



Since January 2020 Elsevier has created a COVID-19 resource centre with free information in English and Mandarin on the novel coronavirus COVID-19. The COVID-19 resource centre is hosted on Elsevier Connect, the company's public news and information website.

Elsevier hereby grants permission to make all its COVID-19-related research that is available on the COVID-19 resource centre - including this research content - immediately available in PubMed Central and other publicly funded repositories, such as the WHO COVID database with rights for unrestricted research re-use and analyses in any form or by any means with acknowledgement of the original source. These permissions are granted for free by Elsevier for as long as the COVID-19 resource centre remains active.

Minimising the risk of monkeypox virus transmission during faecal microbiota transplantation: recommendations from a European expert panel



Faecal microbiota transplantation (FMT) is an established treatment for recurrent *Clostridioides difficile* infection, recommended by several guidelines for this indication.^{1,2} FMT is not only more effective than antibiotics for recurrent *C difficile* infection,³ but also able to prevent *C difficile* infection-related complications.⁴ Several actions have been taken to guarantee and expand FMT availability, and to increase its safety. Stool banks are a model that ensures a high level of product quality and reliability of supply.^{1,2} The need for stool banks became evident during the COVID-19 pandemic, when, because of concerns about the potential transmission of SARS-CoV-2 virus via faeces, FMT was temporarily withheld in some countries.⁵ In response to this issue, the FMT community has provided recommendations with the aim of safely continuing the routine provision of FMT by reorganising workflows, mainly of donor screening.⁵ These recommendations have proved to be effective in retaining a similar number of donors and patients as before the pandemic and maintaining safety.

As of Sept 7, 2022, monkeypox virus infection has been reported in over 100 countries or territories since January, 2022, including 97 that have not ever reported an outbreak before.⁷ Consequently, on July 23, 2022, WHO declared the monkeypox virus outbreak to be a public health emergency, advocating common actions aimed at preventing it.⁸

Monkeypox virus is a DNA virus belonging to the Poxviridae family, close to the variola virus (known as smallpox). It typically has a 1–2 week incubation period, a prodromal period with fever and lymphadenopathy, and finally a macular rash progressing through papular, vesicular, and pustular stages. Monkeypox virus is usually a self-limiting disease, with symptoms lasting 2–4 weeks.⁹

Monkeypox virus is believed to be transmitted predominantly through direct contact with lesions or infected body fluids, with possible involvement of fomites and large respiratory droplets. However, the current outbreak differs from previous ones because

it seems to spread mainly (90–95%) via sexual contact among men who have sex with men, with a high frequency of anogenital lesions and proctitis.⁹ Moreover, some affected individuals can be asymptomatic or have few symptoms.¹⁰

Some reports have identified the monkeypox virus genome in rectal swabs or faecal samples,^{10,11} and viable virus has been isolated from rectal swabs in one of these studies,¹⁰ supporting the theoretical risk of transmission of monkeypox virus via FMT.

In August, 2022, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued a safety alert concerning this risk, advising the need for increased safety protections to be applied to the FMT workflow related to the monkeypox virus, including additional questions to identify donors who might have recent or active infection or be at high risk of infection.¹²

As a European expert panel, we agree that there is a need for expanding the donor questionnaire to decrease the risks of transmission of monkeypox virus. This outbreak appears to spread mainly through sexual contact. Current guidelines for donor screening already recommend excluding individuals with risky sexual behaviour (including sexual contacts with sex workers, with anonymous individuals, or individuals with sexually transmittable diseases), which is also applicable for identifying potential donors with monkeypox virus.^{1,2} Moreover, we recommend screening potential donors, at the first evaluation and at each donation, for both the presence of prodromal non-specific symptoms (including fever, lymphadenopathy, or myalgias) or of newly appeared skin lesions (mainly macular rash progressing to vesicula and pustula) within the previous 30 days; or close contact with individuals with proven or suspected infection within the previous 30 days, or both. If either of these items is positive, the potential donor should be prohibited from donating at least for 30 days.

We also agree with the suggestion from the FDA to retrospectively extend this screening to donors whose stool batches have been collected since March, 2022.¹²

Published Online
September 15, 2022
[https://doi.org/10.1016/S2468-1253\(22\)00305-3](https://doi.org/10.1016/S2468-1253(22)00305-3)

Notably, the FDA has not suggested any additional testing. PCR-based tests for detecting viral DNA in biological samples are available for monkeypox virus, but accuracy on stool samples is unknown.

Additionally, the FDA recommends informing patients of the potential risk of monkeypox virus transmission. We agree with the importance of informing patients about the potential risks of transmission of infectious agents but believe that the current incidence of monkeypox virus (which seems to be limited to risks groups who are excluded from donation) does not justify emphasising it as a separate entity.

We agree that, on the basis of current knowledge of the transmission of monkeypox virus and the performance of available tests, the addition of laboratory testing would not increase safety, and is not clinically justified at present.

These recommendations count for both research and clinical practice and should be adapted to local health-care systems and regularly updated on the basis of new insights in the epidemiology of monkeypox virus and potential advantages of specific diagnostics.

EJK and GC are joint senior authors. GI has received personal fees for acting as speaker for Biocodex, Danone, Sofar, Malesci, Metagenics, and Tillotts Pharma, and for acting as consultant or advisor for Ferring Therapeutics, Giuliani, Malesci, and Tillotts Pharma. BHM has received consultancy fees from Finch Therapeutics Group and Ferring Pharmaceuticals. HS reports personal fees from Danone, Enterome, Takeda, AbbVie, Roche, Amgen, Danone, BiomX, Ferring, BMS, Astellas, MSD, Novartis, Tillotts Pharma, and Biocodex; grants from Biocodex, Danone, and BiomX; and is a co-founder of Exelium Biosciences. MJGTV has received research grants from 3M, Astellas Pharma, Biontech, DaVolterra, Evonik, Gilead Sciences, Glycom, Immunic, MaaT Pharma, Merck/MSD, Organobalance, Seres Therapeutics, and Takeda Pharmaceutical, and speaker or consultancy fees from Alb Filis Kliniken, Arderypharm, Astellas Pharma, Basilea, Bio-Mérieux, DaVolterra, Farmak International Holding GmbH, Ferring, Gilead Sciences, Immunic, MaaT Pharma, Merck/MSD, Pfizer, Roche, Organobalance, and SocraTec R&D. AG reports personal fees for consultancy from Eisai, 3PSolutions, Real Time Meeting, Fondazione Istituto Danone, Sinergie Srl, Board MRGE, and Sanofi; personal fees for acting as a speaker for Takeda, AbbVie, and Sandoz; and personal fees for acting on advisory boards for VSL3 and Eisai. JJK and EJK have received unrestricted research grants from the Vedanta Biomedical Company, Boston. GC has received personal fees for acting as advisor for Ferring Therapeutics. All other authors declare no competing interests. GI is supported by the Linea D-1 of the Catholic University of Rome and by the Ricerca Finalizzata Giovani Ricercatori 2018 of the Italian Ministry of Health (project GR-2018-12365734) AG, GC, and GI are supported by the BIOMIS grant of the Italian Ministry of Research. BHM is supported by a National Institute of Health Research (NIHR) Academic Clinical Lectureship (CL-2019-21-002). GI, AG, and GC thank the Fondazione Roma for the invaluable support to their scientific research.

Gianluca Ianiro, Benjamin H Mullish, Tariq H Iqbal, Elisabeth M Terveer, Simon Mark Dahl Baunwall, Alexander Link, Harry Sokol, Juozas Kupcinskas, Luca Masucci, Maurizio Sanguinetti, Maria J G T Vehreschild, Christian L Hvas, Josbert J Keller, Antonio Gasbarrini, Ed J Kujiper, Giovanni Cammarota
gianluca.ianiro@unicatt.it

Digestive Disease Center, Fondazione Policlinico Universitario Agostino Gemelli IRCCS, Rome 00168, Italy (GI, AG, GC); Dipartimento Universitario di Medicina e Chirurgia Traslazionale, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Rome, Italy (GI, AG, GC); Division of Digestive Diseases, Department of Metabolism, Digestion and Reproduction, Faculty of Medicine, Imperial College London, London, UK (BHM); University of Birmingham Microbiome Treatment Centre, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK (THI); Department of Gastroenterology, University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust, Birmingham, UK (THI); Department of Medical Microbiology (EMT, JJK, EJK) and Netherlands Donor Feces Bank (EMT, EJK), Leiden University Medical Center, Leiden, Netherlands; Department of Hepatology and Gastroenterology, Aarhus University Hospital, Aarhus, Denmark (SMDB, CLH); Department of Gastroenterology, Hepatology and Infectious Diseases, Otto-von-Guericke University, Magdeburg, Germany (AL); Service de Gastroentérologie, Hôpital Saint Antoine, Sorbonne Université, Inserm, Centre de Recherche Saint-Antoine, Paris, France (HS); French Group of Faecal Microbiota Transplantation, Paris, France (HS); INRA, UMR1319 Micalis, AgroParisTech, Jouy-en-Josas, France (HS); Department of Gastroenterology and Institute of Digestive Research, Lithuanian University of Health Sciences, Kaunas, Lithuania (JK); Microbiology Unit, Fondazione Policlinico Universitario "A. Gemelli" IRCCS, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Rome, Italy (LM, MS); Department of Internal Medicine, Infectious Diseases, University Hospital Frankfurt, Goethe University Frankfurt, Frankfurt, Germany (MJGTV); Department of Gastroenterology, Haaglanden Medical Center, The Hague, Netherlands (JJK)

- 1 Cammarota G, Ianiro G, Kelly CR, et al. International consensus conference on stool banking for faecal microbiota transplantation in clinical practice. *Gut* 2019; **68**: 2111–21.
- 2 Keller JJ, Ooijevaar RE, Hvas CL, et al. A standardised model for stool banking for faecal microbiota transplantation: a consensus report from a multidisciplinary UEG working group. *United European Gastroenterol J* 2021; **9**: 229–47.
- 3 Baunwall SMD, Lee MM, Eriksen MK, et al. Faecal microbiota transplantation for recurrent *Clostridioides difficile* infection: an updated systematic review and meta-analysis. *eClinicalMedicine* 2020; **29-30**: 100642.
- 4 Cammarota G, Ianiro G, Magalini S, Gasbarrini A, Gui D. Decrease in surgery for *Clostridium difficile* infection after starting a program to transplant fecal microbiota. *Ann Intern Med* 2015; **163**: 487–88.
- 5 Ianiro G, Mullish BH, Kelly CR, et al. Reorganisation of faecal microbiota transplant services during the COVID-19 pandemic. *Gut* 2020; **69**: 1555–63.
- 6 Ianiro G, Bibbò S, Masucci L, et al. Maintaining standard volumes, efficacy and safety, of faecal microbiota transplantation for *C. difficile* infection during the COVID-19 pandemic: a prospective cohort study. *Dig Liver Dis* 2020; **52**: 1390–95.
- 7 US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Monkeypox: 2022 global map & case count. www.cdc.gov/poxvirus/monkeypox/response/2022/world-map.html (accessed Sept 7, 2022).
- 8 WHO. WHO Director-General's statement at the press conference following IHR Emergency Committee regarding the multi-country outbreak of monkeypox – 23 July 2022. World Health Organization, 2022. <https://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-statement-on-the-press-conference-following-IHR-emergency-committee-regarding-the-multi-country-outbreak-of-monkeypox--23-july-2022> (accessed Aug 28, 2022).
- 9 Thornhill JP, Barkati S, Walmsley S, et al. Monkeypox virus infection in humans across 16 countries – April–June 2022. *N Engl J Med* 2022; **387**: 679–91.
- 10 De Baetselier I, Van Dijk C, Kenyon C, et al. Retrospective detection of asymptomatic monkeypox virus infections among male sexual health clinic attendees in Belgium. *Nat Med* 2022; published online Aug 12. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41591-022-02004-w>.
- 11 Peiró-Mestres A, Fuertes I, Camprubi-Ferrer D, et al. Frequent detection of monkeypox virus DNA in saliva, semen, and other clinical samples from 12 patients, Barcelona, Spain, May to June 2022. *Euro Surveill* 2022; **27**: 2200503.
- 12 US Food and Drug Administration. Safety alert regarding use of fecal microbiota for transplantation and additional safety protections pertaining to monkeypox virus. Aug 22, 2022. <https://www.fda.gov/vaccines-blood-biologics/safety-availability-biologics/safety-alert-regarding-use-fecal-microbiota-transplantation-and-additional-safety-protections-0> (accessed Aug 29, 2022).