Table 10.
Comparative analysis of IoT security schemes.
| Author | Year | Objective | Technique Used | Type of Data | Framework | Pros | Cons |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Guo et al. [214] | 2017 | Solve complexity due to dynamic data | PKI | Big data | Big data left | Single sign-on | ID exposed, Fake certificate after changing RSU |
| Li et al. [215] | 2019 | Remove certificate storage dependency | PKI | Vehicle data | - | Certificate-less | vulnerable to resist attack |
| Kerrache et al. [218] | 2019 | To ensure trust among drivers | Chaotic map and Social Network | Social profile | TACASHI | Honesty factor | Dependent on external factor |
| Meshram et al. [221] | 2021 | To secure smart city | Chaotic map | Smart city | - | Lightweight | Need to enhance security |
| Al et al. [219] | 2021 | Reduce communication and key management overhead | CRSA | Throughput gain | - | Minimizes collision and Improved throughput | High storage, Keys of vehicles can be exposed |
| Hwang et al. [223] | 2020 | To enable safe channel for sharing medical data | CP-ABE | Medical data | - | Safeguard issue of key abuse | Leakage of PHI file |
| Han et al. [222] | 2021 | Algorithm to build frequent item sets | CP-ABE | Attributes | - | Improved speed | Limited to same attribute set |
| Huang et al. [224] | 2019 | To safeguard against unauthorized entity | ECG | PHR file | - | Lightweight | Need to be anonymous |
| Hahn et al. [228] | 2019 | Countermeasure against MAC-based flaws | MAC | Health data | - | Less verification time | Server impersonation |
| Siddiqi et al. [227] | 2020 | To build feasible and secure IoMT communication | MAC | Medical data | IMDfence | Less energy consumption | Need to ensure anonymity |
| Wazid et al. [229] | 2019 | Secure wireless communication | ECC | Surrounding information | AKM-IoV | Dynamic node addition | Does not resist DoS attack |
| Wu et al. [230] | 2020 | Reduce the verification delay and achieve fast message verification | ECC | Batch message | - | Batch verification | Need focus on security |
| Thumbur et al. [231] | 2021 | Avoid complex certificate management problem and key escrow problem | ECC | Signature | Aggregate Signature | Low verification time and storage at RSU | DoS attack |
| Zhang et al. [232] | 2020 | Secure communication with limited bandwidth | ECC | Signature | - | Random number to avoid side-channel attack | Need RSU and TA secure communication |
| Ghahramani et al. [233] | 2020 | Support roaming users in global mobility network | ECC | Mobile users data | - | Added deep learning to verify biometric | High storage and communication cost |
| Xie et al. [235] | 2021 | To protect wireless sensor networks in smart city | ECC | Wireless sensor | - | Simple | Smart card stolen attack |
| Xia et al. [237] | 2021 | To secure environment of smart grid | ECC | Smart meter | - | Completed in two steps | Smart meter capture attack |
| Chen et al. [238] | 2021 | To get data from edge nodes | ECC | Edge utility nodes | - | XOR and Hashed computation | Did not consider the whole network |
| Srinivas et al. [239] | 2021 | Secure big data collection in smart transportation | ECC | Vehicle data | - | Security | Computational, communication cost |
| Sharma et al. [243] | 2021 | Correctness of data exchange | Supervised machine learning | Location and movement | - | Detect attack and countermeasure | Limited to position based attack |
| Pascale et al. [244] | 2021 | Detection of a possible cyber-attack | Machine learning | Parameters as RPM | - | Accuracy | Not focused on data transmission |
| Pradeep et al. [245] | 2022 | Secure smart city applications | CHAP PPP | Operational data of city | - | Simple calculations | System verification is absent |
| Wang et al. [246] | 2018 | Physical and external security | PUF | Vehicle data | NOTSA | OBU with segregated applications | Need secure area in OBU |
| Yanambaka et al. [250] | 2019 | To develop secure IoMT system | PUF | Health data | PMSec | Simple and lightweight | ML attack, MITM attack |
| Alladi et al. [247] | 2021 | Verification of ECU firmware | PUF and ECC | Firmware and software | - | Physical safety | Insider can identify secret key |
| Aman et al. [248] | 2021 | Resist physical attacks and reduce overhead with secure communication | PUF | Network traffic | - | Low authentication packets and overhead | CRP updates can expose system |
| Alladi et al. [249] | 2021 | Sensitive information transfer and resist node capture/tampering attack | PUF | Traffic information | SecAuthUAV | Low energy in device and low storage in server | Could server impersonation and ID expose |
| Badar et al. [251] | 2021 | Securing smart grid | PUF | Line flaw or breakage | - | Computational cost is low | Communication cost is high |
| Tanveer et al. [252] | 2021 | To make reliable smart grids | PUF and ECC | Power usages | ARAP-SG | Computational cost is less | Unnecessary storage and computation |
| Jiang et al. [254] | 2019 | Application of blockchain in IoV | Blockchain | Big data | - | Showed IoV using Blockchain | Security will be in future work |
| Liu et al. [255] | 2019 | Reduce transaction confirmation delay and clod-start of new users | Blockchain (PoW) | Traffic information | - | Pricing strategy | Not suitable for high resource adversary |
| Yin et al. [256] | 2020 | Reduce processing time with gainig profit | Blockchain | Mobile crowdsensing | - | Time-window based urgent task | Reactive security |
| Yang et al. [257] | 2019 | Trust management in vehicular network | Blockchain (PoW and PoS) | Traffic | - | Credible neighbor rating | Reply attack, MITM attack etc, overhead |
| Gao et al. [258] | 2020 | Effective network management | Blockchain | Vehicular data | SDN | Avoid frequent handover and relieve pressure | No focus on data transmission trust |
| Xu et al. [259] | 2021 | Energy efficiency and encounter external invasion | Blockchain | Vehicular data | - | Suitable for high amount of data | basic security |
| Javaid et al. [260] | 2020 | Trust establishment | Blockchain (dPoW) and PUF | Traffic | - | No physical and side-channel attack | Can expose response |
| Vivekanandan et al. [261] | 2021 | Secure device to device communication in smart city | Blockchain and ECC | Devices data | BIDAPSCA5G | Location incorporation | Eavesdropping attack |
| Wang et al. [262] | 2022 | To build a reliable communication channel for healthcare | Blockchain (PoW) and PUF | Health information | - | Low cost | Storage cost |