Table 4.

Influences on risk-taking–qualitative studies.

Organizational factors
Normalization of deviance	Michalski and Bearman, (36) “One comment made by a pilot to justify committing violations demonstrates just how normal these attitudes were: ‘you've got to turn a blind eye to some of it otherwise you're not going to be able to work and it's not going to be a productive business.”'
	Paletz et al., (50) “Pilots describe becoming used to the risk of flying in bad weather and the dangers of complacency. When the same risky behavior led to no negative consequences, the pilots kept performing the same behaviors during the course of several days or flights. ‘It could stay that way for weeks and weeks, foggy and wet, rainy, and you get out there and fly and you get accustomed to it'.”
Direct report influence–foot-in-the-door	Bearman et al., (49) ”'He went to have a look-see and that was the end of that. Didn't even get in the pass – got in the pass but never made it around the corner.”'
	Paletz et al., (50) “'[A manager would say] ‘why don't you go take a look? See what it looks like. It's legal to leave – go look.' You get out there and generally you don't come back. You're already out there […] So you just keep skulking and skulking under this bad weather a little bit more, until all of a sudden you're in over your head […]”'
Organizational pressure–time / financial	Bearman et al., (49) “In some cases pilots were only paid for completing a flight as scheduled. This exerted a powerful incentive to reach their destination, even if doing so was not the safety option.” “A pilot had a fatal accident because he only had one chance to make a trip: ‘it was windy and Gusty and just not very good to go in there. It was one of those let's go take a look at it cause this will be the only chance we'll get to do the trip… He was supposed to leave the day before and the weather wasn't good.”'
	Michalski and Bearman, (36) “'There's 400 other guys on file with resumes and I can have any one of them here tomorrow. Do you want the job? Make me money.”' “'When you get back from a flight, you'd have about 40 min to check the weather, do a flight plan, refuel the aircraft, have your lunch, and get all these things done. You just don't have the time to do all that stuff comfortably, so you'd go have lunch and you'd make it a 40 min lunch break and you jump back into the airplane with the same flight plan, and the same weather that you left with in the morning.”'
Social factors
Being accepted as part of the group / informational social factor	Michalski and Bearman, (36) “pilots often gave into social pressures because they wanted to fit in and be accepted by their peers”.
	Paletz et al., (50) “'He went through the pass and he got through it just fine, but the 10 it took me to get to where he was, the pass had closed.' The assumption of safety based on observation of others' flying may be incorrect because weather can change rapidly, the other pilots could be taking great risks, and/or the other pilots may be more experienced, equipped, or knowledgeable then the observer.”
Perceived customer pressure	Michalski and Bearman, (36) “Pilot attempted to land at the destination site in stormy conditions so she could pick up a customer who needed to attend a funeral. Pilot faced requests to fly lower than the regulations allowed and to go to other destinations than those specified in the original booking. Several pilots admitted to giving into these pressures and conforming to what was requested, often because the pilot was concerned that the customer would complain to their boss.” Paletz et al., (50)
	“'it takes a lot to look at these four people and go well, I know you see the lake [his passengers wanted to visit] but I don't want to go in there because its dangerous.' Feeling pressured to avoid social disapproval and failure (e.g. reluctance to disappoint passengers). In such cases, the passengers did not necessarily express disappointment; the pilot was simply aware of the passengers' desire and wanted to fulfill them.”
Personal factors
Personal benefit	Bearman et al., (49) “'I said well, you know, it's pretty bad and I went. I literally went through indefinite ceiling, half mile, quarter mile junk for the better part of the pass… but that was a stupid decision based on wanting to get home.”'
	Michalski and Bearman, (36) “'because night hours are really hard to come by I decided to leave even earlier so the whole flight would be at night. So it meant getting up at 1 am so I didn't get much sleep and I was in a (Cessna) 210 with no weather radar and I basically just blasted off without thinking too much about it and there were just thunderstorms everywhere and lightning flashes, but the problem at night is that you can't tell how close they are. So I was just kind of flying blindly in the direction I needed to go to. I ended up flying through a bit of weather at some stage, which was rough.”'
Reluctance to admit defeat / incur personal inconvenience	Bearman et al., (49) “Reluctance to land in remote areas–because of the discomfort/inconvenience. Decision making was influenced by not wanting to land where there was a lack of basic human facilities. No sleeping accommodation for those who might get stuck in bad weather, forcing them to sleep in the aircraft, or ‘maybe on the floor of a shack somewhere'. The influences need not be large or important to others. Personal inconvenience of not having running water or telephone communications may be enough to subtly erode safety for particular people circumstances.”
	Paletz et al., (34) “Reluctance to face social disapproval was at times not very subtle, such as in situations in which the pilot might ‘lose face' or admit defeat in front of his or her peers. ‘Ego plays a big role in pushing a pilot to do something that, you know, he doesn't want to come back and say I couldn't make it […], three other pilots made it; what's wrong with you?”'