Skip to main content
. 2022 Jul 14;46(4):713–735. doi: 10.1007/s12197-022-09591-x

Table 5.

Moderating effects of government responses

Econ_Support Stringency Gov_Resp Containment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CVD

-0.217***

(0.046)

-1.145***

(0.061)

0.644*

(0.378)

1.846***

(0.271)

CVD*X

0.015***

(0.001)

0.019***

(0.000)

-0.001

(0.005)

-0.016***

(0.003)

Size

1.579

(1.729)

1.579

(1.729)

1.579

(1.729)

1.579

(1.729)

Capital

39.391***

(8.270)

39.391***

(8.270)

39.391***

(8.270)

39.391***

(8.270)

Asset_Quality

1.470

(1.573)

1.470

(1.573)

1.470

(1.573)

1.470

(1.573)

Loans

9.555***

(2.499)

9.555***

(2.499)

9.555***

(2.499)

9.555***

(2.499)

Deposits

1.607

(1.355)

1.607

(1.355)

1.607

(1.355)

1.607

(1.355)

Growth

-2.739**

(1.080)

-2.739**

(1.080)

-2.739**

(1.080)

-2.739**

(1.080)

Earnings

-25.662***

(7.285)

-25.662***

(7.285)

-25.662***

(7.285)

-25.662***

(7.285)

Constant

2.743

(18.673)

4.232

(18.729)

3.383

(18.705)

2.185

(18.709)

Observations 1,953 1,953 1,953 1,953
AdjR2 0.205 0.205 0.205 0.205
#Banks 547 547 547 547
FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
F Statistic 2736.80*** 2058.91*** 284.56*** 281.01***

In this table, we document the moderating effects of government interventions on the association between CVD and Z-Score. In all models, we regress Z-Score on CVD, CVD*X, all bank- and macro-controls, while including the country-year and bank-fixed effects. CVD*X is our variable of interest, where X represents Econ_Supp, Stringency, Gov_Resp, and Containment in models 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are reported in parentheses