Table 15.
Theories utilised in implication of implementing theme
| Theory/model/paradigm | Citations |
|---|---|
| Agency theory | Chaudhuri et al. (2021), Tan et al. (2022a) |
| Dynamic capability view (DCV) | Sheel and Nath (2019), Benzidia et al. (2021), Kusi-Sarpong et al. (2022) |
| Fuzzy set theory | Ozdemir et al. (2020), |
| Game theory | Choi (2019), De Giovanni (2020), Guo et al. (2020), Hayrutdinov et al. (2020), Bai et al. (2021), Niu et al. (2021a, 2021b), Xu et al. (2021b), Xu and Choi (2021), Yu et al. (2021), Liu (2022), Tao et al. (2022), Wu and Yu (2022), Xu and Duan (2022), Li et al. (2022a), Yang et al. (2022) |
| Grounded theory | Qian and Papadonikolaki (2021) |
| Information processing theory (IPT) | Martinez et al. (2019), |
| Institutional theory (IT) | Tan et al. (2022a) |
| Mean-risk theory | Choi (2020), |
| Network theory (NT) | Paul et al. (2021), Tan et al. (2022b) |
| Organizational information processing theory (OIPT) | Dubey et al. (2020) |
| Pattern matching theory | Kshetri (2021) |
| Principal-agent theory (PAT) | Xing et al. (2021), L. Liu et al. (2021) |
| Relational view (RV) | Dubey et al. (2020), Qian and Papadonikolaki (2021), Tan et al. (2022b) |
| Resource based view (RBV) | Martinez et al. (2019), Sheel and Nath (2019), Nandi et al. (2020), Paul et al. (2021), |
| Transaction cost economics (TCE) | Roeck et al. (2020), |
| Signaling theory | Treiblmaier and Garaus (2022) |
| Social exchange theory | Wang et al. (2021b) |
| System dynamics | Mangla et al. (2021), |
| Systems theory | Zelbst et al. (2020) |