Figure 1.
The signalling game with conflict of interest. A differential cost model when the cost is condition-dependent. After nature randomly divides the roles (S and R) and the types of signallers (high- and low-quality S), players make sequential decisions. First, S can send two different signals (low-intensity signal, high-intensity signal) to get the resource from R. After this, R receives the signal and decides whether to provide the resource to S or not. At the end of each round players get feedback on their success. Both high- and low-quality S wins when they get the resource from R, but for R only the dedication of the resource to a high-quality S and its protection from low-quality S generate successful outcomes (see outcomes in brackets at the ends of the decision tree where the first element refers to R and the second to S). The reward for success is indicated simply as 1 in the figure, in the experiment it meant a pay-off of HUF 1200. In the figure cLL, cLH, cHL and cHH indicate the different cost of signals according to the type of signaller.