https://foreignpolicy-com.proxy.uchicago.edu/2020/03/23/death-american-competence-reputation-coronavirus/, 27 June 2020.

4

Jeremy Konyndyk, “Exceptionalism Is Killing Americans: An Insular Political Culture Failed the Test of the Pandemic,” Foreign Affairs, 8 June 2020, accessed at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-06-08/exceptionalism-killing-americans, 23 July 2020.

5

George Packer, “We Are Living in a Failed State,” The Atlantic, 21 April 2020, accessed at https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/06/underlying-conditions/610261/, 27 June 2020.

6

Simon Tisdall, “U.S.’s Global Reputation Hits Rock-Bottom over Trump’s Coronavirus Response,” The Guardian, 12 April 2020, accessed at https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/apr/12/us-global-reputation-rock-bottom-donald-trump-coronavirus, 27 June 2020.

7

For example, see Lara Jakes, “U.S. Leads the World’s Virus Fight? That’s News to the World,” New York Times, 14 May 2020, accessed at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/08/us/politics/trump-coronavirus-alliances.html, 27 June 2020; Kathrin Hille et al., “The Trump Factor: Asian Allies Question America’s Reliability,” Financial Times, 14 June 2020, accessed at https://www.ft.com/content/74576c3a-6303-4ba0-bbe3-15b563ce6019, 28 June 2020; and Ishaan Tharoor, “The Pandemic and the Waning of American Prestige,” Washington Post, 26 April 2020, accessed at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/04/27/pandemic-waning-american-prestige/, 23 July 2020.

8

For example, see David E. Sanger, Eric Schmitt, and Edward Wong, “As Virus Toll Preoccupies U.S., Rivals Test Limits of American Power,” New York Times, 4 June 2020, accessed at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/01/us/politics/coronavirus-global-competition-russia-china-iran-north-korea.html, 27 July 2020; and Noah Barkin, “In the Post-Pandemic Cold War, America Is Losing Europe,” Foreign Policy, 19 May 2020, accessed at https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/19/coronavirus-pandemic-europe-opinion-polls-united-states-china-losing/, 2 July 2020.

9

Most scholars and policymakers now recognize that a basically competitive, adversarial relationship has taken shape between the United States and China at least since the early 2010s. See, for example, Adam P. Liff and G. John Ikenberry, “Racing Toward Tragedy? China’s Rise, Military Competition in the Asia-Pacific, and the Security Dilemma,” International Security 39 (Fall 2014): 52–91; Nina Silove, “The Pivot before the Pivot: U.S. Strategy to Preserve the Power Balance in Asia,” International Security 40 (Spring 2016): 45–88; Thomas Wright, “The Return to Great-Power Rivalry Was Inevitable,” The Atlantic, 12 September 2020, accessed at https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/liberal-international-order-free-world-trump-authoritarianism/569881/, 28 July 2020; John J. Mearsheimer, “Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order,” International Security 43 (Spring 2019): 7–50; and U.S. Department of State, “A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision,” 4 November 2019, accessed at https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Free-and-Open-Indo-Pacific-4Nov2019.pdf, 28 June 2020.

10

David Pierson, Alice Su, and Shashank Bengali, “China Reins in Nationalists Clamoring for an Invasion of Taiwan,” Los Angeles Times, 8 June 2020, accessed at https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2020-06-08/china-taiwan-nationalism-pla, 28 June 2020; see also Minnie Chan, “China Tries to Calm ‘Nationalist Fever’ as Calls for Invasion of Taiwan Grow,” South China Morning Post, 10 May 2020, accessed at https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3083696/china-tries-calm-nationalist-fever-calls-invasion-taiwan-grow, 27 June 2020; and Jack Detsch, “China Uses Pandemic to Boost Military Pressure on Taiwan,” Foreign Policy, 12 May 2020, accessed at https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/12/china-coronavirus-military-pressure-taiwan/, 28 June 2020.

11

Javier C. Hernández, “China Revels as Unrest Spreads across U.S.,” New York Times, 3 June 2020, accessed at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/02/world/asia/china-george-floyd.html, 27 June 2020.

12

Kurt M. Campbell and Rush Doshi, “The Coronavirus Could Reshape Global Order,” Foreign Affairs, 18 March 2020, accessed at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-03-18/coronavirus-could-reshape-global-order, 27 June 2020.

13

See, for example, Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World (New York: W.W. Norton, 2008); Jeff D. Colgan and Robert O. Keohane, “The Liberal Order Is Rigged: Fix It Now or Watch It Wither,” Foreign Affairs 86 (May/June 2017): 36–44; and Célia Belin, “When American Politics Jeopardize American Global Leadership,” Brookings Institution, 16 October 2017, accessed at https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/10/16/when-american-politics-jeopardize-american-global-leadership/, 23 July 2020.

14

Robert Gilpin, War and Change in International Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 31.

15

Alexander Cooley and Daniel H. Nexon, “How Hegemony Ends: The Unraveling of American Power,” Foreign Affairs 99 (July/August 2020): 143–157.

16

Important works include Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); Stephen Van Evera, “Hypotheses on Nationalism and War,” International Security 18 (Spring 1994): 5–39; Jack Snyder and Karen Ballentine, “Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas,” International Security 21 (Fall 1996): 5–50; and Thomas Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947–1958 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).

17

Snyder, Myths of Empire, 42.

18

For example, see Jennie Welch, “China’s Domestic Pressures Shape Assertive Foreign Policy,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 16 November 2012, accessed at https://www.cogitasia.com/chinas-domestic-pressures-shape-assertive-foreign-policy/, 2 July 2020; Oriana Skylar Mastro, “China Can’t Stay Home,” National Interest 135 (January/February 2015): 38–45; and John Richard Cookson, “The Real Threat of Chinse Nationalism,” National Interest, 28 August 2020, accessed at https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-real-threat-chinese-nationalism-13729, 2 July 2020. Chinese officials themselves have sometimes justified assertive military behavior with references to domestic public opinion. For example, see Ying Fu and Shicun Wu, “South China Sea: How We Got to This Stage,” National Interest, 9 May 2015, accessed at https://nationalinterest.org/feature/south-china-sea-how-we-got-stage-16118?page=0%2C3, 2 July 2020.

19

James Reilly, Strong Society, Smart State: The Rise of Public Opinion in China’s Japan Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 1–2.

20

James D. Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,” American Political Science Review 88 (September 1994): 577–592; and Kenneth A. Schultz, “Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises,” American Political Science Review 92 (December 1998): 829–844.

21

Important works include Jessica L. Weeks, “Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve,” International Organization 62 (Winter 2008): 35–64; Jessica Chen Weiss, Powerful Patriots: Nationalist Protest in China’s Foreign Relations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014); Kai Quek and Alastair Iain Johnston, “Can China Back Down? Crisis De-escalation in the Shadow of Popular Opposition,” International Security 42 (Winter 2017–2018): 7–36; Mark S. Bell and Kai Quek, “Authoritarian Public Opinion and the Democratic Peace,” International Organization 72 (Winter 2018): 227–242; and Jessica Chen Weiss and Allan Dafoe, “Authoritarian Audiences, Rhetoric, and Propaganda in International Crises: Evidence from China,” International Studies Quarterly 63 (December 2019): 963–973.

22

On this point, see Hein E. Goemans, War and Punishment: The Causes of War Termination and the First World War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press); and Alexandre Debs and Hein E. Goemans, “Regime Type, the Fate of Leaders, and War,” American Political Science Review 104 (August 2010): 430–445.

23

See Reilly, Strong Society, Smart State; and Weiss, Powerful Patriots.

24

Quek and Johnston, “Can China Back Down,” 10.

25

For a review of the recent literature, see Susan D. Hyde and Elizabeth N. Saunders, “Recapturing Regime Type in International Relations: Leaders, Institutions, and Agency Space,” International Organization 74 (Spring 2020): 363–395.

26

BBC News, “China Employs Two Million Microblog Monitors State Media Say,” 4 October 2017, accessed at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-24396957, 2 July 2020; and Michelle Fong and Jennifer Cheung, “If You Like Killing Time on Social Media, China Has a Job for You,” Public Radio International, 31 July 2014, accessed at https://www.pri.org/stories/2014-07-31/if-you-killing-time-social-networks-china-has-job-you, 3 July 2020.

27

Quoted in Reilly, Strong Society, Smart State, 35.

28

Jessica Chen Weiss, “How Hawkish Is the Chinese Public? Another Look at ‘Rising Nationalism’ and Chinese Foreign Policy,” Journal of Contemporary China 28 (March 2019): 679–680.

29

Quek and Johnston, “Can China Back Down,” 2934. Not surprisingly, several studies in recent years have attempted to systematically map the Chinese public’s foreign policy attitudes. See Alastair Iain Johnston and Daniela Stockmann, “Chinese Attitudes toward the United States and Americans,” in Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Anti-Americanisms in World Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007), chap. 6; Alastair Iain Johnston, “Is Chinese Nationalism Rising? Evidence from Beijing,” International Security 41 (Winter 2016–2017): 7–43; and Weiss, “How Hawkish Is the Chinese Public?”

30

Indeed, scholars working in the neoclassical realist school of IR have long argued that calculating relative power can be a slippery exercise even for seasoned policymakers. See, for example, Aaron L. Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895–1905 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989); and William Curti Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993).

31

On heuristics, see Gerd Gigerenzer and Wolfgang Gaissmaier, “Heuristic Decision Making,” Annual Review of Psychology 62 (2011): 451–482.

32

Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 308.

33

Gilpin, War and Change, 23. Other important works on power shifts include A.F.K. Organski, World Politics, 2nd ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968); Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987); Friedberg, The Weary Titan; Dale C. Copeland, The Origins of Major War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000); Alexandre Debs and Nuno P. Monteiro, “Known Unknowns: Power Shifts, Uncertainty, and War,” International Organization 68 (January 2014): 1–31; Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, Rising Titans, Falling Giants: How Great Powers Exploit Power Shifts (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018); and Stacie E. Goddard, When Right Makes Right: Rising Powers and World Order (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018).

34

Organski, World Politics, 367.

35

This insight draws on canonical bargaining models. See James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization 49 (Summer 1995): 379–414; and Robert Powell, “War as a Commitment Problem,” International Organization 60 (Winter 2006): 169–203. For a recent rejoinder, see Nuno P. Monteiro and Alexandre Debs, “An Economic Theory of War,” Journal of Politics 82 (January 2020): 255–268.

36

Xiaojun Li, Weiyi Shi, and Boliang Zhu, “The Face of Internet Recruitment: Evaluating the Labor Markets of Online Crowdsourcing Platforms in China,” Research & Politics 5 (January–March 2018): 1–8.

37

Li, Shi, and Zhu, “The Face of Internet Recruitment,” 6. As Andrew Scobell and colleagues argue, “China’s state monitoring and censorship decisions suggest that [online public opinion] is of irrefutable interest and relevance to policymakers.” Andrew Scobell, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Astrid Cevallos, Arthur Chan, Zev Winkelman, “Netizen Opinion and China’s Foreign Policy: Interpreting Narratives about North Korea on Chinese Social Media,” Asia Policy 14 (July 2019): 97–122, at 98.

38

John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), 55.

39

For example, see Stephen G. Brooks and William Wohlforth, “The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers in the Twenty-First Century: China’s Rise and the Fate of America’s Global Position,” International Security 40 (Winter 2015–2016): 7–53; Michael Beckley, Unrivaled: Why America Will Remain the World’s Sole Superpower (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018); and Andrea Gilli and Mauro Gilli, “Why China Has Not Caught Up Yet: Military-Technological Superiority and the Limits of Imitation, Reverse Engineering, and Cyber Espionage,” International Security 43 (Winter 2018–2019): 141–189.

40

Committee of 100, “U.S.-China Public Perceptions Survey 2017,” 17 May 2017, accessed at https://www.committee100.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/C100-Public-Opinion-Survey-2017.pdf, 11 August 2020.

41

Susan Peterson, Ryan Powers, and Michael J. Tierney, “TRIP Snap Poll XIII, May 2020,” Teaching, Research, and International Policy Project, accessed at https://trip.wm.edu/data/our-surveys/snap-polls/Snap_Poll_13_Report_Final.pdf, 26 August 2020.

42

Mara Mordecai, “How Americans Envision a Post-Pandemic World Order,” Pew Research Center, 2 June 2020, accessed at https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/06/02/how-americans-envision-a-post-pandemic-world-order/, 2 August 2020.

43

For example, see Quek and Johnston, “Can China Back Down.”

44

Weiss, “How Hawkish Is the Chinese Public?,” 692.

45

On “fightin’ words,” see Burt L. Monroe, Michael P. Colaresi, and Kevin M. Quinn, “Fightin’ Words: Lexical Feature Selection and Evaluation for Identifying the Content of Political Conflict,” Political Analysis 16 (Autumn 2008): 372–403.

46

Original Chinese-language texts of the open-ended responses are available in the online appendix.

47

For example, see Pierson, Su, and Bengali, “China Reins in Nationalists.”

48

Nien-chung Chang Liao, “The Sources of China’s Assertiveness: The System, Domestic Politics or Leadership Preferences?,” International Affairs 92 (July 2016): 817–833, at 828.

49

Weiss, “How Hawkish Is the Chinese Public?,” 684–686.

50

Friedberg, The Weary Titan, 6.

51

Quoted in Katin Bennhold, “‘Sadness’ and Disbelief from a World Missing American Leadership,” New York Times, 23 April 2020, accessed at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/23/world/europe/coronavirus-american-exceptionalism.html, 18 August 2020.

52

For example, see Daniel W. Drezner, “The Song Remains the Same: International Relations after COVID-19,” International Organization 74, Suppl. 1 (December 2020): E18–E35, at E19.

53

Joshua D. Kertzer, Jonathan Renshon, and Keren Yarhi-Milo, “How Do Observers Assess Resolve?,” British Journal of Political Science 50 (January 2021): 308–330, at 326.

54

Drezner, “The Song Remains the Same,” E19.

55

Richard N. Haas, Foreign Policy Begins at Home (New York: Basic Books, 2013), 3.

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