Table 5.
Moderating effect regressions.
| Model | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Variables | CSP | ||
| H2 | H3 | Full model | |
| Firm size | 0.292*** | 0.297*** | 0.297*** |
| (0.068) | (0.070) | (0.070) | |
| Firm age | −0.389 | −0.238 | −0.236 |
| (0.227) | (0.214) | (0.215) | |
| ROA | 6.332*** | 6.977*** | 6.946*** |
| (0.781) | (0.781) | (0.781) | |
| SOE | −0.094 | −0.104 | −0.105 |
| (0.121) | (0.124) | (0.123) | |
| Leverage | −1.692*** | −1.633*** | −1.634*** |
| (0.118) | (0.113) | (0.113) | |
| Board size | −0.014*** | −0.014*** | −0.014*** |
| (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) | |
| CEO duality | 0.024 | 0.019 | 0.020 |
| (0.054) | (0.053) | (0.053) | |
| Shareholder concentration | 0.934** | 0.940** | 0.940** |
| (0.338) | (0.351) | (0.351) | |
| DT | 0.080 | 0.014 | 0.152 |
| (0.086) | (0.042) | (0.090) | |
| Board independence | 0.059 | 0.190** | 0.078 |
| (0.114) | (0.087) | (0.120) | |
| Institutional ownership | 0.241 | 0.125 | 0.120 |
| (0.177) | (0.182) | (0.183) | |
| DT × board independence | 0.470** | 0.410* | |
| (0.228) | (0.223) | ||
| DT × institutional ownership | 0.306*** | 0.324*** | |
| (0.091) | (0.096) | ||
| Constant | −1.850 | −2.681 | −2.649 |
| (1.658) | (1.692) | (1.695) | |
| N | 10,048 | 10,048 | 10,048 |
| adj. R2 | 0.375 | 0.385 | 0.385 |
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, and ***p < 0.01.