Table 2.

Fixed effects wage regressions (Dependent variable: log. of wages per capita)

	(a) Restrictions in hiring workers	(b) Restrictions in hiring workers, endogeneity	(c) Restrictions in hiring skilled workers	(d) Restrictions in hiring workers, bargaining lev.
Generalized residual from first stage regression (control function)	–	0.005 (0.017)	–
Collective bargaining agreement	0.026** (0.008)	0.031** (0.009)	0.025** (0.008)
Industry-level collective bargaining agreement				0.028** (0.008)
Firm-level collective bargaining agreement.				0.018 (0.011)
Restrictions in hiring new workers	0.014** (0.005)	0.007 (0.029)	–	0.013* (0.005)
Restrictions in hiring new skilled workers	–	–	0.013** (0.005)
Interaction variable between collective bargaining and hiring restrictions	−0.013‡ (0.008)	−0.009 (0.009)	−0.011 (0.008)
Interaction variable between industry-level collective bargaining and hiring restrictions				−0.013‡ (0.008)
Interaction variable between firm-level collective bargaining and hiring restrictions				−0.012 (0.014)
Adj. R2	0.8669	0.8737	0.8669	0.8669
Observations (Establishments)	75,439 (22,087)	56,491 (15,993)	75,439 (22,087)	75,439 (22,087)

Source: IAB Establishment Panel 2008–2018.

Note: The model also includes the following dichotomous and auxiliary variables: Log. of running sum of expansion investment, log. of value added, shares of temporary employed, female workers, workers with a degree from university, workers subject to the German social security system, apprentices, foreign workers, workers younger than 25, workers older than 50, dummies for export, foreign ownership, individual ownership or partnership, single establishment, Western Germany and high competition, nine time dummies, 42 industry dummies, establishment size (six dummies), family management (two dummies), state of machinery (two dummies) and profitability (two dummies). Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on establishments. **; * and ‡ denote significance at the .01; .05 and .10 level, respectively