Table 5.
Results of RSI-defined overreaction proxies.
Dep. Var. |
OB-RSI |
OS-RSI |
||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Ind. Var. | (IIIa) | (IIIb) | (IIIc) | (IVa) | (IVb) | (IVc) |
Directors' shareholding | −0.1277*** | −0.1072** | −0.1081*** | −0.008 | −0.0148 | −0.0196 |
(0.0456) | (0.0471) | (0.0374) | (0.0519) | (0.0543) | (0.0462) | |
Top ten shareholding | 0.004 | 0.0101 | 0.0228 | 0.0229 | 0.0194 | 0.0126 |
(0.0338) | (0.0346) | (0.0207) | (0.0324) | (0.0335) | (0.0178) | |
Managers' shareholding | −0.1078 | −0.1652 | −0.0381 | 0.0183 | 0.0532 | 0.0021 |
(0.2341) | (0.2276) | (0.2826) | (0.3926) | (0.3989) | (0.4335) | |
Directors' pledge | −0.0287 | −0.0291 | −0.0344 | 0.0017 | 0.0027 | 0.0067 |
(0.0241) | (0.0243) | (0.0215) | (0.028) | (0.0284) | (0.0225) | |
CEO duality | 0.0003 | 0.0013 | 0.0065 | 0.0129 | 0.0126 | 0.0093 |
(0.0123) | (0.0122) | (0.0063) | (0.0126) | (0.0128) | (0.0113) | |
Board size | 0.001 | 0.0009 | 0.0006 | −0.0014 | −0.0018 | −0.0014 |
(0.0021) | (0.0024) | (0.0014) | (0.0024) | (0.0026) | (0.0019) | |
Leverage | 0.0275 | 0.0263 | 0.009 | 0.0216 | 0.0157 | 0.0274 |
(0.0331) | (0.0372) | (0.0322) | (0.0392) | (0.045) | (0.0587) | |
Net profit | −0.0101 | −0.0217 | −0.0289 | 0.0254 | 0.0211 | 0.0288 |
(0.022) | (0.0332) | (0.219) | (0.023) | (0.0344) | (0.0431) | |
Asset turnover | −0.0079 | −0.0179* | −0.0204** | −0.0024 | 0.001 | 0.0032 |
(0.0103) | (0.0099) | (0.0081) | (0.0076) | (0.0097) | (0.0107) | |
Firm size | −0.0093 | −0.0066 | −0.0016 | 0.0062 | 0.006 | 0.0024 |
(0.0061) | (0.007) | (0.0079) | (0.0066) | (0.0076) | (0.0098) | |
Const. | 0.255*** | 0.2158** | 0.1782 | 0.0292 | 0.0383 | 0.078 |
(0.0844) | (0.0912) | (0.1187) | (0.0979) | (0.1077) | (0.1373) | |
yearly dummies | Y | Y | N | Y | Y | N |
Outliers excluded | N | Y | Y | N | Y | Y |
Adj R2 | 0.2059 | 0.2143 | 0.1399 | 0.0873 | 0.0775 | 0.0329 |
Coeff. Est. | GLS | GLS | Petersen | GLS | GLS | Petersen |
Std, Err. | White | White | Cluster F&T | White | White | Clusster F&T |