Table 2.
Principle | Example | Pro | Con |
---|---|---|---|
Goal gradient (target neither too easy nor too hard) | Incentives for a modest reduction in empiric antibiotic use in the NICU | Gradual promotion of positive behavior with metrics that can be accurately analyzed |
Extreme reduction may harm patients Ability to achieve target may depend on patient risk factors beyond the purview of the provider |
Weber-Fechner law (incentive should be proportional to base) | The magnitude of performance-based bonus is proportional to base salary | Providers will notice and pay attention to targets/goals | Senior providers and Chiefs benefit more than junior providers for the same task |
Immediacy (incentives paid close to work completion) | Work RVU based productivity bonus paid monthly instead of yearly | Immediate gratification |
Increased administrative work Variable pay (withholding a portion of base compensation if metrics are not met in subsequent months) may negatively impact morale |
Nudging | Incentives to improve documentation and attendance at procedures | Increase divisional revenue | May lead to therapies that are not medically indicated |
Loss aversion | Withholding a portion of bonus for poor chart completion rate | Penalty is more effective in changing behavior | Negative effect on faculty morale |
Social ranking | Public display of top performer of the year (highest % of discharge orders by 10 am) | Intrinsic motivation at minimal cost | Providers with consistently low performance may perceive this as social shaming |