Table 1.
Treatment-control balance.
| Control mean | Treatment-Control Difference |
|||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Participant Characteristics | Video Message 1 | Video Message 2 | Video Message 3 | Financial incentive | Scheduler Link | |
| Age | 36.9 | −0.91 | −0.56 | −0.19 | −0.70 | −0.65 |
| (11.7) | (0.410) | (0.616) | (0.865) | (0.502) | (0.539) | |
| Female (%) | 72.8 | −0.40 | 0.51 | 3.64 | 2.27 | 1.94 |
| (0.924) | (0.903) | (0.384) | (0.568) | (0.629) | ||
| English as preferred language (%) | 94.1 | −1.02 | 1.81 | 0.31 | 0.44 | 0.03 |
| (0.650) | (0.403) | (0.889) | (0.533) | (0.990) | ||
| Hispanic (%) | 30.9 | 2.89 | 6.22 | 0.65 | 2.86 | 3.32 |
| (0.508) | (0.157) | (0.883) | (0.489) | (0.426) | ||
| Black (%) | 28.7 | 2.75 | −2.28 | 4.13 | 1.95 | 1.91 |
| (0.520) | (0.591) | (0.339) | (0.630) | (0.640) | ||
| Impaneled (%) | 61.0 | 9.90 | 5.18 | 4.73 | 11.95 | 6.53 |
| (0.029) | (0.257) | (0.303) | (0.006) | (0.139) | ||
| At least high school graduate (%) | 91.2 | −0.28 | 0.53 | 0.38 | 0.45 | 0.35 |
| (0.916) | (0.843) | (0.886) | (0.859) | (0.891) | ||
| HH Income < $20,000 (%) | 40.4 | 6.25 | 1.94 | 8.13 | 5.83 | 4.40 |
| (0.177) | (0.675) | (0.082) | (0.184) | (0.321) | ||
| Supported Biden (%) | 55.4 | 0.50 | −2.92 | −1.04 | −1.73 | 0.24 |
| (0.914) | (0.532) | (0.824) | (0.696) | (0.957) | ||
| Supported Trump (%) | 14.7 | −0.32 | 3.54 | 0.58 | 1.80 | 0.93 |
| (0.924) | (0.296) | (0.563) | (0.571) | (0.771) | ||
| F statistic | N/A | 0.76 | 0.65 | 0.57 | 1.03 | 0.47 |
| P-value | N/A | 0.6717 | 0.7746 | 0.8399 | 0.4127 | 0.9108 |
Notes: We report the control mean (and standard deviation for continuous variables) and the treatment means (with p-values in parentheses) for the characteristics shown in the left-hand column. The final row reports the pooled F-statistic and p-value from testing treatment-control balance on the set of characteristics jointly. For variables that are percentages, the treatment–control difference is shown in percentage points. Due to a coding error during the early phase of the study, randomly assigned impaneled members at 1:1:1 instead of a 2:1:1 ratio to no financial incentives, a $10 incentive and a $50 incentive causing a disproportionate share of the impaneled receiving financial incentives.