Table 6.
Change in the support for home care subsidy and nursing home aversion.
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| No change | -.344*** | -.337*** | -.345*** | -.354*** |
| (.026) | (.027) | (.021) | (.022) | |
| Less in favor | 0.095*** | 0.099*** | 0.081*** | 0.094*** |
| (.028) | (.027) | (.020) | (.021) | |
| More in favor | 0.249*** | 0.237*** | 0.264*** | 0.260*** |
| (.032) | (.032) | (.025) | (.026) | |
| 2081 | 2002 | 2081 | 2002 | |
| Controls | N | Y | N | Y |
| Use sampling weights | Y | Y | N | N |
Note: This table presents the average marginal effects of being less inclined to enter a nursing home on being in each category of change in the support for a policy that subsidizes home care, estimated from multinomial logit regressions. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. See the text for the control variables included. *, **, ***: significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.