Table 3.
Overview of physical layer countermeasures.
| Ref. | Technique | Enhances * | Advantages | Disadvantages |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| [64] | Replay detection | C | Comprehensive experimental validation | - |
| [65] | Secret key agreement | C,I | Experimental validation | No experiments with LoRaWAN |
| [19] | Secret key agreement | C,I | Quantization for high key randomness | No experiments with LoRaWAN |
| [21] | Secret key agreement | C,I | Effective over long communication distances | Requires reconfigurable antennas |
| [66] | Secret key agreement | C,I | Suitable for mobile and stationary nodes | - |
| [67] | Secret key agreement | C,I | Low algorithmic complexity | Bit disagreement rate |
| [68] | Secret key agreement | C,I | High secret key entropy | Increased algorithmic complexity |
| [22] | Jamming detection | A | Versatile modeling tools for performance evaluation | No large scale validation |
| [23] | Jamming detection | A | High detection accuracy | Only small scale validation |
| [69] | Jamming resilience | A | - | No experimental validation |
| [70] | Jamming resilience | A | - | No experimental validation |
| [24] | Jamming resilience | A | Effective against synchronized jammers | - |
| [71] | Jamming resilience | A | High performance improvement with low overhead | Acknowledged transmissions not supported |
| [72] | Jamming resilience | A | High performance improvement | - |
| [16] | Wireless fingerprinting | U | Investigation on various neural networks | Channel effect is not considered |
| [73] | Wireless fingerprinting | U | Algorithm for manual extraction of RF fingerprints | Experiments on channel robustness are missing |
| [74] | Wireless fingerprinting | U | Both indoor and outdoor experiments. Receiver and channel effects are studied. | Solutions to channel and receiver effects are not provided |
| [75] | Wireless fingerprinting | U | Experiments at various distances are conducted | Solutions to channel effects are not provided |
| [14] | Wireless fingerprinting | U | Consideration on openset/zero-shot classification | Solutions to channel effects are not provided |
| [18] | Wireless fingerprinting | U | Large-scale dataset of 100 LoRa devices. Both outdoor and indoor environments | - |
| [17] | Wireless fingerprinting | U | Design of channel independent spectrogram to mitigate channel effects. | Low SNR outdoor experiments are missing |
* (C—Confidentiality, I—Integrity, A—Availability, U—Authentication).