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. 2022 Sep 3;71(2):509–537. doi: 10.1057/s41308-022-00187-3

Table 2.

Results controlling for aspects of program design

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Credit-to-GDP gap

(change from t−3 to t−1)

0.15** 0.16** 0.08** 0.07*** 0.14***
(0.07) (0.08) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05)
Dummy: Civil conflict 2.05** 2.02** 1.80* 1.67** 1.82***
(0.80) (0.81) (0.98) (0.66) (0.67)

Output growth

(t−1)

0.21*** 0.21*** 0.13 0.11** 0.08
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.06) (0.05)
Dummy: 2019 3.38*** 3.49*** 2.52*** 3.86*** 3.98***
(1.11) (0.96) (0.69) (0.91) (0.84)

Expected real growth of base money

(t−1 to t+1)

−0.02
(0.04)

Expected change in money multiplier

(t−1 to t+1)

0.18
(0.88)

Expected fiscal adjustment

(t−1 to t+1)

0.17
(0.14)

Loan amount

(Access/GDP)

−0.03
(0.16)

Debt outstanding to IMF

(t; Debt/GDP)

−0.29***
(0.09)

Interact: Debt outstanding *

Credit-to-GDP gap

−0.01***
(0.00)
Constant −0.63 −0.70* −0.78* −0.33 0.23
(0.43) (0.42) (0.43) (0.60) (0.36)
Observations 91 92 136 218 216
R2 0.27 0.27 0.10 0.13 0.19
Time period 2002–2019 2002–2019 2000–2019 2000–2019 2000–2019
Sample Full Full Full Full Full

White heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by country are shown in parentheses. The use of *** denotes a coefficient significantly different from zero at the 0.01 confidence level; **0.05; *0.10