Skip to main content
. 2022 Jan-Jun;15(1):98–125. doi: 10.21500/20112084.5434

Table B2. Experimental Design and Overall Results in the Dictator Game Across Studies Included.

Reference Country Treatments Amount at stake Mean giving
Ben-Ner et al. (2009) United States In-group and out group multiple categories (political views, nationality, religion/belief in God) $10 USD $2.04 (political views), $2.07 (nationality), and $1.85 (religion/belief in God)
Bjorvatn and Tungodden (2015) Uganda Disability primes and neutral primes 2000 USh (UGX, about USD .53) Measured as altruism: .42 urban-disabled, .41 urban non-disabled, .40 rural disabled and .39 rural non-disabled (control treatment) .44 urban-disabled, .40 urban non-disabled, rural disabled .45, and 0.43 rural non-disabled (treatment group)
Grimm et al. (2017) Germany In-group and multiple out-groups (academic departments Economics, Humanities, Law, Natural Sciences, and Psychology) 100points(about $1.12 USD) 18.750 (in-group) and 13.299 (out-group)
Grosskopf and Pearce (2017) England Anonymous, or receivers with English and Muslim surnames 10 pounds sterling (about $13.05 U) 4.05 pounds (anonymous), 4.88 (English), and 2.62 (Muslim)
Güth et al. (2009) Germany Primary treatment (know about their common group identity) and Random treatment (only know partially about their common group identity) random treatment 10 ECU (Experimental Currency Unit, about USD .56) 4.347 (M.In-group), 2.875 (M.Out-group), 2.969 (R.In-group), and 2.562 (R.Out-group)
Jenkins et al. (2018) States United Group membership and exchange rates USD 10 Under 1:1 exchange rate, then the mean ranged from 5.05 (home- less), 4.91 (elderly), and 4.21 (mental disability) to 2.16 (inmate), 1.85 (addict), and 1.70 (lawyer)
Saccardo (2015) Germany Information about the first name of the experimental opponent (German-sounding names and Turkish sounding names) 10 EUR for both players, or 9 EUR for decision-maker and 15 EUR for the receiver 38.1% altruistic choice (German condition), 36.6% altruistic choice (Turkish condition), 61.9% selfish choice (German condition), and 63.4% selfish choice (Turkish condition)
Tanaka and Camerer (2016) Vietnam Three ethnic groups: in-group majority (Vietnamese) behavior towards high-status outgroup (rich Chinese) and low-status outgroup (poor Khmer) 10k dong (about USD .53) Khmer exhibits the strongest outgroup bias against Vietnamese and Chinese (2000 to 3000). Vietnamese give more to their own group (range from 3000 to 4000) than Chinese (range from 2000 to 3000). The Chinese give more to their own group (range from 3000 to 4000) than to Vietnamese (range from 3000 to 4000). However, one unusual cross-group exception is that the Vietnamese and the Chinese give more to Khmer than their own group members.