Scenario	Description of the Scenario	Clinical guidelines	Laboratory guidelines
1st	To assess the effectiveness of disease‐specific sampling procedures of animals of listed species in a suspected establishment, based on clinical examination (TOR 1.1) and laboratory examination (TOR 1.2), in their ability to detect a category A disease in kept animals if the disease is present in that establishment, or to rule it out if not present (Art. 6 (2)).	Article 4: 1. When animals on a holding are suspected of being infected or contaminated with SPP/GTP, Member States shall ensure that the official veterinarian immediately activates official investigation arrangements to confirm or rule out the presence of the disease in question2. As soon as the suspected presence of the disease is notified, the competent authority shall have the holding placed under official surveillance and shall in particular require that: (a) a census be made of all categories of animals of susceptible species and that, in respect of each of these categories, the number of animals already dead, infected or liable to be infected or contaminated be recorded; the census must be kept up to date to take account of animals born or dying during the period of suspicion; the information in the census must be kept up to date and produced on request and may be checked at each visit. Disease Strategy Sheep pox and goat pox (Animal Health Australia, 2011): Susceptible animals on suspect premises will be physically examined on a daily basis for the first 14 days and weekly thereafter, as will all susceptible animals in the RA (or a statistical sample if large numbers of susceptible animals are involved). Note: Scientific opinion on sheep and goat pox (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2014 ): SPGP shows highly characteristic clinical signs and lesions easily recognised by experienced veterinarians and farmers. Clinical signs and lesions are fully expressed in naive populations, with many infected animals exhibiting all the symptoms of infection (high fever, pox lesions in the skin and mucous membranes, eye and nasal discharge and enlarged lymph nodes) at the same time, allowing effective clinical surveillance programmes.The effectiveness of clinical diagnosis was demonstrated during the outbreaks in Greece in 2013–2014, when culling was implemented in 52 outbreaks on the basis of clinical signs before laboratory confirmation. In all of these outbreaks, clinical diagnosis was subsequently confirmed by laboratory results, with 100% agreement. In Bulgaria, all four outbreaks in 2013 were detected based on clinical signs and then confirmed by laboratory diagnosis. It is well understood that the effectiveness of clinical diagnosis depends on the experience of veterinarians in correctly identifying the disease, as well as on disease awareness, particularly in areas where no previous outbreaks have been detected.	Article 4: 1. When animals on a holding are suspected of being infected or contaminated with SPP/GTP, Member States shall ensure that the official veterinarian immediately activates official investigation arrangements to confirm or rule out the presence of the disease in question and, in particular, must take or have taken the samples necessary for laboratory examination. To that end the animals in question may be transported to the laboratories under the supervision of the competent authority, which shall take appropriate steps to prevent the disease from spreading. EU Reference Laboratory for Capripox Viruses: Sheep and goat pox (EURL Capripox, 2021): Laboratory confirmation of SPPV/GTPV is most rapid using the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) method in combination with a clinical history consistent with generalised SPPV/GTPV infection. Isolation of the virus is possible as capripoxviruses will grow on tissue culture of ovine, caprine or bovine origin, although field isolates may require up to 14 days to grow or require one or more additional tissue culture passage(s). OIE Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals, heading ‘B.Diagnostic techniques’ (OIE, 2019): 1. Identification of the agent: 1.1. Specimen collection and submission: Material for virus isolation and antigen detection should be collected by biopsy or at post‐mortem from skin papules, lung lesions or lymph nodes. Samples for virus isolation and antigen‐detection enzyme‐linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) should be collected within the first week of the occurrence of clinical signs, before the development of neutralising antibodies. Samples for genome detection by polymerase chain reaction (PCR) may be collected before or after the development of neutralising antibody responses. Buffy coat from blood collected into EDTA (ethylenediaminetetraacetic acid) during the viraemic stage of capripox infection (before generalisation of lesions or within 4 days of generalisation), can also be used for virus isolation. Laboratory confirmation of SPPV/GTPV is most rapid using the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) method in combination with a clinical history consistent with generalised capripox infection. Diagnostic tools to detect capripoxvirus infections and diva strategies; Joint FAO/IAEA Division (Lamien, 2017): Specimens for the laboratory: –Skin biopsies, swab samples for virus isolation, histopathology and electron microscopy and molecular detection. –Serum samples for serology: from acute and chronic cases and 2 to 3 weeks after the first appearance of skin lesions. Sheep & Goat Pox (CFSPH, Iowa State University, 2008): Samples for virus isolation and for some antigen‐detection tests should be collected during the first week of illness, before neutralising antibodies develop. Blood samples should be taken as early as possible; virus isolation is unlikely to be successful after generalised lesions have been present for more than a few days. Sheep and Goat Pox. (Centre for Agriculture and Biosciences International, 2019): A tentative clinical diagnosis can be made in the field. Specimens to submit for laboratory diagnosis (virus isolation) can include biopsy tissue material, but post‐mortem specimens collected from one or two severely affected acute cases are preferable. Biopsy specimens should include samples from two or three lesions at the papular or vesicular stage. Blood (in EDTA for PCR test and in heparin for virus isolation) should be collected aseptically from early febrile cases. Post‐mortem specimens should include lesions from skin, turbinates, trachea, lungs and enlarged lymph nodes. Emergency animal diseases: A field guide for Australian veterinarians (Breed et al. , 2019 ): You will be able to isolate the virus within the first week of clinical signs developing, before neutralising antibodies develop. Collect: – serum from at least 10 live, clinically affected animals, and from exposed animals (particularly those that are convalescent). – EDTA blood from live, clinically affected animals (7–10 ml/animal) fresh tissue‐characteristic pox lesions from skin as well as respiratory and gastrointestinal tracts (2 g of each tissue). – nasal swabs from live, clinically affected animals. – fixed tissue—characteristic pox lesions from skin as well as respiratory and gastrointestinal tracts (in neutral‐buffered formalin). The most rapid, sensitive and specific diagnostic procedure is the detection of viral DNA in characteristic poxvirus lesions or nasal swabs by real‐time or conventional PCR. A positive result can be obtained within 1 day of the laboratory receiving samples. Emergency Animal Disease Bulletin No. 118 (Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment, 2017): Sheep pox and goat pox should be considered in cases where there is high morbidity and mortality in sheep and goats, and where typical pox lesions are seen on the skin and respiratory and digestive mucosa. Confirmatory diagnosis is made by specifically identifying the virus in tissues by virus isolation, in addition to detecting viral DNA in tissue samples using PCR techniques. Specimens required for testing include biopsies of skin, respiratory and gastrointestinal lesions (fresh and fixed), nasal swabs and whole blood collected in EDTA tubes.
2nd	To assess the effectiveness of disease‐specific sampling procedures, based on laboratory examination (ToR 1.2), in their ability to detect the disease in the event of preventive killing, and in their ability to support with the epidemiological investigation (disease detection, prevalence estimation, virus identification, etc.) in kept animals of listed species in an affected establishment, before or when they are killed or found dead. The purposes of the epidemiological enquiry are described in Article 57 of Regulation (EU)2016/429.	NA	No specific guidelines described in legislation Article 8: 1. The epizootiological enquiry shall deal with: (a) the length of time during which the disease may have existed on the holding before being notified or suspected; (b) the possible origin of the disease on the holding and the identification of other holdings on which there are animals of susceptible species which may have become infected or contaminated; (c) the movement of persons, animals, carcasses, vehicles, equipment or any other substances likely to have carried the agent of the disease to or from the holdings in question; 2. A crisis unit shall be established in order to provide full coordination of all measures necessary to ensure eradication of the disease as quickly as possible and for the purpose of carrying out the epizootiological enquiry.
3rd	To assess the effectiveness of disease‐specific sampling procedures based on clinical (ToR 1.1) and laboratory (ToR 1.2) examinations of the animals of listed species belonging to the categories described in article 13(2)) of an affected establishment, in order to grant a specific derogation from killing these animals, while ensuring that they do not pose a risk for the transmission of the disease.	NA Article 5: 1. Once it has been officially confirmed that SPP/GTPis present on a holding, Member States shall ensurethat, in addition to the measures laid down in Article 4 (2), thecompetent authority requires application of the following measures: (a) all animals of susceptible species on the holding shall be killed on the spot, without delay. The animals which have died or been killed shall either be burnt or buried on the spot, if possible, or destroyed in a carcase disposal plant.	NA
4th	To assess the effectiveness of disease‐specific sampling procedures, based on clinical (ToR 1.1) and laboratory (ToR 1.2) examinations of the animals of non‐listed species kept in an affected establishment, in their ability to ensure the detection of the virus if the virus is present in these species.	No specific guidelines described in legislation Note: Disease Strategy Sheep pox and goat pox (Animal Health Australia, 2011): Although experience overseas is that cattle are unlikely to be significant in the course of an SPP/GTP outbreak, any cattle in nose‐to‐nose contact with infected sheep or goats may need to be included in the stamping‐out program.	No specific guidelines described in legislation
5th	To assess the effectiveness of disease‐specific sampling procedures, based on clinical (ToR 1.1) and laboratory (ToR 1.2) examinations of the wild animals of listed species within the affected establishment and in its surroundings. The purpose of the sampling procedures is to ensure the detection of the virus, if the virus is present in these wild species.	No specific guidelines described in legislation Article 6: Where animals living in the wild are infected or suspected of being infected, Member States shall ensure that appropriate action is taken . Note: Scientific opinion on sheep and goat pox (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2014 ): There is, to date, no evidence of SPPV and GTPV viruses in wildlife, and it is assumed that wildlife do not play a relevant role in the epidemiology of SPP and GTP (Babiuk et al., 2008), although it cannot be excluded that wild sheep and wild goats can be infected with SPPV. In support of this fact, the lumpy skin disease virus, closely related to SPPV/GTPV, has been isolated from wild ruminants. Note: Disease Strategy Sheep pox and goat pox (Animal Health Australia, 2011): If the disease occurs in an area where there are feral goat populations, a goat culling or control program, combined with surveillance, will be established to determine whether the infection has entered the population.	No specific guidelines described in legislation
6th	To assess the effectiveness of disease‐specific sampling procedures based on clinical (ToR 1.1) and laboratory (ToR 1.2) examinations of the animals of listed species in establishments located in the protection zone. The purpose of the sampling procedures is to ensure the detection of the virus, if the virus is present in these animals.	Article 11: 1. Member States shall ensure that the following measures are applied in the protection zone: (a) all holdings within the zone having animals of susceptible species shall be identified; (b) there shall be periodic visits to holdings having animals of susceptible species, a clinical examination of those animals; a record of visits and findings must be kept, with the frequency of visits being proportional to the seriousness of the epizootic on those holdings at greatest risk. Disease Strategy Sheep pox and goat pox (Animal Health Australia, 2011): On properties in the Restricted Area (RA) (at least 5 km from the Infected Premise (IP)), physical inspection surveillance visits should be made as soon as possible after the first IP is declared in the RA and then 1, 2, 3 and 6 weeks later. At physical inspection surveillance visits, every mob of susceptible animals must be inspected and numbers accounted for. In extensive grazing areas, where the degree of contact between groups of animals in a flock may be low, care must be taken to ensure that all groups of animals are present and healthy. A final inspection may be needed 6 months after the last case.	No specific guidelines described in legislation Article 11: 1. Member States shall ensure that the following measures are applied in the protection zone: (a) all holdings within the zone having animals of susceptible species shall be identified; (b) there shall be periodic visits to holdings having animals of susceptible species, a clinical examination of those animals including, if necessary, the collection of samples for laboratory examination; a record of visits and findings must be kept, with the frequency of visits being proportional to the seriousness of the epizootic on those holdings at greatest risk.
7th	To assess the effectiveness of disease‐specific sampling procedures, based on clinical (ToR 1.1) and laboratory (ToR 1.2) examinations of the animals of listed species, for the sampling of establishments located in a protection zone when the radius is larger than 3 km. The purpose of the sampling procedure is to ensure disease detection of the virus if the virus is present in establishments within the protection zone.	Article 10: 1. Once the diagnosis of one of the diseases in question has beenofficially confirmed, Member States shall ensure that the competent authority establishes around the infected holding a protection zone with a minimum radius of three kilometres, itself contained in a surveillance zone with a minimum radius of 10 kilometres. The establishment of the zones must take account of geographical, administrative, ecological and epizootiological factors relating to the disease in question, and of monitoring facilities. →See 6th scenario	See 6th scenario
8th	To assess the effectiveness of disease‐specific sampling procedures, based on clinical (ToR 1.1) and laboratory (ToR 1.2) examinations of the animals of listed species, for the sampling of the establishments located within the surveillance zone. The purpose of the sampling procedure is to ensure disease detection if the virus is present in establishments within the surveillance zone.	No specific guidelines described in legislation Article 12: 1. Member States shall ensure that the following measures are applied in the surveillance zone: (a) all holdings having animals of susceptible species shall be identified; (b) the movement of animals of susceptible species on public roads shall be prohibited except for the purpose of leading them to pasture or animal buildings; the competent authority may, however, grant a derogation from that prohibition for the transit of animals by road or rail without unloading or stopping; (c) the transport of animals of susceptible species within the surveillance zone shall be subject to authorisation by the competent authority; (d) animals of susceptible species must remain inside the surveillance zone for a maximum incubation period after the most recent recorded case of disease.	No specific guidelines described in legislation
Derogations to allow animal movements
9th	To assess the effectiveness of disease‐specific sampling procedures based on clinical and/or laboratory examinations of the animals of an establishment in a protection zone, in order to grant a derogation from prohibitions in the movement of animals, and allow for the animals to be moved to a slaughterhouse located within the protection zone or in the surveillance zone or outside the restricted zone (Art29).	Article 11: 1. Member States shall ensure that the following measures areapplied in the protection zone: (d) animals of susceptible species must remain on the holding on which they are being kept, except to be transported under official supervision directly to a slaughterhouse located in that zone foremergency slaughter or, if that zone has no slaughterhouse underveterinary supervision, to a slaughterhouse in the surveillance zone designated by the competent authority. Such transport may be authorised by the competent authority only after the official veterinarian has carried out an examination of all the animals of susceptible species on the holding and confirmed that none of the animals is suspected of being infected. The competent authority responsible for the slaughterhouse shall be informed of the intention to send animals to it. Disease Strategy Sheep pox and goat pox (Animal Health Australia, 2011): All movement of susceptible animals within the Restricted Are (RA) will be prohibited for an initial period of at least 21 days so that the animals within the area can be observed by direct physical examination and appropriate diagnostic tests. Animals on Dangerous Contact Premises (DCPs) and Suspect Premises (SPs) will be examined daily for the first 2 weeks and then at weekly intervals. Other properties in the RA will be examined weekly. In the absence of any signs of disease during this 21‐day period of observation, animals from the RA may be sent for slaughter, under permit, at approved abattoirs.	No specific guidelines described in legislation
10th	To assess the effectiveness of disease‐specific sampling procedures based on clinical and/or laboratory examinations, to grant a derogation from prohibitions in the movement of day-old‐chicks located in the protection zone and hatched from eggs originating in the restricted zone or outside the restricted zone. The sampling procedures should ensure that the movement of these day-old‐chicks to an establishment located in the same Member State but if possible, outside the restricted zone.	NA	NA
11th	To assess the effectiveness of disease‐specific sampling procedures based on clinical and/or laboratory examinations, to grant a derogation from prohibitions in the movement of ready‐to-lay poultry located in the protection zone, to establishments located in the same Member State and if possible within the restricted zone.	NA	NA
12th	To assess the effectiveness of disease‐specific sampling procedures based on clinical and/or laboratory examinations of the animals of an establishment in a protection zone, in order to grant derogation from prohibitions in the movement of these animals to a plant approved for processing or disposal of animal by‐products in which the kept animals are immediately killed (Art37).	No specific guidelines described in legislation	No specific guidelines described in legislation
13th	To assess the effectiveness of disease‐specific sampling procedures based on clinical and/or laboratory examinations of the animals of listed species in order to grant derogation from prohibitions and allow for these animals to be moved : a) from an establishment in a surveillance zone to a slaughterhouse located within or outside the restricted zone, b)from an establishment outside the surveillance zone to a slaughterhouse situated in the surveillance zone.	Article 12: 1. Member States shall ensure that the following measures are applied in the surveillance zone: (d) animals of susceptible species must remain inside the surveillance zone for a maximum incubation period after the most recent recorded case of disease. Thereafter, animals may be removed from that zone to be transported under official supervision directly to a slaughterhouse designated by the competent authority for emergency slaughter. Such transport may be authorised by the competent authority only after the official veterinarian has carried out an examination of all the animals of the susceptible species on the holding and confirmed that none of the animals is suspected of being infected. The competent authority responsible for the slaughterhouse shall be informed of the intention to send animals to it.	No specific guidelines described in legislation
14th	To assess the effectiveness of disease‐specific sampling procedures based on clinical and/or laboratory examinations of kept ungulates of listed species in order to grant a derogation and allow for the animals to be moved from an establishment in the surveillance zone to pastures situated within the surveillance zone.	NA Article 12: 1. Member States shall ensure that the following measures are applied in the surveillance zone: (b) the movement of animals of susceptible species on public roads shall be prohibited except for the purpose of leading them to pasture or animal buildings.	NA
15th	To assess the effectiveness of disease‐specific sampling procedures based on clinical and/or laboratory examinations of kept ungulates of listed species in order to grant derogation and allow for them to be moved from an establishment in the surveillance zone to an establishment belonging to the same supply chain, located in or outside the surveillance zone, in order to complete the production cycle before slaughter.	NA Article 12: 1. Member States shall ensure that the following measures are applied in the surveillance zone: (b) the movement of animals of susceptible species on public roads shall be prohibited except for the purpose of leading them to pasture or animal buildings.	NA
16th	To assess the effectiveness of disease‐specific sampling procedures based on clinical and/or laboratory examinations to grant derogation of movements of day-old‐chicks hatched from establishment located in the surveillance zone, from eggs originating within the surveillance zone and eggs originating outside the restricted zone, to an establishment located in the same Member State where they were hatched.	NA	NA
17th	To assess the effectiveness of disease‐specific sampling procedures based on clinical and/or laboratory examinations, to grant a derogation from prohibitions in the movement of ready‐to-lay poultry located in the surveillance zone to establishments located in the same Member State.	NA	NA
18th	To assess the effectiveness of disease‐specific sampling procedures based on clinical and/or laboratory examinations of the animals of an establishment located in the restricted zone of an outbreak in order to allow their move within the restricted zone, when restriction measures are maintained beyond the period set out in Annex XI.	Article 13: Where the prohibitions provided for in Articles 11 (1) (d) and 12 (1) (d) are maintained beyond 30 days because of the occurrence of further cases of the disease and as a result problems arise in keeping the animals, the competent authority may, following an application by the owner explaining the rounds for such application, by the owner explaining the grounds for such applications authorise the removal of the animals from a holding within the protection zone or the surveillance zone, provided that: (a) the official veterinarian has verified the facts; (b) an inspection of all animals on the holding has been carried out; (c) the animals to be transported have undergone a clinical examination, with negative result; (d) each animal has been marked by ear marking or has been identified by any other approved method; (e) the holding of destination is located either in the protection zone or within the surveillance zone.	No specific guidelines described in legislation
Repopulation
19th	To assess the effectiveness of disease‐specific sampling procedures based on laboratory examinations of the animals that are kept for the repopulation prior to their introduction to rule out the presence of the disease.	NA	No specific guidelines described in legislation Article 5: The restocking of the holding shall be authorised by the competent authority, following the satisfactory inspection by the official veterinarian of the cleaning and disinfection operations carried out in accordance with Article 16. Disease Strategy Sheep pox and goat pox (Animal Health Australia, 2011): On infected premises (IPs), and on dangerous contact premises (DCPs) that have been destocked, sentinel animals may be introduced after decontamination is completed. These animals should undergo weekly physical inspection with appropriate testing for 6 weeks, when restocking may occur. The flock should be inspected at 1‐month intervals for 3 months.
20th	To assess the effectiveness of disease‐specific sampling procedures based on laboratory examinations of the animals that have been repopulated, in the event of unusual mortalities or clinical signs being notified during the repopulation; to rule out the presence of the disease.	NA	No specific guidelines described in legislation Disease Strategy Sheep pox and goat pox (Animal Health Australia, 2011): Animals dying within 12 months after repopulation of IPs must be autopsied and appropriate samples taken for virus testing.
21st	To assess the effectiveness of disease‐specific sampling procedures based on laboratory examinations of the animals that have been repopulated, on the last day of the monitoring period calculated forward from the date on which the animals were placed in the repopulated establishment. In case the repopulation takes place in several days, the monitoring period will be calculated forward from the last day in which the last animal is introduced in the establishment.	NA	No specific guidelines described in legislation Disease Strategy Sheep pox and goat pox (Animal Health Australia, 2011): On infected premises (IPs), and on dangerous contact premises (DCPs) that have been destocked, sentinel animals may be introduced after decontamination is completed. These animals should undergo weekly physical inspection with appropriate testing for 6 weeks, when restocking may occur. The flock should be inspected at 1‐month intervals for 3 months.