Table 7.

Results of RSI-defined overreaction proxies by using other models for robustness.

Dep. Var.	OB-RSI		OS-RSI
Indep. Var.	(VIIa)	(VIIb)	(VIIIa)	(VIIIb)
Directors' shareholding	−0.1094**	−0.1072***	−0.0228	−0.0148
	(0.0466)	(0.0405)	(0.0541)	(0.045)
Top ten shareholding	0.0272	0.0101	0.0106	0.0194
	(0.0364)	(0.0321)	(0.0419)	(0.0357)
Managers' shareholding	−0.031	−0.1652	−0.0336	0.0532
	(0.2274)	(0.2068)	(0.2551)	(0.2299)
Directors' pledge	−0.0324	−0.0291	0.014	0.0027
	(0.0251)	(0.0229)	(0.028)	(0.0255)
CEO duality	0.0079	0.0013	0.0092	0.0126
	(0.0131)	(0.0113)	(0.0154)	(0.0125)
Board size	0.0004	0.0009	−0.0012	−0.0018
	(0.0026)	(0.0023)	(0.0029)	(0.0026)
Leverage	0.0066	0.0263	0.0277	0.0157
	(0.0346)	(0.0318)	(0.0394)	(0.0353)
Net profit	−0.0291	−0.0217	0.0335	0.0211
	(0.0285)	(0.026)	(0.0318)	(0.0289)
Asset turnover	−0.0212**	−0.0179**	0.006	0.001
	(0.01)	(0.0088)	(0.0115)	(0.0098)
Firm size	−0.0003	−0.0066	0.0006	0.006
	(0.0067)	(0.0061)	(0.0076)	(0.0068)
Const.	0.1589*	0.2158***	0.1033	0.0383
	(0.094)	(0.0836)	(0.1084)	(0.0929)
yearly dummies	N	Y	N	N
Outliers excluded	Y	Y	Y	Y
Adj R2/Wald χ2 (Prob)	0.1392	37.55 (0.009)	0.0312	43.64 (0.004)
Coeff. Est.	Panel	Censor Panel	Panel	Censor Panel
Std. Err.	Random	Random	Random	Random