Table 2.

Model results for all countries

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
(Intercept)	–6.6267	–0.3088	0.6004	–0.3061
	(3.5754)	(3.2097)	(4.2624)	(3.2109)
GDPpc	1.5174	0.0957	0.0543	0.0953
	(0.8086)	(0.7339)	(0.8715)	(0.7346)
GDPpc2	–0.0781	–0.0047	–0.0019	–0.0047
	(0.0428)	(0.0403)	(0.0455)	(0.0403)
GDP growth	–0.0008	–0.0015	$-{0.0035}^{*}$	–0.0015
	(0.0009)	(0.0012)	(0.0013)	(0.0012)
Government debt	–0.0005	–0.0008	–0.0013	–0.0008
	(0.0005)	(0.0006)	(0.0007)	(0.0006)
FF income dep.	–0.0061	$-{0.0117}^{**}$	$-{0.0115}^{**}$	$-{0.0117}^{**}$
	(0.0034)	(0.0023)	(0.0019)	(0.0023)
VAT	0.0029	0.0095	0.0048	0.0095
	(0.0043)	(0.0072)	(0.0074)	(0.0072)
Leader age			0.0013
			(0.0010)
Male leader			0.0194
			(0.0552)
Leader education			–0.0669
			(0.0334)
Leader ideology			–0.0209
			(0.0112)
Economic crisis year				–0.0006
				(0.0153)
R2	0.9531	0.9060	0.9078	0.9060
Adjusted R2	0.9509	0.9051	0.9068	0.9051
Country intercepts	N	Y	Y	Y
Country trends	N	Y	Y	Y
Leader intercepts	Y	N	N	N
Leader trends	Y	N	N	N
Number of observations	26,171	26,171	22,660	26,171
RMSE	0.1101	0.1531	0.1496	0.1531
N clusters	121	121	114	121

The outcome is the net implicit tax on gasoline. The sample includes all countries with more than one political leader throughout the period of analysis. Coefficient estimates indicate the expected change in net implicit taxes for one-unit changes in each covariate; ${}^{***}P<0.001$; ${}^{**}P<0.01$; ${}^{*}P<0.05$; GDPpc, GDP per capita; GDPpc², GDP per capita squared; FF income dep., fossil fuel income dependence; N, no; Y, yes; N clusters, number of clusters.