Table 5.
Support for home care subsidy and nursing home aversion.
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Very much agree | 0.118*** | 0.100*** | 0.094*** | 0.073*** |
| (.026) | (.027) | (.022) | (.023) | |
| Agree | –.077** | –.079*** | –.066*** | –.067*** |
| (.031) | (.032) | (.024) | (.025) | |
| Disagree | -.039 | –.033 | –.022 | –.009 |
| (.025) | (.026) | (.018) | (.019) | |
| Very much disagree | –.002 | 0.012 | –.006 | 0.003 |
| (.012) | (.019) | (.015) | (.015) | |
| 2229 | 2134 | 2229 | 2134 | |
| Controls | N | Y | N | Y |
| Use sampling weights | Y | Y | N | N |
Note: This table presents the average marginal effects of being less inclined to enter a nursing home on being in each category of support for a policy that subsidizes home care, estimated from multinomial logit regressions. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. See the text for the control variables included.
*, **, ***: significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.