Pandemic diplomacy and patron–client relations in Sino-Serbian cooperation

Abstract

Since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the authorities of Serbia have undertaken a concerted effort to secure China’s support in containing the coronavirus. This asymmetrical cooperation, apart from aspects concerning health security, has allowed both sides to obtain considerable political and economic benefits. This article examines how China and Serbia utilize pandemic cooperation to pursue and realize their wider foreign and internal policy goals through patron–client ties, as well as highlighting the pitfalls of this kind of relationship. Although the outbreak of the pandemic and the medical cooperation that followed do not constitute a turning point in the well-established relations between the two countries, the article argues that pandemic cooperation has considerably strengthened relations. In many ways, the pattern observed by the authors resembles China’s pandemic exchanges with other countries, especially smaller states with authoritarian inclinations.

Serbia pursues a multi-vectored foreign policy based on a highly flexible approach so as to maximize benefits in its relations with major powers. The balanced approach was officially introduced by President Boris Tadić in 2009, through the concept of the Four Pillars of Serbian foreign policy, with the powers being the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the European Union (EU), Russia, and the United States. Among the four, the highest priority was given to relations with the EU and to Serbia’s expressed commitment to undertake the EU’s accession process. However, relations between Serbia and China have become increasingly close in the last 15 years, with growing cooperation in a number of areas, including politics, economy, military, ¹ and most recently, prevention and control processes due to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020.

The Republic of Serbia is attractive to China for geopolitical, economic and strategic reasons. ² In fact, when it comes to measuring China’s actual influence on Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), for example, by examining the voting behaviour and rhetoric which Serbia employs at the United Nations General Assembly, the country seems to be an outstanding example, even among CEE countries that are considered to be China’s closest political partners in the region. ³ One can also interpret Serbia’s voting pattern as a direct result of other mitigating factors and not because of China’s influence. These include voting on issues important to Russia, with whom both Serbia and China often ally, as well as issues connected with territorial integrity and non-interference, an area in which China and Serbia have a declared shared interest. ⁴ Consequently, China’s diplomatic support is important for Serbia’s territorial integrity, helping the Balkan nation to defend its position on Kosovo (Resolution 1244) at the United Nations Security Council. ⁵ In exchange, the Serbian leadership reiterates support for China’s position on issues related to Taiwan, Xinjiang, the South China Sea, its human rights record and market economy status. According to Liu Zuokui, one of China’s leading experts on CEE from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Serbia’s backing is particularly valuable in the context of the unfavourable stance taken against China on the abovementioned issues by many EU member states. ⁶

Interestingly, the wording constituting a rejection of Taiwan’s statehood and a clause on resolving the South China Sea dispute in line with Beijing’s policy were inserted into the Sino-Serbian comprehensive strategic partnership which was signed during Chairman Xi Jinping’s visit to Serbia in 2016. ⁷ So far, this is the only example of such a commitment among the five partnerships of this kind signed between China and CEE countries, namely, Serbia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Greece and Hungary. Moreover, Serbia was the first European country to express its support for Hong Kong’s National Security Law. The Balkan state has constantly highlighted these commitments during the country’s pandemic-related official communications with China, although its support for PRC’s ‘core interests’ is seemingly not dependent on the medical assistance it receives from China. Still, the example of Ukraine, which was reportedly pressured to drop its support for the scrutiny of human rights violations in Xinjiang, demonstrates that China can weaponize vaccine deliveries. ⁸ Through the prism of patron–client ties, this article examines how China and Serbia use pandemic cooperation to pursue and consolidate their wider foreign and internal policy goals.

The article is divided into five sections. In the first part, it examines the theoretical understanding of patron–client relations. It then traces Sino-Serbian asymmetrical and reciprocal exchanges against the backdrop of moral obligations of the countries which are bound by a ‘traditional’, ‘steel-like’ friendship and who share a sense of being ‘oppressed by the West’, illustrated by the 1999 NATO bombings in Belgrade. Next, the article analyses how pandemic cooperation has allowed China to present itself as Serbia’s most reliable friend, and to demonstrate its declared systemic superiority over the EU. The article then goes on to discuss the effects of these actions in public opinion polls in Serbia, as well as the EU’s official reaction during the 2020 Balkan Summit. The final part of the article examines the benefits Serbia receives both in terms of regional influence and reputational gains. For a clearer picture of Sino-Serbian ties, we examine both sides of the patron–client dynamics, by drawing on Chinese and Serbian primary and secondary sources as well as semi-structured expert interviews conducted by the authors.

Theorizing patron–client relations

Patron–client ties are a consensual relationship, founded on asymmetry and imbalance between the respective parties, which Eric Wolf calls a ‘lopsided friendship’. ⁹ According to the definition provided by James Scott, patron–client ties are instrumental friendships in which individuals of higher socio-economic status (patrons) use their own influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or both, for persons of lower status (clients) who, for their part, reciprocate by offering general support and assistance, including personal services, to patrons. ¹⁰ For Robert Kaufman these dyadic exchanges are characterized by three components: unequal power and the status of the actors involved, a self-regulating principle of reciprocity, and a particularistic and informal character. ¹¹ Scholars also emphasize that patron–client ties involve mutually beneficial obligations and undetermined reciprocal commitments which can be adapted depending on context. ¹²

These findings largely overlap with the patron–client model at the international level, which was developed by Christopher Carney who pointed out three key constitutional elements of these dyadic ties: asymmetry, reciprocity and affectivity, facilitated by compliance (e.g. voting in key issues at the UN). ¹³ However, despite a declared affinity, patron–client mutual support comes from shared interests. In the particular case of China’s relations with Cambodia, the patron–client dynamic was evaluated by John Ciorciari as relatively unexacting for both partners. Both sides reap economic benefits and political backing, yet there are not too many demands for the client to be deferential toward policies in return for the patronage; therefore ‘the cultivation of patron–client ties largely reflects the realist logic of seeking subordinate friends at an acceptable cost’. ¹⁴

When it comes to Serbia, the practice of clientelism is widespread, and both society and political elites perceive similar relations at the international level as something natural. ¹⁵ In recent years, the endemic state capture and patronage networks under President Aleksandar Vučić’s ruling Serbian Progressive Party have become increasingly embedded in the state and administrative apparatus (12 per cent of all voters in Serbia are members of this party), ¹⁶ benefitting from interactions with China, especially in government-to-government projects. ¹⁷ In this asymmetric partnership, China has provided Serbia with investments and credit lines worth up to US$10 billion, which reinforce the political positions of Serbia’s ruling elites. ¹⁸

Cooperation with China has become an important element of the Serbian authorities’ domestic political promotion and strengthening of the Serbian Progressive Party’s image and its legitimacy to govern. Some observers claim that China has already become a key pre-election factor for Serbia and it has, in fact, supplanted traditional international actors such as the EU, and in particular, Germany. ¹⁹ For example, before the June 2020 Serbian parliamentary elections, President Vučić and other senior officials, along with Chinese ambassador Chen Bo, conducted a series of ‘inspection visits’ at the sites of Chinese investments and infrastructure projects in Serbia. These inspections included meeting a Chinese medical team during an on-site visit to China’s constructed Fire Eye COVID-19 testing laboratory in Belgrade. ²⁰ Experts also point to China’s growing normative impact on the increasingly illiberal rule of President Vučić and a gradual reduction in legal requirements for Chinese investors. ²¹

Regarding informal networks, the Chinese presence is much more evident in Serbia and other non-EU countries under the 16 + 1 (14 + 1) format in the Western Balkans, which operates outside of the EU’s legal and normative powers. As noted by Jelena Gledić, the overzealous legal reforms which are aimed at attracting foreign investors in the Western Balkans increase the risk of corruption due to largely opaque contracts. Although these concerns apply to China and other foreign investors, the increasing Chinese presence is particularly controversial due to the export of a Chinese workforce to a region that is already struggling with high unemployment rates. ²² China is seemingly exploiting democratic shortcomings and the weak rule of law in some countries of Central and Eastern Europe, a region which Chinese policymakers consider to be similar to the Global South. ²³

When it comes to major drivers behind a patron’s actions toward the client, Christopher Shoemaker and John Spanier point to the asymmetry of the involved state’s military potential and the security transfer from patron to client, which gives the patron long-term influence on the client’s security. Another factor is having ascendancy over a major competitor rather than generating material gain from the client. Finally, there is the existence of a critical perceptual dimension between the patron and client which must be apparent to other international actors. ²⁴ However, instead of focusing on military security, in the context of the patron–client relationship, this article uses health security during the COVID-19 pandemic as the litmus test of the relationship between China and Serbia, with the EU being the former’s major competitor in this regard.

The goals envisioned by the patron vis-a-vis the client can be described as ‘intangible benefits’. These include ideological goals, aimed at displaying the superiority of the patron’s system in relation to its competitors (which the client may emulate to pursue its own goals), and allowing for the patron to present moral tones in foreign policing; international solidarity and perceptual binding reflected in a variety of forms; and strategic advantages including access to the client’s territory and resources vital to the patron’s direct competitor. ²⁵

With regard to the goals sought by the client, one has to note that they are decisively shaped by the threat environment. As noted by Shoemaker and Spanier, in lower-threat scenarios (those other than securing the client’s national salvation), the client’s ability to control the relationship increases. This may be conducive for the development of the client’s own economic or foreign policy agendas in economic development, regional leadership, and international prestige. ²⁶ In this article, we will verify these findings in light of the client’s efforts to expand its regional and global outreach as a COVID-19 vaccine provider.

By analysing Sino-Serbian relations from the patron–client perspective, the article seeks to answer the following questions: what kind of narrative informs the moral obligation and ideational binding of China–Serbia patron–client relations?; what are the goals sought by the states involved in this type of cooperation?; to what extent has the intensification of anti-pandemic cooperation helped China to frame itself as Serbia’s key partner?; and finally, how has Serbia managed to turn China’s competition with the EU to its own advantage and to extend its regional influence?

Affectivity, asymmetry, and reciprocity in Sino-Serbian pandemic cooperation

According to Carney, it is affectivity coupled with asymmetry that distinguishes patron–client ties from more instrumental forms of international relationships. It is also crucial to underline that this model of international cooperation is not viewed as a zero-sum game by either party. ²⁷ Indeed, the perceptual binding has been, from the very beginning of the pandemic, employed to reinforce the China–Serbia relationship and has been repurposed by China’s party-state propaganda.

In mid-February 2020, CCTV 13, the biggest PRC news channel with a mainly domestic audience, aired an interview with Serbia’s Health Minister, Zlatibor Lončar. The Serbian minister used the occasion of a pandemic-themed discussion to remind viewers of China’s support for Serbia vis-a-vis Kosovo, and the 1999 NATO bombings. One should also not be surprised by his assertion, in line with the PRC’s official pronouncements, that ‘China has taken all possible measures to suppress the spread of the virus’. ²⁸ However, these narratives – to which the Serbian authorities publicly subscribed and continue to do so – stood in stark contrast to the PRC leadership’s mishandled response to the outbreak of the pandemic in the first weeks of January 2020. ²⁹

In late February, the Serbian Deputy Prime Minister and Ivica Dačić, the first Foreign Minister to visit China after the outbreak of the pandemic, paid a two-day visit to Beijing. Dačić met with the head of the Chinese diplomatic corp, Wang Yi, whom he called an ‘old friend’ and a ‘brother’. Dačić stated that the visit represented a touchstone of extraordinary strategic relations and steel-like friendship between the two countries. To this end, Dačić referred to the NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy, the 1999 incident that came to symbolize the Sino-Serbian shared political identity, and stated: ‘You were not afraid of NATO bombs when Serbia was bombed, your diplomats were killed by the bombs meant for the Serbians, so my visit shows that we are not afraid of the virus.’ ³⁰ However, communication between the leadership of the two countries was not limited to cooperation on COVID-19, because they also supported each other in their respective political goals as well as relevant issues pertaining to sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Apart from expressing admiration for the Chinese people as well as the leadership for its allegedly timely and effective response to the pandemic outbreak, Dačić also thanked China for affirming its support for Serbian sovereignty and territorial integrity with regard to the problem of Kosovo. In return, Dačić assured Beijing of Serbia’s continued backing for China’s ‘core interests’. Moreover, the Serbian politician emphasized that China was a bulwark in the fight against the coronavirus and that his country was ready to provide China with medical assistance in the weeks that followed. ³¹ Considering the enormous asymmetry between Serbia and China, such a promise had clear propaganda overtones. Just a few weeks later, the situation was reversed, because China sent medical aid to Serbia, a move which reflects the self-regulating principle of the patron–client reciprocal relationship.

Indeed, on March 15, 2020 China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang heralded the immediate medical assistance to Serbia, and stated that during the early phase of the Chinese people’s fight against the pandemic, ‘the Serbian government and people have given firm support to China in various ways’. ³² A few days later, the Serbian Foreign Minister declared, ‘China sends [us] donations, and the EU does not want to sell us medical aid’. ³³ The context of such statements is also important with regard to the EU, because Chinese assistance to Serbia came earlier than the EU’s, an issue discussed in the following section. However, contrary to official statements framing the patron’s ‘security transfers’ as benevolent, some Serbian experts claimed that these were actually purchased, and almost everything that came from China had been bought either by the Serbian government or through funds donated by the EU. ³⁴

Unlike other forms of an instrumental relationship, the Sino-Serbian cooperation was, especially in the earlier stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, matched with high affectivity for the pronouncements and gestures expressed by both sides of this patron–client arrangement. An important stage of relations, informing the perceptual element of the patron–client matrices, came with President Vučić’s televised conference in mid-March 2020, during which he declared that he had sent a letter to Xi Jinping asking for Chinese medical assistance. As Vučić noted, for the first time, he officially addressed the PRC leader ‘not only as a dear friend but also as a brother, and not only my personal friend but also a friend and brother of this country [Serbia]’. ³⁵ Apart from the affectionate gestures and wording that signalled the reciprocal nature of the China–Serbia relationship, one can observe how the patron began to draw intangible benefits from the relationship with the client by displaying its perceived systemic superiority against a major competitor, namely the EU.

China as Serbia’s ‘sole saviour’ and the battle of narratives over systemic superiority with the EU

In a speech in March, Vučić’s appraisal of China as the only country that can be relied upon was in stark contrast to his critique of the EU, which included Brussels’s delayed transfer of medical equipment to non-EU countries. The Serbian president went on to juxtapose China’s friendly assistance with the EU’s supposed egoism.

A week after the Serbian president’s speech, the first Chinese medical team was personally received on the tarmac at Belgrade’s Nikola Tesla airport by Serbia’s key senior officials and the PRC’s Ambassador to Serbia, Chen Bo. To further court China, President Vučić ‘affectionately kissed the PRC’s flag’; these events were quickly reported by Chinese official media ³⁶ which used the opportunity to denounce the weakness of democratic governance and hail the CCP’s autocratic system. ³⁷

The political framing of these ceremonies did not go unnoticed in the EU. The head of diplomacy, Josep Borrell, warned about the global battle of narratives with China, stating that CCP officials initially covered up the information about the outbreak. Furthermore, Borrell pointed out that it was the EU that had sent medical supplies to help Chinese authorities in the fight against the virus in the critical months of January and February. However, having managed to curb the number of new infections within its borders, China began to send its medical supplies and experts to other countries, as it fought for influence by spinning its ‘politics of generosity’. ³⁸

In fact, when the virus emerged in Wuhan, the EU immediately provided 60 tons of medical supplies to China, discreetly doing so at the request of Chinese officials. ³⁹ This is very much in contrast to the highly publicized Chinese medical help to foreign countries, including Serbia, which centred around ‘welcoming ceremonies’. In the case of the Czech Republic, one can see this ceremony in terms of a political concession from the recipient rather than a spontaneous act of gratitude to China. ⁴⁰

Despite the Serbian leadership’s claim – that Serbia can only count on China – making the headlines, it was not entirely aligned with the facts. One may assume that Vučić’s and other senior Serbian officials’ implied criticism of the EU was likely aimed at putting pressure on both the EU and China, in order to receive financial and material help from the patron’s competitor to fight the virus. This demonstrates how a client can positively exploit its role as well.

This strategy had an immediate impact. Within a week, the EU announced a package of measures to support Serbia, including financial assistance worth €93 million, reiterating the EU’s solidarity with Serbia. ⁴¹ Nonetheless, the general impression in the Western Balkans was that the EU had ‘reluctantly given too little and too late’. ⁴² Indeed, Strahinja Subotić, a political expert at the European Policy Centre in Belgrade, explained that proactivity defines Sino-Serbian cooperation while the EU remains predominantly reactive. ⁴³

This misperception of Chinese vs. EU help has been created, in part, by the aforementioned gestures and pronouncements by a wide range of high-ranking Serbian and Chinese officials. For example, the Serbian Prime Minister, Ana Brnabić in an interview with CCTV, stated that the activities of the Chinese Embassy and Chinese leadership meant that they were Serbia’s sole saviours. ⁴⁴ This false dichotomy was further reinforced by Serbian pro-government media outlets ⁴⁵ and an intense social media campaign, predominantly produced by an army of bots and fake accounts. ⁴⁶ President Vučić himself was also actively using his Instagram account to promote China’s image as Serbia’s most important and dependable international partner during the pandemic state of emergency. ⁴⁷

This narrative, actively co-produced by China and Serbia, was also employed during a ceremony in Belgrade, marking the arrival of a cargo train with medical supplies from Wuhan. The arrival of China’s security transfers at Belgrade’s train station, as was the case with an earlier ceremony, was again used by Serbian authorities to make another set of pronouncements. Prime Minister Brnabić reiterated Serbia’s long-lasting support for the ‘one China policy’, ⁴⁸ proving that the Serbian leadership would not miss an opportunity to reciprocate by promoting the patron’s foreign policy agenda.

To demonstrate its support, Serbia would indeed go to great lengths. In September 2020, the PRC Embassy in Belgrade fiercely condemned an independent daily newspaper, Danas, for posting an article authored by Taiwan’s Foreign Minister Joseph Wu. In the article, Wu argued that Taiwan’s achievements in curbing the COVID-19 pandemic could serve as a role model and should be internationally acknowledged. Furthermore, Wu suggested that this model could be shared in the United Nations, an organization that the PRC has blocked Taiwan from joining. ⁴⁹ In response to the publication, the Chinese Embassy accused ‘Taiwan separatists’ of concocting various excuses to politicize the fight against the pandemic in an attempt to challenge the one-China principle internationally and that the publication of such articles undermined China’s sovereignty and violated international consensus. More importantly, the Chinese side had explicitly laid out its expectations: ‘We also firmly believe that the honest and friendly Serbian people will continue to support the Chinese people in defending their sovereignty and territorial integrity.’ ⁵⁰ Serbia’s Foreign Ministry officially reacted to the publication by stating that the article published by Danas was completely against the policy of Serbia which had lent consistent and principled support to the one-China policy and the territorial integrity of China. ⁵¹ The case of the Danas article demonstrates how Chinese ‘expectations’, which one can equate with an attempt to intervene in another country’s domestic media, were managed by the Serbian authorities. This also serves as another argument that the pandemic response had not created but only helped in strengthening the reciprocal features of the China–Serbia relationship.

What is gained and what is lost in the patron–client relationship vis-a-vis the EU?

In terms of mollifying public opinion, China’s diplomatic offensive, backed by the Serbian authorities and pro-government media, did have a significant impact. It created an impression that it was not the EU but China that primarily helped Serbia during the pandemic, although available data strongly suggest the exact opposite. There are two major sources of the overall ‘pro-Chinese’ narrative dominating the Serbian media landscape: government and state-owned media outlets, and – increasingly important in recent years – Chinese or Chinese-backed media outlets in Serbia. ⁵² At the same time, independent media outlets are marginalized or, as in the case of the aforementioned Danas newspaper, openly denounced by Serbian authorities seemingly attempting to meet China’s expectations concerning the international isolation of Taiwan.

However, as Serbian experts argue, the lack of public awareness about the EU’s actual assistance cannot just be attributed to the Serbian government’s framing of China as a benevolent helper in contrast to the EU’s alleged ineptness or lack of solidarity (as Vučić stated in his mid-March TV conference). This perception among the Serbian general public could also be put down to the weakness of EU public diplomacy as illustrated by its inability to convey its message to the relevant audience. ⁵³

As a result, in an opinion poll conducted by the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (hereafter the Belgrade Centre), almost two-thirds of Serbia’s citizens thought that Serbia should harmonize its foreign policy with Russia and China, while only 13 per cent believed that it should be done with the EU. ⁵⁴ Consequently, as many as 87 per cent of the respondents assessed China’s influence in Serbia as good while a mere 4 per cent saw it as negative, while the EU received 24 per cent and 68 per cent, respectively. ⁵⁵ When asked which country was the largest financial and humanitarian donor to Serbia during the pandemic, 75 per cent of the Belgrade Centre respondents said that it was China, while only 3 per cent thought it to be the EU. ⁵⁶ Therefore one should not be surprised that, in the hierarchy of the most friendly countries, Serbians put China in second place after Russia, an effect largely attributed to the (mis)perception of China’s help during the pandemic, as well as other factors such as rising power status, the non-recognition of Kosovo, and the shared historical memory of NATO’s 1999 bombings. ⁵⁷

A slightly different picture of the EU was presented in the Central European Institute of Asian Studies survey, which was also conducted between September and October 2020. The majority of respondents thought that China had helped Serbia during the pandemic (80 per cent), while only 50 per cent thought the same about the EU. ⁵⁸ Moreover, as in the Belgrade Centre survey, around two-thirds of Serbs thought that Serbia’s foreign policy should be aligned with China, though – contrary to the former poll – the EU was seen as an almost equally important partner. ⁵⁹ The Central European Institute of Asian Studies survey also revealed that China’s image among Serbia’s population had improved in the previous three years, an opinion most attributable to the abovementioned misperception of COVID-19 aid. ⁶⁰

However, there are still considerable downsides to this patron–client relationship. While ties to China have helped Serbia to strengthen its influence in the Western Balkans and beyond, as discussed in the final section, it may also undermine Serbia’s credibility vis-a-vis the EU, an organization that Serbia still wants to join.

The immediate results of China’s pandemic cooperation with Serbia were reflected in the declaration that concluded the EU–Western Balkans Zagreb Summit on May 6, 2020. Although the document did not mention China explicitly, one can clearly infer that the PRC’s conduct in the Western Balkans is of key concern to the EU. Primarily, the document pointed out that the EU had very swiftly ‘mobilized a package of over EUR 3.3 billion to the benefit of the Western Balkans’. It also emphasized, ‘The ongoing pandemic demonstrates how the EU and the Western Balkans together are tackling common challenges. This cooperation includes joint procurement and the unrestricted trade-flow of protective personal equipment’ (bold in the original). ⁶¹

The Zagreb summit declaration also stated, ‘The fact that this support [that of the EU] and cooperation goes far beyond what any other partner [that is, China] has provided to the region deserves public acknowledgement’ (bold in the original). ⁶² These remarks from the declaration implicitly refer to the position taken by Serbia’s senior leaders that Europe is unresponsive to the country’s needs, and they have used the media, state ceremonies, and public spaces to express their profound gratitude to China. The Zagreb Declaration pertaining to growing Serbia–China ties called on the EU and the Balkan states to reinforce ‘cooperation on addressing disinformation and other hybrid activities originating in particular from third-state actors which sought to undermine the European perspective of the region’. ⁶³ A key premise of the declaration was a reference to a concerted social media campaign to create a narrative of the Sino-Serbian steel-like friendship, hailing the Serbian authorities’ effective response and China’s assistance, while criticizing the lack thereof from the EU.

Emulating vaccine diplomacy: How the client turns its relationship with the patron to its own advantage

As pointed out by President Vučić, Serbia had accepted ‘the Chinese model’ in its approach to contain COVID-19. ⁶⁴ In terms of the establishment of the patron’s ‘long-term voice’ in the client’s health security sector, one has to note that apart from the massive transfers of medical equipment, China has provided medical expertise to support Serbia’s fight against the coronavirus and it has established two COVID-19 testing laboratories in Serbia. ⁶⁵ However, with regard to the establishment of a long-term involvement in Serbia’s health security, the most notable development in China–Serbia cooperation was the agreement on the opening of the Sinopharm vaccine factory. The facility constructed under a joint agreement with the United Arab Emirates was, according to President Vučić, not only intended to secure vaccines for Serbia’s citizens but for the entire region of the Western Balkans. ⁶⁶

Since January 2021, the PRC has conducted a worldwide campaign to deliver vaccines, both in the form of commercial transfers and donations. By the beginning of December 2022, China had sold 1.853 billion doses, donated 328 million and delivered 1.653 billion doses, and it became Serbia’s principal source of vaccines. Yet among the massive 4.2 million doses provided by Chinese producers, a mere 0.2 million were donated, thus revealing the patron’s commercial interest. ⁶⁷

In terms of achieving Beijing’s political goals, this was essentially a continuation of ‘mask diplomacy’, initiated in early 2020. In both cases, an important premise is China’s domestic and foreign policy considerations vis-a-vis the United States and the EU: covering up mistakes made during the initial stages of the pandemic, repurposing (through welcoming ceremonies) the gratitude of the receiving countries for internal political purposes, and the PRC’s ‘systemic rivalry’ in management crisis with liberal democracies. Apart from presenting medical help as proof of what China perceives as the supreme effectiveness of its authoritarian model over the EU in the Western Balkans, China has used massive vaccine deliveries to replace Russia as Serbia’s most important partner from the East.

During the course of the pandemic crisis, Serbia’s own version of vaccine diplomacy was of particular importance. It aimed at improving its international image, restoring economic markets, and more importantly, supporting its claims of regional leadership in the Western Balkans as well as strengthening the diplomatic isolation of Kosovo. For example, during the ceremony of handing over a mere 5000 vaccine doses in the Bosnian capital of Sarajevo, President Vučić assured the assembled media outlets that he was able to deliver ‘whatever vaccine’ the neighbouring countries needed, ⁶⁸ projecting himself as the ‘patron’ of the region. However, due to the low availability of vaccines in the Western Balkans at the time and the late start of the vaccine drive in Kosovo (under the Covax programme), one may assume that such gestures would still translate into strengthening the regional influence of Serbia. Even critics of the increasingly authoritarian President Vučić admitted that the pace and progress of obtaining vaccines from various sources had, to a certain extent, justified Serbia’s multi-vector foreign policy. ⁶⁹

Thanks to its Chinese patron, Serbia conducted its own vaccine diplomacy not only in its immediate neighbourhood but also with several countries in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. Outside of the Balkans, Serbia’s ‘generosity’ was available only to countries that did not recognize Kosovo; another aim of the vaccine diplomacy could have also been the re-establishment of some of the markets for Serbia’s defence industry products, which were lost after the collapse of Yugoslavia. ⁷⁰ This was possible due to the large quantities of China’s Sinopharm vaccines, which provided Serbia with a surplus of vaccines from other manufacturers, from Russia and the West, which in turn could be utilized by Serbia in the international arena.

Interestingly, as Vučić himself admitted, the Chinese vaccines were banned from being donated to third-party countries, and as such, were excluded from Serbia’s regional and global diplomatic offensive orchestrated around the redistribution of vaccines. There was speculation that the Sinopharm vaccines, to be produced in Serbia, would be excluded from the patron’s ban on third-party exports. According to Vuk Vuksanović, this was not a likely scenario, because the primary purpose of this endeavour is commercial, to penetrate markets in both the EU and the Balkans. ⁷¹

On the other hand, due to the abundant supplies of Chinese vaccines for its own citizens, Serbia also started a campaign of inviting residents of neighbouring countries for vaccinations, promoting itself as a regional centre for COVID-19. ⁷² Apart from the average citizen, this ‘vaccine tourism’ also targeted opinion-makers. For example, over 100 North Macedonian journalists travelled by bus and were vaccinated with AstraZeneca doses in Vranje, southern Serbia. The vaccination campaign was coordinated by the journalists’ associations of both countries and was supported by the office of President Vučić. ⁷³ Serbia’s leader also scored political points in its vaccine diplomacy. The United Nations praised Serbia for vaccinating refugees and asylum seekers. ⁷⁴ These examples demonstrate how the client, in lower-threat scenarios, can work the relationship with the patron to its own ends, with results transcending the bilateral dynamics of the relationship without contradicting the patron’s political goals and economic interests.

Conclusions

Drawing from the theoretical framework of patron–client ties, this article used a case study approach to examine the role of great powers, the pandemic, and smaller states in international relations. The analysis revealed three defining elements of this type of relationship: asymmetry, reciprocity and affectivity. Based on the threefold definition, the article examined China–Serbia pandemic cooperation.

Firstly, the asymmetry of potential in the fight against COVID-19 and its accompanying transfers of medical help from China to Serbia: from medical equipment (test kits, personal protective equipment, and ventilators) in 2020 to massive deliveries of vaccines in 2021. This was matched with the establishment of China’s long-term voice in Serbia’s health security sector whereby Chinese medical experts were sent to guide Serbia’s anti-pandemic management, train medical staff, and establish COVID-19 testing laboratories as well as mask production facilities. There was also an agreement to build a Chinese Sinopharm vaccine factory on Serbian soil.

Secondly, Serbia reciprocated by amplifying the narratives on the perceived advantages of the Chinese political system over Western democracies, which were presented on numerous occasions by senior Serbian officials and government-controlled media. During such events, the EU was singled out as an entity unable to effectively respond to the COVID-19 pandemic and unable to provide Serbia with indispensable and timely help during the crisis.

Thirdly, in terms of perceptual dimension and affectivity, the Sino-Serbian patron–client relationship has been from the very start of their health security cooperation supported by political pronouncements emphasizing the critical ideational cohesion between the two states, bound by the NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999. This dramatic incident, the memory of which is nurtured and regularly foregrounded by Chinese and Serbian officials, has become an underlying theme of bilateral cooperation from the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. The existence of this affective binding, a crucial element of the patron–client model, means that the China–Serbia relationship differs from other examples of China’s pandemic cooperation with European partners at this critical juncture, as countries around the world compete for strategic resources.

In terms of the goals achieved by the two countries in this patron–client relationship, China has strengthened its influence on public opinion in Serbia, distorting perception mainly at the cost of the EU (contrary to an increasingly negative evaluation of China’s management of the pandemic across EU countries). This example proves that during a crisis such as a pandemic, the patron can use the client to demonstrate its ‘systemic advantages’ over its main competitors. Indeed, both in propagandist and practical terms, the EU has failed to keep up with China in delivering COVID-19 aid to Serbia and the Western Balkans in general. The EU’s failing in this matter has presumably further promoted the perception of the effectiveness of the Chinese authoritarian model as compared to liberal democracies.

Moreover, China has secured economic opportunities, such as those directly related to COVID-19 cooperation, including massive sales of medical equipment and Chinese-made vaccines. In this regard, China is seemingly creating a long-term stake in Serbia’s health security sector by establishing laboratories and a vaccine factory on the client’s soil. Last but not least, Serbia has reciprocated with staunch diplomatic and political support for issues of major concern to Beijing, including Taiwan and the one-China policy, as well as policies regarding Xinjiang and Hong Kong.

On the other side of the spectrum, by standing with its Chinese patron, Serbia has managed to secure medical aid (both in the form of donations and commercial transfers) which allowed it to keep the pandemic under control and sustain economic growth at a time of global competition for critical resources and a worldwide economic slowdown. This is despite the fact, that as the Chinese side itself has revealed, the made-in-China vaccines have lower efficacy than those from Western producers. ⁷⁵ However, thanks to the PRC, Serbia’s principal provider of vaccines, the Balkan state has been able to pursue its own vaccine diplomacy both on a regional and global scale. Therefore the practice of Sino-Serbian pandemic cooperation points to the less obvious effects of patron–client relations between the two countries: the client uses the patron to secure its ‘economic development, regional leadership, and international prestige’, and thus to a large extent, appears to be the primary beneficiary of this type of relations.

The case of Serbia demonstrates how a client can utilize or even steer the relationship with the patron for its own needs. For this reason, the client adjusts its narratives regarding a particular area of cooperation to the patron’s expectations. However, once the goal (e.g. Serbia’s health security) is attained, the motivation to meet the patron’s expectations decreases, as can the intensity of affectivity. Nonetheless, since patronal relationships cannot be analysed without their regional or global context, one can infer that deepening this type of ties can expose both the patron and the client to the risk of alienating relations with other partners and competitors.

The pattern of relations that we observed between the PRC and Serbia in many ways resembles China’s exchanges with other partners, especially low- and middle-income countries. Though it is beyond the scope of this article to evaluate to what extent these exchanges contain patron–client characteristics, China has clearly managed to forge stronger ideational binding with many partners through COVID-19 assistance programmes. In fact, the PRC has used the pandemic as an effective springboard to foster meaningful friendships (with an emphasis on reciprocity), promoted its narratives and own vision of the international world order (‘community with a shared future for humankind’), and filled a vacuum caused by the perceived lack of solidarity from the West. ⁷⁶ This is especially the case with those countries with authoritarian tendencies that enjoyed strong political and economic relations with China before the outbreak of the pandemic. ⁷⁷

Last but not least, the analysis of Sino-Serbian ties demonstrates the continuing relevance of the patron–client model in contemporary international relations. It is a dynamic and mutually beneficial model, with the self-regulating principles of reciprocity and informality as two of its key elements. In this regard, this kind of relationship is closer to the relational realm of China’s foreign policy, a preferred but not always achievable mode of conduct with foreign countries. Therefore, future research can validate the findings of this analysis by comparing other close partnerships which China forges with small states.