TABLE A6.
Differential response to an opposing‐party governor, Democrats versus Republicans and strong versus weak policy states
| Dependent variable: number of behaviors | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
| Opposing | −0.115*** | −0.120*** | −0.179** | −0.073 |
| (0.059) | (0.057) | (0.073) | (0.063) | |
| Opposing x | 0.120* | 0.059 | ||
| Democrat | (0.069) | (0.108) | ||
| Opposing x | −0.194 * | |||
| strong response | (0.111) | |||
| Opposing x | 0.107 | |||
| Democrat | (0.142) | |||
| x strong response | ||||
| N | 1753 | 1753 | 1753 | 1753 |
| R 2 | 0.050 | 0.043 | 0.043 | 0.045 |
| State FE | Y | N | N | N |
Note: This table explores whether the opposing‐party effect in states with a stronger policy response to COVID‐19 is driven by the differential response by Republicans versus Democrats. Column (1) replicates the result from Table 2; column (2) shows that this result is little altered when we replace state fixed effects with an indicator for being in a Democratic state, as required for this analysis. Column (3) shows how the opposing party effect differs for Democrats, while column (4) shows how it differs by both Democrat/Republican and strong policy response.